What Is at Stake in Hungary’s Election

Critical Questions by Donatienne Ruy and Maria Snegovaya

Published March 11, 2026

On April 12, 2026, Hungarians will head to the polls for what could be the most consequential parliamentary elections in Europe this year. Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has consolidated power for 16 years and become a Euroskeptic standard-bearer, is facing the most intense challenge of his tenure from opponent Peter Magyar-himself a former member of Orban's Fidesz party. These elections will have a real impact on the European Union's ability to face overlapping challenges in coming years, including economic competitiveness, support for Ukraine, and recalibrating the bloc's relationship with the United States.

Q1: What is the state of Hungary's democracy ahead of the election?

A1: Hungarian elections will take place in a highly polarized environment as Viktor Orban's Fidesz party aims to maintain power after 16 consecutive years at the country's helm. Under his leadership, the country has experienced a severe decline in democratic indicators. Freedom House in 2020 downgraded Hungary from a semi-consolidated democracy to a hybrid regime, while V-Dem Institute has deemed it an "electoral autocracy" since 2018, a system where multiparty elections occur but are neither fully free nor fair and fundamental freedoms such as expression and association are curtailed. Hungary is the first EU member state classified as either a hybrid regime or electoral autocracy.

Fidesz's societal remake is prominent across five categories:

1. institutions and rule of law, including the 2011 constitutional changes that reduced judicial independence and the appointment of Fidesz loyalists to critical nonpartisan positions (e.g., chief prosecutor);
2. media freedom, including the dissolution of state media's editorial independence (e.g., coverage skewing heavily pro-government) and strategic takeovers of private media outlets;
3. the economy, including regulatory pressures on domestic and foreign companies and Orban's favoring of his close circle for investments or public tenders;
4. closing civic spaces, including the intimidation of watchdogs and nongovernmental organizations and attacks on academic freedom; and
5. cultural issues, including anti-LGBTQ+ campaigns, a heavy focus on Christian values, and increased control over history and memory-building endeavors.

Hungary also suffers from serious corruption and fraud. The Fidesz party regime effectively operates a patronage state, using state power and high-level corruption to enrich regime insiders and sustain Orban's power.

In the past 16 years, the opposition has been unable to stem this decline. One problem has been institutional: Repeated changes in electoral rules by the ruling party (including gerrymandering and even legalized "voter tourism," allowing voters to register outside their place of residence) have made it difficult for the opposition to win. As a result of these manipulations, the opposition Tisza party would need to beat Fidesz by between 3 and 5 percent of the national vote to secure a majority in the parliament. Allies of the Orban regime also dominate the media landscape, promoting pro-government propaganda and disinformation. Another challenge has been the opposition's own inability to build a united front against Fidesz, compounded by limited leadership renewal.

In this setting, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights deemed recent elections to be free but not conducted on a level playing field. Recent electoral process changes risk aggravating the situation for the April vote.

Q2: What makes Hungary a distinct case among EU member states?

A2: Hungary is a country of 9.5 million people that accounts for 2 percent of the European Union's population and 1.1 percent of its total GDP. Yet it regularly makes the headlines in Europe, for several reasons.

First, Orban's autocratic rule has created a network of patronage that has accumulated significant economic power and long benefited from EU membership and subsidies (until recently). Close to 80 percent of Hungary's exports go to other EU member states. EU cohesion funds have amounted to 3.5 percent of GDP per year between 2004 and 2024, much of which has gone to state-linked enterprises. At the same time, Hungary has been under repeated investigations for fraud related to misuse of funds by the European Anti-Fraud Office.

Second, some of Orban's conservative and nationalist policies have long clashed with the values and basic rights outlined in the European treaties-for example, the attempted ban of the Budapest Pride march in 2025. The prime minister has often lamented what he perceives as the decadence of the European Union's social and cultural values. As a result, in 2022 the European Union suspended €22 billion ($26 billion) worth of cohesion and recovery funds to Hungary because of its repeated infringements on judicial independence and other freedoms, an unprecedented financial sanction against an EU member state.

Finally, Hungary is deeply at odds with the European Union's foreign policy decisions. It has repeatedly threatened to veto new sanctions against Russia or aid to Ukraine to extort concessions (such as unfreezing funds), with some success, and at times to the benefit of the Kremlin or individual Russian oligarchs. It has continued to buy large amounts of Russian oil and gas as the rest of Europe-aside from Slovakia-has weaned itself off it. Orban has met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at least four times since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (and about 15 times since Orban came to power in 2010) and has maintained close relations with China.

Q3: Who are the main players in the upcoming elections?

A3: As incumbent, Orban is attempting to lead his Fidesz party to victory for a fifth consecutive term, which would require a majority in the 199-seat National Assembly. Fidesz is currently polling at around 39 percent, but the opposition's rise and economic headwinds are beginning to rankle some party members. These dynamics have prompted the party leadership to recruit new candidates in one-third of the country's constituencies ahead of the election-an unusually large turnover for Fidesz.

The main challenger in this election is Peter Magyar of the Tisza party, who is leading the opposition to heights not seen in years. Tisza, currently polling at around 48 percent, has consistently led Fidesz in the polls for the past year, marking the most serious challenge to Orban's rule since he came to power in 2010. Yet the electoral map, the Hungarian diaspora's consistent support of Fidesz, and the vote count will require a large margin of victory to win seats, so this polling edge is no guarantee. Though Orban has tried to paint Magyar as a puppet of Brussels and Ukraine, an approach that worked effectively against previous challengers, so far Tisza's lead remains.

The key to Magyar's success is that he is seen as a more credible, non-corrupt alternative who still has conservative bona fides, making him a palatable anti-Orban option (e.g., embracing conservative positions on sociocultural issues and immigration). A former insider connected to Fidesz, Magyar has built a reputation as a conservative challenger relatively untainted by corruption allegations often associated with Orban and other Fidesz members. Magyar's political rise accelerated in 2024, when he broke with Fidesz during the scandal over a presidential pardon linked to a cover-up of child abuse in a state-run children's home, which triggered a major crisis in Hungary.

Another notable development is the partial consolidation of the opposition, as several smaller parties have stepped aside to avoid splitting the anti-government vote. In many constituencies, this allows a Tisza candidate to run largely unopposed against a Fidesz member. These tactical decisions may prove decisive for Tisza's chances. However, both Democratic Coalition (DK, a long-standing opposition party) and Our Homeland (MH, a far-right party likely to align with Fidesz), are still running and may affect vote shares for both Tisza and Fidesz if they reach the seat threshold of 5 percent.

Q4: What are the main issues driving the campaign?

A4: Though the campaign officially started at the beginning of March 2026, Viktor Orban has been attacking Magyar for months, often by stoking fears about Ukraine and the risk of a spreading war. He claims that aligning with the rest of Europe in supporting Ukraine against Russia's invasion would bankrupt Hungary, force it to send Hungarian youth to die on the front lines, and threaten its access to Russian energy. Fidesz and associated groups have activated their messaging machine through social media, mailers, and other tactics to share such content. They even accused one prominent Tisza member of colluding with Ukrainian intelligence services to undermine the election, even though Magyar has been very cautious on Ukraine-related issues, only advocating for a ceasefire and for a more distant relationship with Russia. Recent comments hint at the possibility Orban could deploy security forces inside Hungary to guard against alleged Ukrainian interference. Orban may also try to leverage the war in Iran to create new fears among voters, particularly on access to cheap oil and gas should Ukraine not relent on restoring access to the Druzhba pipeline.

A fear-based campaign proved highly effective for Orban in the 2022 parliamentary elections: Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, he pivoted to capitalize on his ties to Putin, positioning himself as the candidate of "peace and security." He pledged to keep Hungary "neutral" and out of NATO's war effort and accused the opposition of seeking to drag Hungary into the war and of making secret deals with Kyiv.

This time, such messaging may not be enough for voters. One reason is the significant deterioration of Hungary's economic situation, despite Orban's claim that his neutral posture would shield the country. After contracting by 0.8 percent in 2023, the economy grew only by an average of 0.5 percent in 2024 and 2025 (slower than the EU average). The budget deficit, projected at 5 percent for both 2025 and 2026, also significantly exceeds the EU target of 3 percent. The freezing of EU funds further worsened the economy. Regional disparities remain significant as well, with rural areas falling behind cities such as Budapest, partly because of governance gaps.

Memories of the relative prosperity of 2012-2019 may have benefited Orban in 2022 but are unlikely to help in the 2026 campaign. Many voters are beginning to wonder why economic returns appear to benefit Orban's elites more than ordinary citizens. Even cash incentives, tax cuts, and social benefits Fidesz has habitually disbursed ahead of the election appear less effective this time. Magyar has capitalized on this discontent, focusing his campaign on the "mafia state" Fidesz has built, the corruption that must be dismantled, and the rebuilding of public services along with the return of frozen EU funds. He is additionally promoting unity and the need to protect Hungarians' living conditions.

Q5: What is the role of external actors in this election?

A5: Both China and Russia are a critical part of Orban's post-2008 "Eastern Opening" strategy, which postulates that Hungary can diversify its foreign policy while still benefiting from EU membership. The strategy is also tied to Orban's illiberal turn in domestic politics, as it allows Hungary to avoid the pressure of EU restrictions. Accordingly, the Orban regime may encourage China and Russia to influence the political environment in Hungary through information campaigns and economic signaling.

Hungary's dependence on Russia has deepened in the post-invasion period, primarily in the energy sector. As the only EU member fully dependent on Russia for nuclear fuel, Hungary is proceeding with the construction of the Paks II nuclear power plant, built with Russian technology and funding, reinforcing its long-term dependence on Rosatom. Hungary's reliance on Russian crude oil has grown between 2022 and 2025 from 61 to roughly 92 percent through the Druzhba pipeline. Because the southern branch of the pipeline runs through Ukraine, the war-related sanctions and disruptions to transit further strained bilateral relations, with Budapest accusing Kyiv of delaying restoration of oil flows and using the dispute for political leverage. These tensions have escalated in recent days: On March 6, Hungary seized Ukrainian money originating in Austria. Magyar's campaign has alleged Russian interference in the campaign, and a recent investigation reported on an active meddling effort underway, with Russia's First Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko allegedly tasked to run a Moldova-style operation in Hungary.

Hungary has also become China's closest EU ally primarily through investment, including the Budapest-Belgrade railway under the Belt and Road Initiative-the terms of which were classified state secrets-and the electric vehicle supply chain, to deliver on Orban's promise to make Hungary a European manufacturing hub (in light of his significant working-class constituency). Hungary is the largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe (31 percent in 2024), surpassing Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

The United States also plays a large role in Hungary's foreign policy, and the U.S. administration has made clear it values those bilateral ties. The 2025 National Security Strategy previewed support for like-minded conservative governments in Europe, of which Hungary is one. Both the president and the secretary of state have made strong statements in support of Viktor Orban and reiterated the deep personal connection between him and President Trump. During his recent visit to Budapest, Secretary Rubio emphasized that the "president has an extraordinarily close relationship to the prime minister . . . and it has had tangible benefits in our relationship." There seems to be a willingness to support Orban through difficult times as well, as evidenced by Rubio's statement that "President Trump will be very interested . . . [in] finding ways to provide assistance . . . and obviously with regards to finances." Despite one tangible outcome of Rubio's trip-the signing of a U.S.-Hungary civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that could provide some diversification to Hungary's nuclear energy sources-the support has so far mainly been rhetorical. Still, Orban would benefit from this kind of public endorsement during the campaign and is looking to leverage that relationship for the country's financial purposes as well, again circumventing EU restrictions (after already securing an exemption for Hungary from U.S. sanctions on Russian energy).

Q6: How does the election affect Hungary's political future?

A6: This election raises the real possibility of the end of Orban's 16-year rule, his consolidation of power, and his network of patronage. A Tisza victory would bring about real change and a more democratic, pro-EU government in Hungary. However, ending Fidesz's entrenched control of most public institutions would take years and require a supermajority in the Assembly, which Tisza is unlikely to get at this point. Furthermore, though Tisza leads in the polls, the polling and the upcoming election should be interpreted cautiously, as Hungary has already become an electoral autocracy. Autocratic incumbents can lose-an upswell of public opposition can lead to an electoral defeat-but the playing field is tilted decisively in the regime's favor.

The election carries high stakes not only for Viktor Orban's political future but also for Hungary's political system. Orban is likely to leverage a range of institutional and political tools to avoid defeat, which could include mobilization of state power to manipulate events on election day and/or challenging the results. As political scientist Adam Przeworski famously argued, democracy is the system in which parties lose elections. Over the past 16 years, Hungary has experienced a steady decline in political and civic freedoms, and Fidesz has won every parliamentary election. The real test will come on election day: Can the incumbent still lose power in Hungary?

Donatienne Ruy is a fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Maria Snegovaya is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.

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