NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

05/19/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 05/20/2026 04:00

Joint press conference

Admiral Giuseppe CAVO DRAGONE

Good afternoon, thank you for being here.

NATO's highest Military Authorities are meeting today to face an increasingly complex security landscape, and to adapt our Alliance.

This adaptation is already occurring and delivering results, starting with fairer burden-sharing: a Stronger Europe in a Stronger NATO, sometimes called "NATO 3.0".

But NATO adapts every day!

This morning, the 32 Allied Chiefs of Defence discussed the Alliance's priorities with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

We took stock of the commitments Allied Heads of State and Government agreed in The Hague, last year.

Now, as we look ahead to the NATO Summit in Ankara, the expectations by military authorities are extremely high: turn all those pledges into tangible results, with faster delivery, in order to achieve higher readiness and stronger deterrence.

We truly welcome Allies' progress on investments.

Earlier this year, for example, we agreed a new distribution of senior leadership roles across the NATO Command Structure, with greater responsibility for European Allies.

This renewed command aligns with Allies' growing strength, matching forces and capabilities where they are needed most.

At the same time, as we discussed with the Chiefs of Defence, we must note that the rate of delivery and fielding of all the capabilities necessary for our deterrence and defence requires dramatic increases and improvement.

We are not at war, but we are not at peace either.

That is why we must re-double our efforts to focus defence investments, in accordance with our pledges.

In parallel, I call firmly on defence industry, to accelerate production and adapt business models to this imperative.

Enough with fragmentation! Which could be the main risk when more funds are available.

We must sustain this commitment in the long term, with steadiness and consistency, not to be thrown off course by social media or other distractions.

The security of our citizens demands no less.

This morning, we also re-affirmed our continued support to Ukraine, and strengthening its Armed forces, for the fight today as well as tomorrow's security.

Let me take this opportunity once again to commend the Ukrainian soldiers, and people, for their courage, resilience, and adaptability.

To them, my message is: "SLAVA UKRAINE!"

Earlier today, we also welcomed the Chair of the European Union Military Committee, General Sean Clancy, to advance NATO-EU cooperation on practical, vital, military matters.

We are building on our already-strong partnership. For example, we recently undertook joint visits to Ukraine and another to the Western Balkans. By aligning complimentary efforts, reinforcing one another, Together, we can deliver so much more.

Thank you again. I now hand over to SACEUR and SACT, who will elaborate on their respective fields of responsibility.

General Alexus G. GRYNKEWICH

Good afternoon, everyone.

It is great to speak with you again-alongside Admiral Cavo-Dragone and Admiral Vandier.

And it is a privilege to meet again with the Chiefs of Defence, and to discuss how European Allies and Canada are taking more responsibility for conventional defence here in Europe, with continued, critical backing from American capabilities, which are being adjusted as I know you've all heard.

As you'd expect, we also discussed the recent decision by the United States to redeploy an armoured brigade from Europe. I'd like to emphasize this decision does not impact the executability of our regional plans.

As we discussed what Allied Command Operations is doing to support Ukraine, to build warfighting readiness and to strengthen our deterrence posture.

You know, the war in Ukraine is into a fifth year and the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to demonstrate extraordinary resilience and innovation. And they continue to share their combat-tested expertise with us, especially when it comes to countering Russian and Iranian drones and missiles.

But Ukraine needs persistent and predictable support from Allies. This is why support for Ukraine through the PURL and other means remains critical.

Regarding PURL, I assure you that everything Allies have paid for is flowing, including air defence interceptors that the Ukrainians so urgently need.

By investing in Ukraine, we are not only protecting their population, and defending their critical infrastructure, and sustaining their fight.

This is also an investment in European security.

Beyond Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East remains tense.

In the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has attacked commercial shipping, disrupted energy flows, and impeded freedom of navigation.

Each Nation is considering their response, with many, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom sailing ships to the region now. We all agree it is in our interest to ensure freedom of navigation in international waters, and Allies are moving out.

As I look deeper and longer term, ongoing operations in Ukraine and the Middle East are informing how we manage our posture and maintain the warfighting readiness needed to deter and defend every inch of allied territory.

I applaud each Ally that is taking immediate steps to leverage increases in defence spending to procure the capabilities needed to maintain credible deterrence and a strong defence.

This requires a strong defence industrial base and we are working with Allies and the EU to ensure our Hague Summit commitments turn into real combat capabilities.

Turning to NATO activities, operations, and missions across ACO, we are executing with precision and efficiency.

Through our enhanced vigilance activities - Arctic, Baltic, and Eastern Sentry, we have greater awareness, increased response capability, and we are seeing results.

Meanwhile, in KFOR there is real progress within the military mission creates opportunity in the political space.

And at NATO Mission Iraq, we've temporarily transitioned to a remote advisory presence to help Iraq build more sustainable and effective security institutions and armed forces to stabilise their country, fight terrorism, and prevent the return of Daesh.

And I'd like to conclude by highlighting today's change of command at NMI.

It was an absolute pleasure working with Major General Christophe Hintzy. I'm very proud of what he accomplished during his command.

And we're excited to have Lieutenant General Armada Vasquez joining our team as we look for opportunities to return to a military-led, non-combat advisory presence in Iraq once conditions allow.

Thanks again, and I look forward to your questions.

Admiral Pierre VANDIER

So, happy to see you again. At the 2025 Summit, the Allies made a historic commitment: moving to 3.5% of GDP to defence investment. That was the buck.

Now the question we have ahead of us is the bang (buck for the bang): how we turn this effort into real capability, real interoperability, and real deterrence, for todays and tomorrow's fight.

That is what ACT is striving for. Our role is to help the Alliance, and very concretely the Chiefs of Defence I have been speaking with all this morning, to get more military effect from the resource's nations are putting on the table.

We need not to forget that the enemy has a vote. Russia and its Allies have adapted. Others are watching and learning. Ukraine and the Middle East show us that war is now shaped by speed, mass, software, drones, electronic warfare, space, and data, areas where we have a lot to do.

So yes, we need more missiles, more shells, more air defence, more high-end capabilities, more stockpiles. These are essential. But they will not be sufficient on their own. More of the same is necessary, but more of the same will not be enough, from far.

If we want mass and speed, we need to know how we can build fast, produced at scale, adapt quickly, and still deliver real operational effect. And we need to identify which part of our industrial base can actually deliver it.

NATO 3.0 doesn't exist without defence industry 3.0.

This is where ACT brings value.

ACT is the de-risking and the acceleration machine for Chiefs of Defence, nations and NATO enterprise.

With LCI-X, you heard about, on counter-UAS and Task Force X in the maritime domain, we bring nations, operators and industry together around real operational problems. We test what works, what can scale, and how it become interoperable capability.

Force Lethality Enhancement programme we discuss sometime with you, we also show that legacy platforms are not obsolete. The decisive question is the force mix: how can we combine ships, aircraft, tanks and high-end systems with robotics, drones, sensors, software and new effectors to increase lethality and better protect our soldiers.

But capability is not enough. We also need forces able to adapt. That means harder, more realistic training. It means cloud, data and AI architectures that allow nations to share information, connect systems, decide faster and remain resilient when communications are degraded.

The point is not innovation theatre. The point is delivery.

From buck to the bang, more capability, more interoperability, more resilience, and therefore more deterrence.

That is what ACT is built to deliver.

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Lili Bayer, Reuters

Thank you very much, Lili Bayer from Reuters. I have a question for SACEUR. There's been some confusion over the past day, so I was wondering if you could clarify for us, how many troops will the US pull from Europe? Where will they be pulled from specifically? Will there be more announcements, and how much does this hurt or impact the implementation of the regional plans? Thank you.

General Alexus G. Grynkewich, SACEUR

Thanks, Emily, in accordance with President Trump's announcement, it will be 5,000 troops coming out of Europe. As I mentioned in my opening comments, a fair number of those come from the armoured brigade combat team that is returning, and the US has also already announced that the previously planned deployment of a long-range fires battalion will be curtailed and will not start occurring. There are some other additional minor elements that will be shifting as well. The planning is still ongoing for what those are for another several 100 troops, and so we can talk about that a little bit later, but the total number is 5,000. On your question of how does it impact us? You know, since the rotational brigade that is returning now, without replacement, showed up in 2022 a lot has happened in the Alliance. First off, the Baltic Allies and the Poles and many others have really built up their ground combat power, so there's substantially more capability in their ground domain than there was previously. I'd also highlight the multinational brigade that we have in Latvia, led by Canada, fully operational on the ground and highly effective. Then the Germans continue to build out a brigade in Lithuania, so again, this is as Allies build up their capability, the United States is able to pull capability back and use it for other global priorities. So, I'm very comfortable with where we are. We'll continue to work on the plan in both of my hats as Commander EUCOM on the US side and across the Alliance as SACEUR to ensure we've got the right coverage in the right places to maintain deterrence.

Terry Schultz, DW

Hi, Terry Schultz. I'm with Deutsche Welle, today. I have a question for SACT. In a recent exercise in Sweden, the Ukrainian war team killed the Swedes three times. The exercise had to be stopped, but what does this tell us about where we are, and in particular, especially on AI and high-tech methods on the battlefield? I mean, could you address both of those things? And I'm not sure if that's exactly why Sweden got killed three times, but could you talk about how AI has changed the way that NATO needs to look at the battlefield, because the Ukrainians are, and the Russians are far ahead?

Admiral Pierre Vandier, SACT

So, given to Ukraine experience, we are turning training not in a fairy tale, but something that is more realistic, and where we use training to make the system change, so as I said, we are, I think the nations are late in adopting some drones, adopting AI, and so today with the experience of the Red Team, which is given by the Ukrainians through JATEC, we are raising the level of the exercises, so the good news is that today we are more realistic about the threat, and we are working on it very hard. I think the number of trainings that will follow this path, where we have some hard time with the enemy, showed that today the nations want to be realistic. They want to make the efforts, and we have the signs, and we have the industries to overcome that.

General Alexus G. Grynkewich, SACEUR

Can I come in on that for just one second, too? So, we've had a number of these exercises where we've done this training with highly qualified opposition forces, sometimes provided by Ukraine, sometimes by others. We often focus on the beginning of the exercise, where we're learning a lot, and when you learn lessons, you're being, you know, removed from the battlefield, if you will. By the end of the exercise, by say the end of a week out in the field, facing that OPFOR you should see our young soldiers from across the Alliance and the rapid increase in their knowledge and their ability to fight back in this environment. So I just want you to know, while we often focus on that initial result, this training is having real results in terms of a capability and understanding of a modern battlefield for our troops. So, it's something we're going to continue to do.

Terry Schultz, DW

How much is that AI considered? How much is that advantage?

Admiral Pierre Vandier, SACT

So, AI is coming in the Alliance, so ACO is running Maven Smart System, and we are buying computing to make that faster and more relevant. ACT is experimenting CoPilot at the enterprise level for the staff work. We have an AI champion, which is a French guy today. France will propose an AI COE next summer, so things are going on. And back to the training we've launched with ACO a program, which is Audacious Training, where all the NATO training now is one with AI process to go faster with more free play, and so to make more relevant trainings.

Victor Jack, POLITICO

Hi, Victor Jack from POLITICO. Thanks for the press conference. My question is for SACEUR, do you expect any future redeployments, US redeployments from Europe in the weeks to come? And are you in talks with Allies about replacing some of their capabilities and the troops which have been announced so far? Thank you.

General Alexus G. Grynkewich, SACEUR

Yeah, on the second part of your question, absolutely in constant contact with Allies. I had a session today with the Baltic Three and Poland to go over what some of the options were, and how we might array capabilities on the Eastern Flank. So, absolutely constant contact with Allies, and constantly looking at what the threat is, and what do we need to adjust, or do we need to adjust. On the question of future redeployments, look, I will not get ahead of any political leadership in the United States. I will just say that the deployments that we have so far are all that's been announced, it's all that I'm expecting in the near term, but you know, over the longer term, we absolutely should expect additional deployments as Europe continues to build capability and capacity and step up to provide more of the conventional defence of Europe.

Maria Aroni, Athens News Agency and Open TV Greece,

Thank you, Maria Aroni, from Athens News Agency and Open TV Greece. I have a question for CMC and also for SACT or SACEUR. If you wish to comment, so the experience of four years of military confrontation in Ukraine has changed the way modern battles are fought, in particular with the extensive use of drones and electronic warfare. What are the lessons learned for the Alliance from this experience? And speaking of drones, I would also like to hear your views on the serious incident, which took place last week, when a rogue maritime surface drone of Ukrainian origin loaded with explosives was recovered by the Greek authorities, it was found by fishermen in a cave near the shore of very tourist Greek island in the Ionian Sea. So, my question is, if NATO is willing and also in a position to tackle such a new type of unorthodox warfare that seriously endangers the safety of navigation in maritime zones such as East Mediterranean, thank you.

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, CMC

We will share the question with SACT as far as lessons learned, drones, so on. For the first part, what the Alliance learned from that. I mean, drones just a kind of revolutionary issue on the battlefield, they will not be the only weapon. They will be maybe the most prominent, and also influencing all the battle space, probably. They will be probably in this, and the next future could be the very first one in getting involved in a confrontation. What we basically learn is that they just shrink dramatically time among all the killing cycle, it's just a matter of maybe minutes or maybe less, seconds. They detect, they track, they analyse and discover what is it, they shoot, they got information, battle damage assessment, and then fill information to the next to the next operation, that's a matter of seconds, and that's happening with artificial intelligence and drones, and that's the big issue. Time is becoming very short. On the other side, unorthodox warfare, well, we can call it unconventional or unorthodox, but it's I think that that's typical of confrontations, and that's typical when, let's say, a smaller country facing a bigger one, they have to exploit all the - I'm not justifying any one - but I'm just thinking in their shoes. I would try to get the most from what I am, and of course there are sovereignty all these kinds of problems we let politics deal with it, but as far as unorthodox or unconventional warfare, I'm expecting that from a smaller nation that is trying to survive that has been attacked, so any kind of solution is good if you're achieving the result. Then probably you have to justify your behaviour, but from the military point of view, that's they are trying to get the most from the field, and that's basically what I think that I would do in their shoes, and then, as far as innovation or drone, I will let Pierre take the floor.

Admiral Pierre Vandier, SACT

So, I will not go too technical, because that is a lot of things. One of the things I would say about the lessons from Ukraine, one is the whole of society resilience. We need to think about that during three decades. We thought that a war was something far from our borders made by some fighters overseas. Today, we see that Ukraine experience shows that to be residential, you need to have a strong collaboration between military instruments of power and civilian one. The example of power grid, of communication grid, transport grid, medical support, that is a common endeavour. Second question, the industry is a part of the war fighting system. We've seen a ramp up of the Ukrainian industry in a dimension that now makes them building something for the West. They have been creating all an industry which is very agile. On the Ukrainian drones, you have a QR code. The soldier can give the report of how his drone is functioning to the headquarter of the company, and they can update the software in a matter of weeks or even days. Today, Ukraine is enabled, the soldier is enabled on its own mobile phone by a suite of applications that is giving me all the tools you need, as you have in your, in your life today. And so the adaptation is maybe the most important lesson. How we have a system that has been very static, where the definition of programs was taking three, four years, and four years to deliver to a system where we can adapt in the night, and that is why it's so important to be data centric, software centric, that enables that. So, it's a big shift for the industry today to come from a platform mindset to a data mindset. Whatever the platform is. And so it's what we see in Ukraine.

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, CMC

Just as far as orthodox or unorthodox, I mean, well, we are facing, I mean, a power who is targeting civilian infrastructure, killing civilians, crossing border of a sovereign nation, kidnapping from 15,000 to 23-24,000 to 25,000 children, and moving them. Is this orthodox?

Milda Vilikanskyte, Lithuanian National Public Broadcaster (LRT)

I have two questions, but they are very related, and I don't know if you yourself will decide who wants to answer. One is about drone, today in Estonia a drone was shot down by Romanian fighter jet who flew from a Lithuanian air base. Also, drones took off in Latvia. In the risk of drones, how would you assess with these incidents? And other question, which is related with drones, we hear Russia accusing and threatening the Baltic states, saying that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia are giving their territory their airspace for Ukraine to attack Russia, and today specifically for Latvia, there was a threat claiming that Latvia let Ukrainian troops to come to their territory and to attack Russia from Latvia, and Russia said that because of that they could attack Latvia also. So, could we say that it is a point-blank threat to NATO Alliance to NATO country, or how we should take this Russia threat? Thank you.

General Alexus G. Grynkewich, SACEUR

I'll take the first swing of that, and then if CMC would like to weigh-in. First, in terms of the drone incident today, where the Romanians shot it down. That's exactly how our defence design is supposed to work. The authorities are delegated down to the lowest tactical level, so that we can defend every inch of Alliance territory when there's an incursion like that. So, I'm extremely proud, you know, we're still assessing the situation, but it looks at initial glance like everything worked, and we've got great integration with all of the Baltic air defence capabilities that are there. And with our air policing mission, as we make a transition to air defence over the over the coming months, in terms of our mindset and our plans, so that's kind of part one. And second, with your, with your comments on the Russian threats, look, it's a standard Russian trope, right? They constantly say that NATO is doing something in an offensive manner, but we all know - you can read the treaty - NATO is a defensive Alliance, we are not a threat to Russia, and they know we're not a threat to Russia. If they thought we were a threat to Russia, they wouldn't have emptied the Leningrad military district to go and invade Ukraine. So, I just offer that at face value, it's so obviously incorrect that there's any threat whatsoever. Last thing I'll say is, if we were allowing drones to go through Baltic airspace, in order to get to Russia, we wouldn't be shooting them down. Thanks.

Andrea Palasciano, Bloomberg News

From Bloomberg News, SACEUR, I have a question for you. You mentioned that you all agree that, in the interest of the Alliance, to secure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, focusing on the on the Coalition of the Willing and the bilateral commitments that have been made, but could you tell us under which conditions NATO would consider participating, and if so, with which assets? Thank you.

General Alexus G. Grynkewich, SACEUR

Yeah, thanks for the question. The conditions under which NATO would consider operating in the Strait of Hormuz are ultimately a political decision, but I'll just give you a couple of thoughts from myself as an Alliance officer. Iran fired ballistic missiles into my AOR, into SACEUR's AOR, multiple times during Epic Fury, so we've had kinetic events coming into the AOR from Iran. The stoppage of the flow that Iran has caused through the Strait of Hormuz is affecting all of our economies in a very negative way, and affecting our economies affects our military industrial capacity over the long term. We know that Iran is, and Russia are doing technology transfer and sharing lessons. We know that the increased price of energy and some of the shortage that we've read about in the news could have a military impact. So, there's a number of impacts here, from the lack of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz right now. I think that's all up for discussion at the political level as to what do those trip, and when would we politically decide to move forward.

Valentina Vasileva, TVP Polish Media

I have a question about Spanish idea to create European army. Last week, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that. What do you think about this idea, especially that it's coming from Spain? And in general, can you imagine that Europe can create common European army without NATO?

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, CMC

I'll take it. Okay this is my mantra. No, I mean, I think there is kind of misunderstanding. We need to start from two basic points. First, single set of army, second sovereignty. I mean, we, the Alliance, I mean the nations are just at one army, every nations, okay? Okay, so that's the one, and they are force providers, so they will provide SACEUR for what he needs to fulfill his mission, depending on the mission. So, we cannot think about an European army, it's an oxymoron or a nonsense, because NATO doesn't have an army, And also the single nation keep the sovereignty of their army, so I mean they are the ones who decide what to do. It and they are providing us NATO for providing what we need. We have to see, I mean, European Union as the European pillar of NATO, but again, they will be using in case they are, they will do a kind of activity, military activity, they will use the same set of armies that NATO has, so that's some, that's why we have to, we need to speak about, I mean, European pillar of the NATO. That's basically it. Of course, we should stick with the idea that that we just said that I mean European Union has some characteristic which are complementary to the NATO and NATO has a strong chain of command, operational orientation, plans, and on and on, so that the operational side of the house on the other side. On the other side, European Union has a great capability in providing financing in a great leverage on industry that we don't have. Basically, they have rules, regulation, and so that's basically it. We are, we are complementary by design, and we have, we should stick with this, just to avoid duplication, waste of money, time, and energies.

Col. Martin L. O'Donnell, SHAPE Spokesperson

A point of clarification, Sir. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but when you were talking about Allies stepping up, you had said, you had used the word "deployment" of US troops. I believe what you meant to say was "redeployment" of US troops.

General Alexus G. Grynkewich, SACEUR

Yes, absolutely.

Andrew Gray, Reuters

So, just to try to clarify this thing, just to follow up on that. So, just to be clear, you had originally said we should absolutely expect additional "deployments" as Europe continues to build capability and capacity step up. So, what you're actually saying is "redeployments", and can you just classify and clarify why that should be expected, and if you can say anything about the kind of timeframe, how long that might happen over.

General Alexus G. Grynkewich, SACEUR

Yeah, yes, redeployments, that was a misspeak. Apologies, I guess one can dream, but no. This is resident in the US National Defence Strategy, and it's resident in the concept that some have called NATO 3.0 as CMC mentioned, and so what we're basically saying is, as the European pillar of the Alliance gets stronger, this allows the US to reduce its presence in Europe and limit itself to providing only those critical capabilities that Allies cannot yet provide, and so we should expect there to be a redeployment of US forces over time as Allies build their capacity. As for the exact timeline, I mean, it's going to vary broadly across a number of different capabilities as nations meet their Hague spending commitments, and meet their capability targets. So, I can't really give you an exact timeline. It's going to be an ongoing process for several years.

Max Delany, AFP

Thanks a lot, Max Delany, AFP. Just following up on a couple of issues. The Strait of Hormuz, you said that it's a political decision ultimately, if NATO get involved, but are you already planning for a possible NATO role in the Strait of Hormuz, if you're asked by the political leadership. And then on the troop redeployment, it wasn't so much the amount that was the issue this time, but the manner in which it was done - impulsive, without coordination, and sudden. Is that the way to do it? And can you guarantee that in future, Europe will be better informed and better able to prepare for these announcements.

General Alexus G. Grynkewich, SACEUR

Yes, so first on your question on planning for SACEUR to undertake any formal military planning requires a council planning directive that gives me guidance from the North Atlantic Council. So, the political direction comes first, and then the formal planning happens after that. Am I thinking about it? Absolutely, but there's no, no planning yet until the political decision is taken. Second, in terms of your comment, look, you know we've talked about this with the Chiefs of Defence today, and I would tell you that every Chief of Defence in there acknowledged that this type of adjustment was something that they knew should be expected. The exact timing was unknown, but when it did happen, and when it was ordered, we were quickly able to talk to our Allies and let them know what was going on and why it was happening, so you know there was coordination, there was an expectation that this would happen, and we're going to stay well synchronized with our Allies moving forward.

Maria Vasileiou, TA NEA

Maria Vasileiou, TA NEA, Greece. I would like to go back to the Ukrainian sea drone that was found in Greek waters and ask SACEUR this time, because this is actually understood, it's not just the only one, the only sea drone of Ukrainian origin that is floating around in the Med. Whether you are concerned that we could see the spilling, that the war could spill into the Med because the Ukrainians are hunting Russian shadow fleet tankers, and in this case, how could NATO react and operate? Thank you.

General Alexus G. Grynkewich, SACEUR

I'm not currently concerned that the war is going to expand into the Mediterranean, I think, as CMC mentioned, these types of tactics are common in conflicts like this, where there's an asymmetry of power. So, I don't, I don't share that concern right now. We'll watch it closely, but I'm not concerned about it. Thanks.

Captain Navy Giovanni Galoforo, NATO IMS Public Affairs and StratCom Advisor

Okay, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much. This concludes our press conference.

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