01/14/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 01/14/2026 15:56
Photo: Kiyoshi Ota/Getty Images
Critical Questions by Kristi Govella and Yuko Nakano
Published January 14, 2026
On January 14, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi informed ruling coalition officials of her intention to dissolve the lower house of the Japanese parliament, setting in motion preparation for an early general election. This decision comes at a time when Japan faces intensifying tensions with China and challenges in its relationship with the United States, as well as difficult economic and social issues at home. The election will be critical for Takaichi and her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as they attempt to strengthen their position in the lower house and gain a mandate for their policy moving forward.
Q1: What is the status of Takaichi's decision and what would an early election timeline look like?
A1: Since Takaichi assumed office last October, there has been consistent speculation that she would call a snap election to solidify her political footing, particularly in light of her very high approval ratings. However, until now, Takaichi has repeatedly stressed that her priority is implementing her policy agenda. At her New Year's press conference, for example, she highlighted her efforts to boost economic growth through "responsible and proactive public finances" to enable strategic investments aimed at enhancing Japan's resilience and security. Therefore, it was widely expected that the government would focus on passing the 2026 budget before the end of the current fiscal year in March. Although rumors that she was considering dissolving the lower house intensified this week, few within her own party appeared to have anticipated Takaichi's decision.
Takaichi has yet to formally announce or explain this decision, partly to avoid overshadowing this week's high-profile visits by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. She is expected to lay out her plans on January 19 and then to dissolve the lower house after it convenes on January 23, with election day likely set for February 8 or 15. LDP Secretary-General Shunichi Suzuki has suggested that the benchmark for victory is retaining the ruling coalition's majority, while others contend that the party should aim to reclaim a majority on its own.
Q2: Why did Takaichi decide to call an early election?
A2: Takaichi hopes to translate her personal popularity into electoral gains for the LDP. According to some polls, her approval ratings are as high as 78 percent at the moment-an extraordinary level for Japanese politics. Takaichi inherited a minority government after the previous LDP-Komeito coalition lost control of both houses in the national elections over the past two years, forcing the LDP to rely on cooperation with other parties. The general election is likely to be framed as a referendum on the LDP's new coalition with the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), formed after its long-standing partner Komeito exited the coalition last fall. With the cooperation of several independent lawmakers, this new LDP-JIP coalition holds a majority in the lower house by only a single seat.
However, a snap election is a calculated risk. Despite Takaichi's popularity, support for the LDP as a party remains in the 30 percent range, reflecting ongoing public concerns. Additionally, if the public perceives that Takaichi is prioritizing politics over policy, this could have negative effects at the ballot box. Opposition parties, including the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP)-which previously agreed to cooperate with the LDP on the timely passage of the budget-have already begun criticizing Takaichi's decision as putting economic priorities on the back burner. The opposition parties themselves are discussing potential strategies for campaign coordination, but their approval ratings are very low and they also face many challenges. Japan's political situation continues to be very fluid as parties redefine their relationships to one another.
Q3: What are the implications for Japanese politics and foreign policy?
A3: The stakes of this election are high. Takaichi's government has an ambitious agenda planned, including revising Japan's three key national security-related documents by the end of this year, accelerating defense spending, and dealing with economic issues such as inflation. Although the LDP-led coalition would remain in the minority in the upper house, securing an outright majority in the more powerful lower house would ease the legislative process and enable Takaichi to take a stronger leadership role on difficult domestic and foreign policy issues. With no national election scheduled for the upper house until 2028, this would be a significant advantage, giving the Takaichi administration more scope to take a long-term strategic approach.
Nonetheless, the risks are also significant. Losing additional seats in an election would leave the LDP searching for additional partners to maintain control of the lower house and make the negotiation and decisionmaking process even more complex than it is now. Even maintaining the current political status quo would likely sap momentum and support for Takaichi's policy agenda and could potentially weaken her credibility on the international stage. Regardless of the outcome, this election will have important consequences for the future of Japanese leadership at home and abroad.
Kristi Govella is senior adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and associate professor of Japanese politics and international relations at the University of Oxford. Yuko Nakano is a fellow with the Japan Chair and associate director of the U.S.-Japan Strategic Leadership Program at CSIS.
Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2026 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
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