09/08/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 09/08/2025 09:07
Photo: Gunter/Adobe Stock
Commentary by Andrew Friedman and Derek Mitchell
Published September 8, 2025
A central theme of Secretary Marco Rubio's Department of State reorganization has been to streamline the department's excessive bureaucracy in the name of agility and efficiency. To do so, he has expressed his intention to empower regional offices by moving "all non-security foreign assistance" into their remit at the expense of functional bureaus that had previously controlled such funds, such as the Democracy, Human Rights and Rule of Law (DRL), and Conflict and Stabilization Operations bureaus. In his own words, this move will ensure that "region-specific functions will be streamlined to increase functionality" and "move . . . at the speed of relevance."
At its core, this is a move towards promoting more localized, context-specific approaches to international challenges U.S. diplomats face abroad. This focus on ensuring that forward-deployed expertise guides U.S. engagement and keeps foreign policy tools strategically aligned is inherently a good one.
However, the elimination of approximately 85 percent of U.S. foreign assistance programming and the firing or incentivized departure of thousands of experienced diplomats and development specialists will limit the number of tools available to optimize this strategy. A more thoughtful and deliberate approach that enabled a smooth transition between the old and new ways of operating would have been preferable to ensure U.S. commitments were upheld and carefully built trust with allies and partners was safeguarded.
But even on the Trump administration's own terms, if the administration is to deliver on its vision, it must not only quickly reinstitute foreign assistance programming but also consider creative new initiatives that will provide the Department of State's regional divisions and diplomats with fresh tools. That includes in the arena of traditional development aid, disaster assistance, educational exchanges-and good governance programming. On the latter front, we propose the creation of an "Ambassadors Fund for Good Governance." Such a fund would offer embassies ready access to a pool of funds for local governance programming to respond rapidly to governance challenges as they arise and combat forces that seek to undermine national efforts to develop good governance norms.
Foreign assistance projects directed by the embassy that create conspicuous improvements, improve development outcomes, align themselves with local interests, and thus create wins for American diplomacy are not new. As a model for the new fund, one need look no further than the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation (AFCP).
Created in 2001, the AFCP has supported more than 1,270 projects in 134 countries, totaling $128 million. These projects are intended to provide a different face to U.S. diplomacy, one that recognizes and supports other countries' unique cultural heritage. This was a central vision of the fund, which, at its inception, was designed as a way to "show respect for other cultures."
The AFCP, when utilized strategically, can exemplify coordinated, context-specific U.S. diplomacy. In the wake of the 2020 earthquake in Albania, for instance, not only did U.S. foreign assistance help support local search and rescue efforts and fund rapid response centers, but through the AFCP, the U.S. government provided $800,000 to rebuild three major fortifications, some of which date back more than 1,500 years, solidifying our bond with a relatively new NATO ally and strategic partner and provided support for local tourism, a key industry.
In Myanmar, the AFCP assisted both the preservation of a nineteenth-century Baptist church and a historic Buddhist monastery in the mid-2010s. These projects demonstrated U.S. respect for the country's diverse historical heritage, broadened the scope of U.S.-Myanmar ties, built trust with the government and people of the country, and solidified the foundations of our (newly reestablished) relationship.
A focus on governance would have several distinct benefits.
First, good governance, including combating corruption, promoting the rule of law, and supporting functional governing institutions and transparent processes, is an essential requirement for the type of commercial diplomacy and dealmaking that favors U.S. business. Efforts by the PRC, Russia, and others to shape local conditions in their favor-through opaque dealmaking, bribery, elite cooptation, and other shadowy practices that challenge the rule of law-not only work against the interests of local citizens and host countries but also U.S. commercial and national security interests. U.S. companies are simply less equipped than those from illiberal nations that operate according to shady practices.
Furthermore, corrupt governance enhances inequality, creates an atmosphere of injustice, fuels social friction, and ultimately leads to national instability, all of which create a poor environment for U.S. investment. Absent renewed efforts by the United States (and others) to help nations shape governing institutions and norms in ways that advance long-term stability and prosperity and protect national sovereignty, alternative forces will bend global developments in a different and more malign direction to the United States' detriment.
Second, working with those seeking to improve their ability to engage in the processes and decisions that impact citizens' lives is another way to demonstrate respect for the unique culture of host countries. From civic organizations seeking to have their voices heard on education, health, and other urgent national matters, to legislatures that seek help with their internal processes, to those working to combat corruption and enhance transparency, and so on, embassies are uniquely well-equipped to know what initiatives are most likely to contribute constructively in the local context.
The speed and flexibility of Ambassadors Fund projects would be the governance equivalent of "shovel-ready" activity. With careful local oversight, these projects can operate in a way that enables continual adaptation and learning. If a program ends up using a flawed or suspect methodology, for instance, funding could be quickly withdrawn or redirected towards others applying a sounder approach. Over time, the fund could develop an evidence base, ensuring future good governance-and overall development-funding is optimally invested. This type of learning is a major loss with the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the reorganization of the Department of State.
Finally, to ensure the success of any U.S. initiative to devolve some good governance programming to embassies, chiefs of mission and their colleagues will need to receive new, specialized training on the nature and strategic benefits of such programming to ensure they are prepared for their remit. The removal of significant governance and human rights expertise from the U.S. government has left a profound gap. Ambassadors and embassy colleagues must be educated in both do-no-harm and conflict sensitivity issues to ensure they approach governance-related issues with the skill and care required.
Create an Ambassadors Fund for Good Governance Administered by DRL Under the Department of State's Office of Foreign Assistance
In envisioning the AFCP, Congress specified funds that could only be used for such a fund while placing control within the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. This recognized the value of on-the-ground understanding for project proposals but acknowledged that the expertise and available time for administering such a fund are found in far greater numbers in Washington than at embassies. Congress should utilize a similar model for an Ambassadors Fund for Good Governance, placing the fund's administration in the hands of DRL to respond to embassy-led proposals for programming.
While DRL has recently experienced substantial layoffs, the bureau has traditionally held the expertise necessary to administer such a fund due to its prior experience in both grantmaking and good governance programming. When adequately staffed, this will allow the bureau to ensure proposals are structured to deliver on an embassy's vision while conforming to do-no-harm and conflict sensitivity principles to avoid unintended consequences such as inflaming conflict or putting program partners at risk.
Further, administering the fund from Washington allows greater geostrategic alignment with collective State priorities. Projects could be prioritized according to broader Department of State strategic goals.
Train Ambassadors and Embassy Political Officers on Do-No-Harm and Conflict Sensitivity Principles
Whether or not an Ambassadors Fund for Good Governance is created, ambassadors and their teams will need to receive special training to understand the nature and benefits of governance programming to ensure they are prepared for the challenges that will arise. Malign efforts by the PRC, Russia, and other malign actors to shape local conditions against U.S. interests are becoming more common, as are other challenges to the rule of law.
The removal of significant governance and human rights expertise from the U.S. government requires that such expertise be regenerated in order to ensure governance programs are impactful and do not exacerbate underlying issues. Both do-no-harm and conflict sensitivity issues must be at the forefront of how these issues are approached and where support is offered. This will require a change in the way that ambassadors and other embassy staff are trained, and ensure that as embassies attempt to support host nations, they will not ultimately make things worse than if programs were never instituted at all.
Andrew Friedman is a senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Derek J. Mitchell is a non-resident senior adviser to the Office of the President and the Asia Program at CSIS and served as the first U.S. ambassador to Burma (Myanmar).
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
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