An “America First” Tech Stack Cannot Be America Alone

Commentary by Stephan Lang

Published January 15, 2026

In the coming weeks, the Trump administration will send important signals on the future of international collaboration in building trusted information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure around the world. With the December 13 deadline for comments on the Commerce Department's request for information on the administration's American AI Exports Program now passed, it will soon be time to announce how the federal government will structure the program to promote a U.S. AI stack. In that announcement, it will be critical to show that the United States is committed to working across the entire tech stack with like-minded partners and allies, bringing real resources to promote a shared approach to technology that strengthens democracy and supports basic human rights.

The United States' main competitor in the tech race, China, has a completely different approach to technology. Through tools like its National Intelligence Law, Beijing exercises control over its tech industry that grants it unrestrained access to the data of its citizens and any companies or consumers whose data Chinese firms can access. Its intelligence service aggressively collects vast amounts of data and recklessly invades critical infrastructure networks around the world. Advances in artificial intelligence and quantum computing will only supercharge China's ability to amass, decrypt, and analyze the data it collects globally. Its Great Firewall and aggressive censorship leverage technology to exercise authoritarian controls on speech and assembly online, crushing any hint of political dissent. As Chinese technology infrastructure companies succeed in marketing their products around the world, they will not only spread systems with these capabilities baked into the hardware, but also normalize Beijing's approach to using technology as a tool for social control and the restriction of fundamental freedoms. This is not only an existential threat to U.S. national security, economic prosperity, and political influence globally-it also puts U.S. values and way of life at risk.

We've seen China's successful strategy for market dominance play out before with sometimes devastating consequences for U.S. influence and interests. One prominent example was the race to build 5G cellular infrastructure. The Chinese government invested heavily in support for its domestic champions, Huawei and ZTE, to compete in markets around the world. By limiting competition within China, Beijing gave the two companies an enormous captive market-China has more than four times as many mobile users as the United States-that enabled the Chinese champions to scale and subsidize their offerings in markets overseas. According to industry sources, Huawei is the leading telecom equipment provider globally, even excluding the China market, despite the United States' active and persistent campaign to raise awareness about the security risks of Chinese vendors.

We see China now deploying the same playbook in other sectors, like cloud services, where Chinese providers, including Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei, are making major investments and utilizing aggressive and sometimes questionable business tactics in markets from Latin America to Southeast Asia and the Middle East. We can expect the same in low-Earth orbit satellite broadband services, where Beijing is strongly supporting its champions Qianfan and Guowang. Qianfan has reportedly clinched deals already with Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, and Kazakhstan, and is in talks with dozens of other countries.

As the Trump administration prepares to further define the American AI Exports Program, it will send key signals on its strategy for tech competition with China over the long term. The first signal the administration sends will be through what it includes in the AI stack it seeks to promote. It will be important to define that stack as broadly as possible to include all elements of the ICT ecosystem required to build competitive AI models and applications. This should include not just U.S. AI models, the chips required to build them, and the data centers necessary for training and inference. It should also include the telecommunications and broadband infrastructure needed to carry the data they rely on and to deliver applications to customers-from subsea cables to advanced wireless networks and satellite broadband. In addition, the program should define the stack in a way that captures a wide variety of applications and use cases that AI powers, like cloud services, smart cities, and the Internet of Things. All of these sectors are critical areas of strategic competition with China and essential to Beijing's strategy to export its tech ecosystem and its approach to technology globally. A sound strategy to meet China's global press will need to be as comprehensive as possible in promoting the entire tech stack produced by the United States and its partners.

The second important signal the administration sends will be how it incorporates non-U.S. companies based in allied and like-minded countries. The United States is the dominant tech power among its allies and partners. However, success in competition is not assured and is far less likely without collaboration and support from the United States' friends around the world. China has structural advantages that can best be countered with allied help. Market size gives China immense capacity to subsidize its companies' exports. To prevent a replay of the scenario where China has used the size of its market to gain advantage in 5G and wireless network equipment, the United States should work with partners to create market scale that can enable effective competition.

The United States also needs partners and allies to overcome the bottlenecks in supply chains that China controls and to leverage other supply choke points against it. China has shown in recent years how its control over many critical minerals enables it to pressure the United States and allies. The United States will need those partners to tap new sources of those essential inputs in the short to medium term while it further reinvigorates U.S. supply chains. Conversely, the United States needs partners like Taiwan, Japan, and the Netherlands to effectively leverage collectively controlled choke points in semiconductor design and manufacturing and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. The United States also needs partners to help it fill gaps in the tech stack where capacity is lacking. Most notably, the United States must continue working with firms like Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung to meet demand for trusted supply in advanced wireless network equipment. Facilitating collaboration with firms like these and like-minded governments in the American AI Exports Program will be essential to the success of administration efforts to promote U.S. technological competitiveness.

Many in industry, academia, and the technical community have recognized the need for such collaboration in advancing U.S. tech priorities, building trusted ICT infrastructure, and ensuring that technology advances freedom instead of stifling it. The Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy's recently launched Global Trusted Tech Network is a useful example of how stakeholders can come together to strengthen cooperation to build ICT infrastructure that is trustworthy, secure, and anchored in shared principles. The administration's new Pax Silica is also an excellent step in delivering the message that the United States values and will continue to build global partnerships as it pursues technological competitiveness and shared economic security. These kinds of initiatives are all the more important as some in Europe and other longtime U.S. partners promulgate the concept of "digital sovereignty" as they advocate for building a tech ecosystem that is less dependent on U.S. firms. It's critical that the United States respond to such tendencies by doubling down on building like-minded partnerships that underpin a common tech future grounded in shared values.

However, there are also concerning signs that the administration may be more interested in going it alone when it comes to strengthening the U.S. tech innovation ecosystem. The December 22 decision by the Federal Communications Commission to add uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components from any foreign producer to its "Covered List" of communications products that are prohibited from being imported into the United States sets a concerning precedent. All other prohibited items on the list are produced by specific Chinese or Russian companies. With a few specific exceptions, this troubling prohibition, in contrast, applies to aerial drones and drone critical components from any foreign supplier, even from the United States' closest allies and partners.

The final signal will be sent through the level of concrete support the administration puts behind the American AI Exports Program. As the new National Security Strategy suggests, concerted and persistent advocacy for U.S. companies will be an important and useful part of the program. But to ensure victory against China's tech champions, the administration should provide concrete support through export financing and foreign assistance. As efforts to promote trusted ICT infrastructure globally since the Clean Networks program of the first Trump administration have shown, current financing options through the U.S. Export-Import Bank and Development Finance Corporation have been insufficient. They have not made a significant difference in the race to sell ICT infrastructure in third-country markets. These programs need to be redesigned from the bottom up and well resourced to make sure they can nimbly provide financing to projects that might otherwise not happen at rates that will make a real difference to buyers.

In addition, the administration's comprehensive review of foreign economic development programs provides an opportunity to direct more significant resources toward activities that will promote U.S. technology in low-income, middle-ground countries that will yield a greater impact and return on investment. Using federal government funding to enable U.S. firms to more effectively compete with China in markets that would otherwise be lost is a good deal for taxpayers. It can create jobs in the United States, help open new markets to U.S. firms, increase U.S. influence, and strengthen U.S. national security by bringing more countries into the American tech ecosystem. Such activities could take a variety of forms, such as satellite and other connectivity projects for schools in remote areas, assistance to low-income countries seeking to move government services to the cloud, or support for upgrading technology in ports, to name just a few. Capacity building for government officials should also be a priority and can directly increase understanding of and support for U.S approaches to tech policy. The United States has a powerful tool in the U.S. Telecommunications Training Institute, an industry-led training provider that has a strong track record in offering capacity building to foreign regulators around the world on top priority issues for U.S. industry interests. This work can advance a wide range of U.S. interests all while providing support to this essential pillar of economic development with real potential to raise standards of living and lift people out of poverty.

Tech competitiveness is now equivalent to U.S. national security and economic strength. The United States' continued leadership across tech sectors is essential to its global influence, security, standard of living, and democratic way of life. A powerful engine for innovation at home is not enough to keep pace with China in the global arena. To preserve the advantage the U.S. tech ecosystem brings, the United States needs to bring its best game across the entire tech stack, leveraging its powerful network of alliances and deploying concrete resources to give U.S. businesses and their partners their best shot at overcoming China's challenge. This is possible with the administration's commitment and leadership-framing the American AI Export Program the right way will be a good start to meeting this existential challenge.

Ambassador (ret.) Steve Lang is a non-resident senior associate with the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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