Speech at the Sixteenth Asser Institute Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Dear participants,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the sixteenth edition of the Asser Institute Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

I wish to thank the organisers for their commitment to this programme, and their diligence over the years in developing the course to reflect the evolving global context.

I would also like to thank all the presenters.

Their willingness to give their time and share their expertise is critical to the success of this programme.

This year the Asser Institute is celebrating 60 years since its establishment in 1965, and I congratulate them on their lasting achievements over six decades of hard work.

The Institute continues to make a powerful and relevant contribution to our understanding of critical global issues through its work, and the OPCW greatly values our collaboration.

Disarmament, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, remains one of the greatest challenges to international peace and security.

This course offers a unique opportunity to hear from pre-eminent experts in this field.

During the lectures and discussions this week, you will gain insight into the political, legal and scientific developments that shape the future of international weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, arms control.

Such understanding is vital in equipping you to contribute to global peace and security.

Your contribution will be more important than ever, in a context where the international disarmament architecture is facing unprecedented pressure.

Dear participants,

Upholding and defending the principles of disarmament and non-proliferation requires countries to prioritise collective peace and security over national military advantage.

As the UN Secretary-General said last month to the UN General Assembly, disarmament is "the foundation of peace."

Regrettably, in a deteriorating security environment, we are seeing trends that are undermining this foundation.

First, geopolitical divisions are widening, and we are witnessing the deepening of a number of ongoing conflicts around the globe.

Furthermore, these conflicts have brought with them an increase in the threats of use of weapons of mass destruction.

Secondly, arms control treaties are fraying.

This year alone, five European countries announced their intention to withdraw from treaties prohibiting the use of land mines and cluster munitions.

2025 has also seen the final collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, one of the pillars of the security framework established at the end of the Cold War.

A third worrying trend is the renewed tension resulting from the rapid development of emerging technologies.

Weapons technologies, including autonomous weapons systems driven by Artificial Intelligence, are outpacing current arms control treaties and oversight mechanisms.

All these trends are mutually reinforcing: as States perceive threats to their sovereignty or security, they focus their attention on national military and defence capability.

This leaves limited space for the vision and principles that underpin the disarmament and non-proliferation framework.

And with every State that wavers or withdraws, the collective power of these instruments is weakened, and further withdrawals become increasingly likely.

This is why it is vital that the international community reaffirm its commitment to these norms.

Striving to maintain the confidence-building and transparency measures that can reassure the international community and encourage them to uphold their obligations, is key.

Dear participants,

It is against this backdrop that the OPCW continues its mission.

Established 28 years ago, the OPCW oversees the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The Convention remains a central pillar of the international disarmament system, with 193 States Parties that have undertaken never to develop, produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons.

Only four countries have yet to join the Convention: Egypt, Israel, North Korea and South Sudan.

It is thus the international disarmament treaty with the highest number of States Parties.

The Convention tasks the OPCW with overseeing the destruction of any declared chemical weapons stockpiles.

In July 2023, the OPCW reached a pivotal milestone with the completion of the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles declared by possessor States Parties.

This was a monumental accomplishment for the disarmament cause and for the international community at large, following decades of intense destruction and verification efforts.

During this process, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has verified the irreversible destruction of over 72,000 metric tonnes of chemical weapons.

However, our mission is not complete.

As the Organisation is now firmly established in the post-destruction phase of its existence, our focus is on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons and ensuring the continued compliance with its provisions.

The cornerstone of our preventive efforts is the industry verification regime.

It remains the gold standard among multilateral disarmament agreements.

Every year the OPCW conducts hundreds of industry inspections to build confidence in compliance with the Convention, and trust among States Parties.

Alongside this, the Secretariat provides comprehensive support to our Member States.

We assist States Parties in implementing the Convention at the national level, and in ensuring that they have the capacity to meet their obligations.

We also provide assistance and protection to States Parties against use and threat of use of chemical weapons, and strengthen their capacity to respond to chemical incidents.

Additionally, we help States Parties develop their legitimate chemical industry within sectors such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals, while raising awareness of the Convention.

It was in recognition of these efforts to rid the world of chemical weapons that the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.

Dear participants,

Our achievements must inspire us to continue tackling the significant challenges we face with renewed determination.

None of these is more serious than the use, and threat of use, of chemical weapons.

In the past decade, despite our collective achievements, chemical weapons have been used in Iraq, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, Syria and the Russian Federation.

The OPCW has been continuously developing its resources, capabilities and structures, to respond to these challenges.

In the 2018 attacks in Salisbury and Amesbury and the 2020 case of Alexei Navalny, the OPCW provided technical assistance to the United Kingdom and Germany, at their request.

In the ongoing war in Ukraine, there are allegations of use of chemical weapons by both Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

At the request of Ukraine, the Secretariat has delivered training, equipment and other assistance to Ukrainian personnel.

This is something any State Party has the right to request.

The OPCW has also conducted three technical assistance visits to Ukraine in support of Ukrainian investigations of possible use of chemical weapons.

As reported to the States Parties, the Secretariat was able to confirm the presence of CS, a riot control agent that the Convention prohibits to be used as a method of warfare, on the battlefield, as documented by Ukrainian investigators.

In the Syrian Arab Republic, after more than a decade of work, we are today presented with an opportunity to close the chemical weapons file once and for all.

As the Secretariat has consistently reported, Syria did not declare the full extent of its chemical weapons programme to the OPCW when it joined the Convention in 2013.

And as documented by the Secretariat, the Assad Government used chemical weapons against its own people on a number of occasions.

However, in the last ten months, we have seen extraordinary developments in Syria.

Following the fall of the Assad Government in December 2024, the Secretariat renewed its engagement with the new Syrian Authorities.

The Director-General visited Damascus on 8 February this year and met with Syria's interim President and interim Foreign Minister.

This was the first time a Director-General of the OPCW visited Syria.

On 5 March, the Foreign Minister of Syria addressed the OPCW Executive Council during its regular session.

On these occasions, and otherwise, Syria has declared its full commitment to the Convention, and its firm intention to fulfil all obligations in that respect.

For now, the priority is to finally determine the full extent of the chemical weapons programme of the Assad regime, and identify and destroy any remaining components of the programme, in particular chemical weapons, that may still be in the country.

This is vital in ensuring that any such weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.

The OPCW continues to engage with the new government of Syria and our States Parties, and the Secretariat's deployments to Syria are ongoing.

In sum, the facts show that the OPCW remains prepared to respond to the use of chemical weapons and assist our States Parties should the worst occur.

Dear participants,

An ongoing concern for the OPCW, in Syria and beyond, is the risk of chemical weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors.

Chemical terrorism is an ever-present threat.

In March this year we commemorated the 30^th anniversary of the Tokyo subway attack perpetrated by the Aum Shinrikyo cult.

In this attack, 12 people died, and thousands were injured, after being exposed to the lethal nerve agent Sarin, inside Tokyo subway trains.

More recently, ISIS used chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria.

The OPCW continues to prioritise this issue and is a vital forum for the States Parties to discuss new measures and exchange best practices in preventing chemical terrorism.

Thousands of toxic chemicals are produced, traded and consumed every day for legitimate purposes - including by private households.

As such the risk of diversion and misuse is high.

Since 2018, the OPCW has been a signatory of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, through which we have cooperated with several other bodies.

The threat of terrorists or States achieving a chemical weapons capability is increased by rapid technological advancements.

Emerging technologies such as synthetic biology, drones, and 3D printing all lower the technological barriers for obtaining and using chemical weapons.

Artificial Intelligence and quantum computing accelerate these developments.

To name just one example, consider the use of agricultural drones made for spraying crop fields with pesticides.

Such drones are now commercially available in many places, and one can imagine the devastation if a pesticide was replaced with a more deadly chemical and directed to a populated location.

However, at the same time these new technologies hold great potential for assisting us in our mission.

AI could, for instance, be used by authorities to predict new toxic chemicals suitable as chemical weapons, allowing for proactive consideration of response and countermeasures.

The task for the OPCW is to keep abreast of these technologies and their potential use and misuse, taking a balanced approach of mitigating risk, capitalising on benefits, and supporting our States Parties in doing the same.

Dear participants,

A key tool for the Organisation in this regard is the Scientific Advisory Board, the SAB.

Consisting of eminent experts from our States Parties, the Board provides advice to the Director-General on scientific and technological developments of relevance to the Convention.

In recent years the SAB has provided special advice on, for instance, chemical forensics and biotoxins.

It also provided advice for the inclusion of Novichok in the Convention's schedules of chemicals.

Specifically with regard to AI, which is currently a major focus area, the Director-General has established a new Temporary Working Group on AI under the supervision of the SAB.

The Group, which started its work in January, is expected to issue its report early next year.

We also pursue the implications of AI for the Convention in many other ways.

In October last year we co-organised, with the Kingdom of Morocco, the first ever Global Conference on AI and the implementation of the Convention.

The Conference was unique in that it brought together over 190 experts and representatives from 46 States Parties, international organisations, academia, and chemical industry.

Through our ongoing AI Research Challenge, we are funding four teams to conduct research on ways that AI can be used to strengthen our capabilities for implementing the Convention.

The work of both these initiatives will be completed by the end of this year, creating a solid foundation on which we can continue to build.

Furthermore, in June this year, the OPCW co-organised with the Government of China an international capacity-building workshop in relation to AI and chemical safety and security in Shanghai.

This workshop combined expert presentations and interactive discussion with highly informative field visits, ensuring that both the Organisation and States Parties benefit from the potential of AI.

Fundamental to enhancing the scientific and technological preparedness of the Organisation is our Centre for Chemistry and Technology (the ChemTech Centre), which opened in May 2023. You will visit the Centre on Thursday.

Since the Centre became fully operational, we have conducted a wide range of activities there, including training of inspectors, laboratory exercises, proficiency testing, and various capacity-building activities for States Parties.

The ChemTech Centre houses cutting-edge facilities and significant expertise and knowledge, necessary for ensuring that we can deliver as expected by our States Parties.

I encourage you to make the most of your visit there.

Dear participants,

You are taking part in this programme at a pivotal time.

As I said at the outset, the international framework for disarmament and non-proliferation is facing existential challenges.

However, there are reasons to be hopeful.

The willingness of the new Government of Syria to comply fully with the Convention, and the collective support from our States Parties for Syria in this endeavour, is encouraging.

At the same time, we are seeing how advances in science and technology are transforming so many fields, delivering solutions and accelerating progress.

When deployed appropriately and thoughtfully, these developments have huge potential to advance our mission of international disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Therefore, I encourage all of you to think creatively about how we can, collectively, face the current challenges and harness the opportunities presented.

I wish you an insightful, inspirational and productive course at the Asser Institute this week.

Thank you for your kind attention.