Who Controls the Wrench: The Debate Over the “Right to Repair”

Critical Questions by Jerry McGinn and Audrey Aldisert

Published November 6, 2025

Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll delivered a fiery speech at this year's Association for the U.S. Army annual convention. He ridiculed the cumbersome Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition system, its slow pace of innovation, and poor integration of cutting-edge commercial technologies. He also highlighted an issue that is at the center of current debates on the FY 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA): The right to repair.

To illustrate the problem, Secretary Driscoll held up an Army-made prototype of a fin for a UH-60 Black Hawk's external fuel tank. The vendor charges $14,000 for a replacement, but in just 43 days, after 3D scans and reverse engineering, his team printed the prototype for $3,000. "Ours is 300 percent stronger and 78 percent cheaper," Driscoll claimed. Although the right to repair may seem like a straightforward solution, it is complicated by intellectual property (IP) issues concerning the equipment produced by companies and maintained by the military services. This issue equally impacts companies of all shapes and sizes, from traditional prime contractors to private capital-backed new entrants.

Q1: What is the right to repair?

A1: The idea is relatively simple: When the DOD purchases equipment or a weapons system, the government and the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) negotiate technical data rights in the contract to keep systems "functional, sustainable, upgradable, and affordable." DOD policy traditionally emphasized commercial technical data rights, and acquisition rules encouraged the DOD to maximize contractor-provided long-term logistics support, largely outsourcing the problem. This meant the vendor, or the OEM, often controlled access to technical data required to repair an item in operational use. In recent years, however, the DOD and Congress have changed their thinking on this issue, leading to this debate over what has been dubbed the "right to repair."

Q2: What is the relationship between the right to repair and IP rights?

A2: The right to repair is all about IP rights. Access to IP is often needed when repairing or maintaining military equipment. When the DOD wants to repair end items in-house or for a lower cost, data rights can pose a challenge. For example, an Army helicopter program wanted to organically sustain its rotor blades, and the OEM responded with a $990 million price for the necessary technical data. An Army unmanned aerial vehicle program tried to do depot-level maintenance and repair analysis, and the contractor quoted $2 billion for the necessary technical data.

This becomes particularly challenging when equipment or weapons systems break overseas and there are no available maintainers or authorized third-party repair contractors in theater. Equipment then has to be shipped back to the United States, or the armed services must wait for the OEM to transport contractors to theater.

There are several types of data rights, including unlimited rights, government purpose rights (that convert to unlimited rights in five years), limited rights, restricted rights, and specially negotiated rights. These rights are determined in the acquisition process and finalized in the contract for each respective program.

The military services or a third party usually require access to significant amounts of detailed technical data, often afforded through unlimited or government purpose rights, to upgrade or sustain an item. The U.S. Air Force's C-130J and KC-46, for example, are commercial derivative aircraft of the C-130 and 767, respectively. The U.S. Air Force has limited data rights, therefore making it difficult to upgrade and sustain the AC-130J, MC-130J, and KC-46. In other cases, the government missed that the data rights were incorrectly labeled or did not put the technical data as a contract deliverable.

Both the DOD and industry can benefit, however, with appropriately defined, labelled, and delivered technical data rights.

Q3: Why is it a problem if the government doesn't have sufficient IP rights?

A3: If the government does not have sufficient IP rights for a system, it cannot repair its own property. This can make repair work less efficient, given that the DOD is subjected to contractor timelines and pricing, even if the fix is small and service members can manage it themselves.

There are numerous examples. For instance, the right to repair issue complicates sustainment procedures for the F-35, particularly affecting the program's long-term affordability due to the DOD's lack of IP ownership. Although the Government Accountability Office recommended in 2014 that the DOD develop a long-term IP strategy for the F-35, the issue remains open. A similar challenge arose with the Army's Stryker family of vehicles: The Army did not purchase the necessary data rights during the initial acquisition, and as a result, it later could not repair, modify, or competitively source parts for the vehicles, undermining cost savings and limiting sustainment flexibility. The right to repair can impact equipment as commonplace as generators and safety clips, requiring the government to pursue risky or expensive measures for what should otherwise be straightforward fixes. Over the last decade, at Congress's direction, the DOD has been more proactive in planning for the IP it would need in sustainment and negotiating for licenses in the early stages of a weapon's acquisition.

Q4: What are the pros and cons of the government having the right to repair?

A4: Sustainment accounts for roughly 70 percent of the total cost of a weapon system. If the government has sufficient IP rights, it can introduce greater competition for maintenance and sustainment contracts, reducing costs and mitigating reliance on a single vendor, commonly referred to as "vendor lock." This aligns with efforts to promote second sourcing-a strategy intended to create alternative suppliers and drive affordability. Previous efforts on second sourcing by the U.S. Navy and Air Force on missiles in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, led to significant cost savings and reliability improvements. Similarly, if the government has the right to repair, it expedites the ability for the military to work on systems when they have the requisite technical expertise.

Forcing OEMs, on the other hand, to transfer parts, tools, and information to third-party contractors may disincentivize industry from investing in research and development (R&D) if they believe their hard-earned innovations could be given away. That third party, in turn, may be able to perform the same repair work for less, without having borne the upfront R&D cost. This approach, dubbed the leader-follower model in the 1980s, proved very controversial.

Q5: What responsibilities would the government assume if it had the right to repair?

A5: Three major responsibilities would fall to the government under the right to repair. First, the government would need to expand its capacity and capability to repair certain systems that contractors were previously maintaining. This includes the skills required to keep the IP itself up to date, especially digital artifacts and software. The government should be realistic about what sustainment it can feasibly do. Otherwise, the DOD would need to rely on the OEM-or a competitor.

Second, the DOD lacks a centralized digital repository in which IP can be accessed across the armed services. Without such infrastructure, the government cannot maximize its purchase of IP because it is unable to efficiently store it, manage it, access it, and therefore, use it. This is not a new problem for the DOD, and in the past has led to multiple services buying the same IP because they are unaware that it has already been purchased.

Third, if the government or a third party assumes the responsibility to repair or otherwise modify the original weapon system, the onus of safety and reliability falls to the DOD. Excluding scenarios where a system is designed with a modular open system architecture and components are intended to be removed and replaced, the DOD must ensure changes to the item do not adversely affect its configuration, operation, or sustainment.

Q6: How does the right to repair impact companies in the industrial base?

A6: The right to repair impacts all prime contractors-traditional firms as well as private capital-backed firms-that develop systems or provide software to the DOD. Investors and shareholders argue that if the firms they back are forced to give away their IP, the value of that IP will be lost, and, by extension, their investment will be diluted.

When the government mirrors commercial IP practices that grant rights to IP based on who funded its development, it gives companies confidence to invest in R&D and bring cutting-edge technology to the Pentagon. When it does not, it can disincentivize innovation and the desire to sell to the government.

Q7: What are the alternative approaches to "right to repair" in the Senate and House versions of the 2027 NDAA currently in conference?

A7: The Senate-passed version of the NDAA includes a section that proposes a new concept called "instructions for continued operational readiness" (ICOR) to enable the right to repair. This ICOR proposal, which exempts commercial items, is based on the Federal Aviation Administration's Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). The purpose of the ICA is to "support an operator's responsibility for maintaining airworthiness." Some in industry argue that ICOA could force contractors to pass proprietary technical data and IP to the government, which it could use for its own purposes or provide to third-party vendors.

The House-passed version of the NDAA also has a proposal for right to repair, mandating contractors to provide the DOD "fair and reasonable access to all repair materials, including parts, tools, and information, used to diagnose, analyze, maintain, or repair the good or service." In this case, "fair and reasonable" is defined along the lines of the price, terms, and conditions that OEMs offer to resellers or distributors. The House version also includes a data-as-a-service provision, which allows the government to pay for just the technical data or software that it uses. In other words, the DOD has access to all technical data and software necessary for platform sustainment but pays per use for repairs or to produce a part. This allows the DOD to have access to the OEM's most recent version of the IP, and the OEM enjoys a reliable revenue stream without disclosure of its IP to competitors.

A separate bill that Senators Elizabeth Warren and Tim Sheey introduced, the Warrior Right to Repair Act of 2025, is similar to the House version.

Importantly, these bills have broad application. Exempting commercial items, these rules of IP transfer would apply just as much to software and drone technology as to tanks and other traditional hardware.

The right to repair reflects a broader debate to balance military readiness with industry incentives. Granting the government greater access to IP can strengthen competition and improve the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of sustainment. Directing the sharing of IP without compensation, however, risks disincentivizing companies to do business with the DOD. A balanced approach-one that safeguards innovation while giving the services the flexibility to repair their systems more efficiently-is essential for operational readiness and industrial preparedness.

Jerry McGinn is director of the Center for the Industrial Base and senior fellow with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Audrey Aldisert is a research associate with the Center for the Industrial Base at CSIS.

The authors wish to thank Alexis Lasselle Ross and Chris Michienzi for their thoughtful feedback.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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