From a Question of Belief to a Question of Security

By Sigurd Grytten

An under-communicated aspect of the climate debate is that, for the ordinary person, it has always been a question of belief. To verify whether the conclusions of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are correct, you need advanced scientific training in climate science. Very few people possess this expertise. For the rest of us, climate change therefore becomes a matter of belief: Do we trust what science tells us about the relationship between burning oil and gas and a warming climate? And do we believe the researchers who describe the consequences of climate change? Many people do not.

Across the West, we have seen declining trust in science, the media and public authorities. In an increasingly polarised political landscape, universities and researchers have, for one side of the divide, become part of an out-of-touch elite. US surveys show a persistent partisan divide in both trust in scientists and attitudes towards universities. Ninety per cent of Democrats say they have at least a fair amount of confidence in scientists, compared with 65 percent of Republicans. We are seeing elements of the same development in Europe, where voters who support far-right parties are particularly sceptical of science.

Social media reinforces this trend by creating parallel realities. It is true that social media have been extraordinarily democratising. But we have also seen a democratisation of truth: a public sphere in which everyone is entitled to their own truth. This represents an extreme form of individualisation. In this public sphere, fewer people believe in science and, consequently, fewer believe in climate change.

As a result, climate and energy policy are becoming part of the broader culture war. Wind power, electric cars and, not least, electric bicycles become political and cultural symbols. Whether you prefer an electric car or a large pick-up truck becomes a question of identity.

For a long time, climate change has been the principal argument for expanding renewable energy. That will have to change as fewer people believe in climate change. My prediction is that renewable energy will increasingly be legitimised in terms of energy security rather than climate-at least in regions that are not self-sufficient in oil and gas.

In a more regionalised world characterised by growing protectionism, the United States, Russia and the Middle East are net exporters of oil and gas, while Europe, India and China remain heavily dependent on imports.

China invested USD 625 billion in clean energy in 2024, twice as much as in 2015. In the EU, clean-energy investment was expected to reach around USD 390 billion in 2025. The IEA estimates that around 70 per cent of the growth in global energy-transition investment between 2020 and 2025 came from countries that are net importers of fossil fuels. The IEA explicitly points to China's efforts to reduce its dependence on oil and gas imports, Europe's response to the loss of Russian gas supplies and India's investment in solar power.

We will therefore see renewable energy in Europe increasingly legitimised as a means of reducing dependence on Trump, Putin and Iran. Energy policy will consequently move out of the climate debate and into a broader debate about geopolitics, defence and security. This will also change the political dividing lines, as the far right is forced to defend a position leaving their nations dependent on oil and gas production in the Middle East. Energy policy will increasingly become a question of national security and national sovereignty.

For renewable energy companies, this creates an additional political argument for investment. Energy produced in Europe can both reduce emissions and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels. But energy security also depends on where the technology and materials come from. Companies will increasingly need to explain how their projects contribute to both the energy transition and security of supply.

The same concern about dependence extends beyond energy. The EU's Clean Industrial Deal and proposed Industrial Accelerator Act reflect a broader effort to combine decarbonisation with stronger European production and economic security. "Made in Europe" is becoming a political priority in strategic sectors. Climate goals remain important, but are increasingly linked to questions of competitiveness and Europe's ability to act independently.

For companies already operating in Europe, and for those considering investing or establishing themselves here, this should inform decisions about production, suppliers and partnerships.

My prediction is that companies' contribution to European security and independence will carry greater weight. They will need a credible account of what they produce, the capacity they build and especially the continuity and security of supply they provide. And, not at least, of which dependencies their investments reduce or create.

For renewable energy companies, this creates a stronger strategic and political case for investment. Energy produced in Europe can both reduce emissions and strengthen energy security by limiting dependence on imported fossil fuels. But security of supply is not simply about where energy is generated. It also depends on where technologies are manufactured, where critical materials are sourced and how resilient supply chains are. Companies must therefore demonstrate not only how their projects advance the energy transition, but also how they strengthen Europe's long-term energy security and resilience.

This shift extends well beyond the energy sector. The EU's Clean Industrial Deal and proposed Industrial Accelerator Act reflect a broader ambition to align decarbonisation with industrial competitiveness, European production capacity and economic security. "Made in Europe" is becoming a political priority in strategic sectors. Climate goals remain important, but are increasingly linked to questions of competitiveness and Europe's ability to act independently.

For companies operating in Europe, or considering entering the market, these priorities can no longer be treated as external political considerations. They must inform core business decisions, from where to invest and produce to how supply chains are structured and which partnerships are established.

Looking ahead, a company's contribution to European resilience and strategic autonomy is set to become an increasingly important part of its licence to operate and grow. It will no longer be enough to demonstrate the economic and environmental value of an investment. Companies will also need to articulate the industrial capacity they create, the security and continuity of supply they provide, and, crucially, which dependencies they help Europe reduce - or risk creating.

The strategic question is shifting from what companies contribute to Europe's green transition to what they contribute to Europe's ability to stand on its own.