The Trump Administration’s Middle East Policy: Shaping an Emerging Regional Order

Commentary by Mona Yacoubian

Published October 6, 2025

This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department entitled Navigating Disruption: Ally and Partner Responses to U.S. Foreign Policy.

Introduction

The Middle East figures prominently in the second Trump administration's foreign policy, beginning even before Trump's inauguration with the administration's involvement in the January 2025 Gaza ceasefire and hostage release. Referencing the deal in his second inaugural address, the president highlighted his aspirations to be a "peacemaker and unifier." Indeed, rather than adopting an isolationist approach to the region as favored by its MAGA base, the Trump administration has thrust itself into the fray of the region's defining conflicts. With the Middle East at a "hinge moment" where the old order is collapsing and a new order emerging, the Trump administration could play a defining role in stabilizing the region and shaping the contours of a new Middle East. But the president has not demonstrated the attention and commitment needed, nor provided his administration with the necessary resources and bandwidth, to bring his vision to fruition.

The Trump administration stands before a historic opportunity to help usher the Middle East into a new era of stability and prosperity. Its engagement in the Middle East is shaping the contours of the emerging regional order-whether by default or design.

The administration has had several touchpoints in the region from its earliest days. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the first foreign leader to meet with President Trump in a February 4 Oval Office meeting. The president's first major foreign trip was also to the region when he traveled to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in May. In many ways, the trip embodied the president's approach to the Middle East: highly transactional, while short on groundbreaking diplomacy and prone to some unexpected twists. It highlighted the administration's focus on commercial deals, with investments reportedly valued at $2 trillion. At the same time, the president did not announce progress on various diplomatic efforts, despite hopes for another Gaza ceasefire or movement toward a deal with Iran.

Yet, he stunned many with his announced decision to lift sanctions on Syria, followed by a surprise meeting with Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Most significantly, while the trip appeared to signal a reorientation of U.S. Middle East strategy away from military intervention in the region, President Trump ordered strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in concert with Israeli military intervention less than one month later.

The Trump Administration's Middle East Policies

In examining the Trump administration's Middle East policies, three decisions hold the potential for the greatest impact on the region: (1) U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, (2) lifting sanctions on Syria and normalizing relations with the transitional government, and (3) broad support for the Netanyahu government's Gaza policies. These decisions either touch on the region's two defining conflicts-Iran and Gaza-or affect the transition trajectory of a regional linchpin, Syria, with enormous geostrategic stakes for the region. Taken together, they will play a critical role in shaping the contours of the Middle East's emerging order, for better or worse.

U.S. Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities

On June 22, the United States carried out Operation Midnight Hammer, targeting Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The U.S. strikes came as part of a wider 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran that started on June 13 when Israel initiated strikes on Iranian nuclear and missile sites as well as its military leadership. Iran undertook counterstrikes against numerous targets across Israel, although most Iranian strikes were intercepted by Israel's missile defenses. Iran also retaliated against the United States with a carefully choreographed strike on al-Udeid air base in Qatar. There were no casualties, and Qatar quickly mediated a ceasefire that-while shaky-remains in place.

Damage assessments have varied since the attacks, but recent U.S. assessments judge that the Fordow nuclear facility was badly damaged. However, the whereabouts of Iran's store of 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium remains unclear, raising the prospect that Tehran might yet pursue its nuclear ambitions. As of early September, Iran has moved toward resuming cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency but has not resumed negotiations with the United States. Both Iran and Israel have warned that the conflict could resume, raising the prospect that the United States could once again be drawn in.

Trump's decision to intervene militarily against Iran may be one of the most consequential of his presidency. The U.S. strikes on Fordow-long contemplated but until June 2025 never pursued-marked a significant escalation and the first large-scale U.S. strikes on Iranian targets in nearly 40 years. The decision could either pave the way for a resumption of negotiations-and a possible deal, given Iran's weakened position-or Tehran could decide to sprint toward a crude nuclear device, provoking renewed military strikes by Israel and possibly the United States. In the first instance, Trump's decision could move the region significantly forward on a path toward de-escalation. In the second instance, the decision could contribute to the region plunging deeper into war.

Lifting Syria Sanctions and Warming Bilateral Ties

Following Trump's surprise May announcement pledging to lift Syria sanctions, he signed an executive order on June 30 removing the sanctions and directing the secretary of state to evaluate suspending congressionally-mandated Caesar sanctions. Trump's sanctions decision prompted the European Union to follow suit.

More significantly, the U.S. decision paved the way for Gulf countries to begin investing in Syria, as they had previously been fearful of running afoul of international sanctions. In late May, a Qatar-led consortium announced a $7 billion investment in Syria's energy sector. Saudi Arabia and Qatar also announced they would jointly fund Syria's state salaries. The UAE signed an $800 million agreement to develop Syria's Tartus port. Additional Gulf deals to rebuild transportation and infrastructure are also in the works.

While in Riyadh, President Trump met with Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria's transitional president. Trump's historic meeting resonated across the region as a strong signal of U.S. support for Sharaa, despite his jihadist past. The interaction launched a normalization process that includes regular meetings with U.S. envoy Tom Barrack and prominent members of Congress, and even efforts to broker normalization with Israel. In July, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham-Sharaa's militia-was removed from the United States' list of foreign terrorist organizations.

Trump administration support for Syria's transition could have an outsized impact. Sitting at the heart of the Middle East, Syria's transition will exert enormous influence on the region's trajectory. By sparking Gulf investment in Syria's beleaguered economy, the U.S. move has already facilitated the country's transition process. While the country is far from stabilized and has witnessed worrying episodes of sectarian violence, enduring U.S. sanctions would have made Syria's difficult transition even more precarious. Yet continued U.S. attention to Syria, including encouraging Sharaa to broaden participation in Syria's governance, will be critical to avert the country's descent back into conflict.

Broad Support for Netanyahu Government's Policies on Gaza

Since taking office, President Trump has largely offered unquestioning support for the Netanyahu government's policies on Gaza, including its restrictions on humanitarian aid. Even after Israel's controversial strike on Hamas targets in Doha, Trump's expression of concern over the attack was soon followed by Secretary of State Rubio's trip to Israel, where he once again underscored strong support for Israel's Gaza policies. While Trump occasionally calls for ending the conflict in Gaza, he has yet to exercise the leverage necessary to do so. On the contrary, glimpses of Trump's Gaza vision suggest alignment with more extreme Israeli positions on the disputed territory. During his February 4 meeting with Netanyahu, President Trump proposed to displace Palestinians from Gaza and create a "riviera in the Middle East." Backtracking from this proposal, President Trump presented 21-point plan for Gaza post-conflict security and governance that envisions gradual Israeli withdrawal, an Arab-Muslim security force, and elements of Palestinian governance. Whether the plan comes to fruition remains very much in question.

Since taking office, President Trump has largely offered unquestioning support for the Netanyahu government's policies on Gaza, including its restrictions on humanitarian aid.

Similarly, regarding Israel's controversial policies of restricting humanitarian aid into Gaza, the Trump administration has followed Netanyahu's lead. Israel's full blockade of Gaza from March 2 through mid-May sparked a dramatic deterioration in humanitarian conditions. In May, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), an Israeli- and U.S.-backed alternative to the UN aid distribution system in Gaza, began operations at four distribution sites. The controversial GHF has proven woefully inadequate to address growing hunger and provoked criticism for its unwillingness to abide by humanitarian principles.

Taken together, these policies reflect two intertwined elements of the Trump administration's approach to Gaza: a deference to Prime Minister Netanyahu's preferences and a deprioritization of humanitarian needs. The administration has not pushed back on the Israeli government's plans to occupy Gaza City and forcibly evacuate Palestinians into a smaller area of Gaza. Instead, President Trump has noted it is "pretty much up to Israel" if it wants to occupy Gaza. He subsequently posted on social media that the only way to get hostages out of Gaza is when Hamas is "confronted and destroyed," seemingly offering tacit support for Israel's expanding operations. Meanwhile, the Trump administration's complacent approach to Gaza's worsening humanitarian situation-marked by a formal declaration of famine in parts of Gaza-underscores the devastating impact of its acquiescence to the Israeli government's refusal to provide adequate aid to the besieged territory.

Regional Responses: Israel and Saudi Arabia

Regional reactions to these Trump administration policies have varied widely. They can best be captured by unpacking how Israel and Saudi Arabia-each with strong ties to the United States-have responded. Not surprisingly, their reactions differ significantly in all three cases. Their responses also reflect the growing disparity between these two regional powers as they pursue widely differing strategies for how to shape the Middle East's emerging order.

For Israel, October 7 marked a watershed moment that reinforced the state's resolve to never again allow the country to be vulnerable to attack by Iran or any of its proxies. It has signaled a willingness to use force whenever and wherever threats arise. This determination has translated into ever-bolder military interventions across the region that have redrawn the Middle East's balance of power. Yet, Israel has not translated these military gains into enduring strategic wins. For Saudi Arabia-the Arab world's current center of gravity-the imperative for economic diversification has fueled a drive to de-escalate tensions in the region, a push for post-conflict stabilization in the Levant, and aspirations to build out commercial and trade ties across the Middle East and beyond. This existential need for regional stability has led to bold diplomatic initiatives, including rapprochement with Iran and warming ties with Turkey. As with Israel, however, whether and how Saudi Arabia translates its expanding leverage into lasting strategic gains remains to be seen.

U.S. Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities

Israel was strongly supportive of the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. For decades and across multiple U.S. administrations, Prime Minister Netanyahu sought U.S. support for and participation in strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. As such, President Trump's decision to order strikes on Iran marked a major victory for Netanyahu.

Going forward, Netanyahu will look to maintain U.S. support, especially if Iran begins to rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal or restart enrichment. Israel has made clear that it will strike Iran again-ideally with U.S. support-in either scenario. Absent a clear U.S. "red light" opposing further Israeli military intervention in Iran, possibly paired with a U.S. "carrot" on other issues of interest to Israel, Israel could seek to derail potential U.S. negotiation efforts with Iran.

By contrast, Saudi Arabia-worried about uncontrolled conflict escalation-responded to the U.S. strikes on Iran with "deep concern." The kingdom worked closely with its Gulf allies to find an off-ramp for the conflict rather than encouraging the United States and Israel to pursue regime change in Iran-once the favored position of the Arab Gulf. This about-face on Iran embodies broader shifts in the regional order where Gulf Arabs now believe the Islamic Republic is a challenge to be managed (and possibly integrated into the region), rather than eliminated. Increasingly, the Gulf views Israel, not Iran, as the primary threat to regional stability.

Going forward, Riyadh will push hard for a diplomatic resolution to Iran's conflict with the United States and Israel. While Saudi Arabia likely is heartened by Iran's weakened position, it views with alarm the prospect of deepening interstate conflict between Israel and Iran. It will remain critical of any further Israeli military action directed at Iran and will likely encourage Washington to restrain its Israeli ally and instead restart bilateral negotiations with Iran.

Lifting Syria Sanctions and Warming Bilateral Ties

Israel responded with alarm to both the U.S. decision to lift sanctions on Syria and President Trump's meeting with Ahmed al-Sharaa. Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly asked President Trump not to lift Syria sanctions in advance of Trump's trip to the region. Moreover, since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Israel has been wary of the former jihadist now in control in Damascus. Seeking to keep the Sharaa government weak and off balance, Israel has repeatedly resorted to military strikes, including in the capital, Damascus. It has also deployed troops in southern Syria, occupying an increasing area beyond the demilitarized zone separating the two countries.

Going forward, Israel will remain wary of the Sharaa government and will likely continue to apply military pressure on Syria, including an expanded occupation of southern Syria and occasional air strikes. At the same time, the Israeli government has demonstrated a willingness to ease up on its interventions when the Trump administration signals its displeasure. Yet, Israel's openness to the Trump administration's efforts to broker a nonaggression pact between Israel and Syria remains an open question. Instead, Syria could become a locus of regional power competition between Israel and Turkey as both seek to exert their influence over Syria's trajectory.

Since the fall of Assad in December 2024, Saudi Arabia has lobbied hard for the United States to lift Syria sanctions, citing them as a key obstacle to the country's reconstruction. Trump's decision to lift sanctions and meet with Sharaa-while in Riyadh-undoubtedly was timed to please his Saudi hosts and likely came at the direct suggestion of Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), the Saudi crown prince. For MBS, the U.S. decision stood as an important victory emerging from Trump's trip.

Going forward, Saudi Arabia will likely encourage the United States to continue along its path toward normalization with Syria. It may push for the repeal of the Caesar sanctions, which must be undertaken by Congress. Riyadh may also press the United States to rein in Israel, should it continue with aggressive military action in Syria.

Policies Toward Gaza and Humanitarian Aid Distribution

Netanyahu is undoubtedly pleased with the tacit, if not outright, support the Trump administration has provided for its military campaign in Gaza. Despite widening domestic and international criticism of Israel's approach, the prime minister has not wavered in his expanding occupation of Gaza in the absence of any U.S. pressure. Indeed, the prime minister appears to bask in U.S. support, with no hint of a shift in policy.

Going forward, Netanyahu can be expected to continue along the same trajectory in Gaza, especially since a dramatic shift in U.S. policy is not in the offing. On the contrary, as the international outcry against Israel's actions in Gaza grows and with an increasing number of U.S. allies moving to declare a Palestinian state, Israel is likely to entrench its position further, bolstered by the prospect of continued U.S. support. Indeed, the Trump administration announced its decision to deny visas to the Palestinian Authority leadership ahead of the UN General Assembly, seemingly in response to mounting calls for declaring a Palestinian state.

Saudi Arabia has been among the most vocal critics of Trump's February 4 proposal on Gaza. Riyadh immediately rejected Trump's proposal and reiterated its refusal to normalize relations with Israel in the absence of significant progress toward the creation of a Palestinian state. The kingdom has also strongly criticized Israel for the lack of adequate aid flowing into Gaza. Following the August 22 famine declaration, Saudi Arabia, while not calling out the United States, faulted the Israeli occupation as the cause of the "humanitarian catastrophe" in Gaza.

Going forward, Saudi Arabia will continue to press hard on Gaza, demanding a permanent ceasefire, unfettered humanitarian access, and significant movement toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. Its leading role in pushing for a two-state solution at the 80th UN General Assembly stands as its most prominent effort in this regard. The kingdom will likely continue its behind-the-scenes lobbying of the United States to pressure Israel to relent on these demands, holding out on any progress toward normalization with Israel in the absence of movement on these issues.

Implications and Recommendations

The Trump administration stands before a historic opportunity to help usher the Middle East into a new era of stability and prosperity. Its engagement in the Middle East is shaping the contours of the emerging regional order-whether by default or design. Specifically, its decisions on Iran, Syria, and Gaza all touch on core challenges in the region and hold the potential to move each in a positive direction. Yet, peril and deepening conflict stand on the flip side of each opportunity. The administration could squander this opportunity if it fails to exploit openings for peace and de-escalation, disregards the negative consequences of untethered military action, or falls into the false lull of inaction.

The administration could squander this opportunity if it fails to exploit openings for peace and de-escalation, disregards the negative consequences of untethered military action, or falls into the false lull of inaction.

On Iran, the administration should capitalize on Iran's weakened position to negotiate a deal. It should leverage the threat of implementing snapback sanctions, additional U.S. sanctions, and the credible threat of military force to compel Iran to the table. Ultimately, a deal could emerge that constrains both Iran's nuclear and regional ambitions in exchange for broad sanctions relief and a potential path for its wider integration into the region.

On Syria, the administration should calibrate its continued support for the Sharaa government with measures that instill buy-in from Syria's minorities and their integration into a decentralized system of governance. It should work closely with Gulf Arab allies to ensure that Gulf-funded stabilization efforts in Syria address key challenges around security, governance, and economic growth.

On Gaza, the administration should reject plans that envision further mass displacement of Palestinians in Gaza, a move that would enflame the region and jeopardize future cooperation with Arab allies. Instead, it should exercise more leverage on Israel to allow adequate levels of humanitarian aid while also pushing for a permanent ceasefire that results in the release of all remaining hostages and movement toward sustainable security and governance arrangements in Gaza.

Mona Yacoubian is senior adviser and director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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