Introduction

What is SCCM?

Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (also known as SCCM) is a core component of enterprise IT infrastructure, enabling centralized software and device management of large-scale Windows environments. While SCCM provides critical capabilities that include software deployment, patch management, operating system imaging, and compliance enforcement, its deep integration and broad privileges make it a prime target for attackers.

This two-part series explores how attackers target SCCM and provides practical detection methods using event logs, file access patterns, and WMI telemetry. In Part 1, we cover SCCM architecture, enumeration techniques, and detection strategies. Part 2 examines advanced attacks including credential access and persistence.

Why Do Attackers Target SCCM?

SCCM infrastructure generates extensive logs that detail its operations, from software deployments to policy updates and client interactions. Attackers are increasingly abusing SCCM because of its powerful capabilities. Most organizations neither collect nor monitor their logs, which exacerbates the issue. As a result, malicious activity can easily blend in with routine administrative actions, allowing attackers to move undetected while abusing legitimate functionality.

SCCM presents a considerable attack surface that adversaries frequently exploit. Its powerful features include:

• Software deployment
• Remote execution
• Configuration management

Threat actors can weaponize these features to achieve various malicious objectives, such as:

• Gaining privileged access
• Moving laterally across a network
• Maintaining persistence

For example, an attacker who gains access to a site server could deploy malicious applications or task sequences across all managed devices. This allows them to misuse SCCM's legitimate mechanisms to distribute malware or establish long-term persistence within the network.

SCCM Architecture: From CAS to Clients

SCCM hierarchy defines the logical structure through which sites, systems, and clients are organized and managed. Before we move on, let's go over some SCCM terms that will accompany us heavily in this article.

• Central Administration Site (CAS) - Sits at the top of the SCCM hierarchy, providing centralized management and reporting across multiple primary sites. It's typically used in large-scale enterprise deployments. If a CAS isn't deployed, the hierarchy starts with the primary site as the top-level site.
• Primary Sites are the core administrative units and are responsible for client management, policy enforcement, and data processing (usually referred to as "site server"). Every client must be assigned to a primary site.
• Secondary Sites are children of primary sites and are used to support remote or bandwidth-constrained locations. Secondary sites help distribute content and policies locally and maintain a partial copy of the site database.
• SCCM clients are software agents installed on managed devices. They communicate with management points to receive policies, send inventory data to the site server, and execute tasks like applying updates and installing software.
• Site Server Roles define specific responsibilities that support system operations and can be distributed across multiple servers to enhance scalability and performance. The site server hosts the SCCM site, manages the SQL database, and oversees the overall configuration.
• Management Point (MP) acts as the communication bridge between SCCM clients and the site server, providing policies and configuration to clients, receiving inventory and status data, and distributing deployment information for applications and updates.
• Distribution Point (DP) stores content such as applications, updates, and operating system images, delivering it to clients as needed.
• Site Database is an essential component that stores all SCCM-related information, manages configuration data and supports system operations through SQL queries.
• SCCM console is the primary interface for managing and monitoring the entire System Center Configuration Manager infrastructure.
• SMS Provider serves as the interface that allows the SCCM console to interact with the site database, enabling administrative tasks and data retrieval.

Figure 1 shows a visual representation of the SCCM hierarchy and how sites and clients interact.

This structured hierarchy enables SCCM to scale from small environments to global infrastructures while maintaining centralized control and flexibility.

Deep Dive: SCCM Attack Tactics

This section provides a detailed examination of common attack techniques targeting SCCM, specifically mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Tactic: Discovery.

Tools Targeting SCCM

Before diving into Discovery, here are some tools attackers use against SCCM that we will explore throughout this blog post:

• SCCMHunter - Tool for identifying and attacking SCCM assets in AD domains.
• SharpSCCM -Post-exploitation tool for lateral movement and credential harvesting.
• CMLoot - Finds sensitive files on SCCM SMB shares.

Additional known tools include malSCCM, PowerSCCM, sccm-http-looter, and SCCMSecrets.

Enumeration Techniques

Attackers gain a lot of information about the domain in general and SCCM in particular by abusing different built in mechanisms like LDAP ,WMI etc.

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)

By querying Active Directory via the LDAP protocol, an attacker can map the SCCM infrastructure. This can reveal information about site servers, management points, distribution points (including those configured for PXE boot), SCCM-related service accounts, and other infrastructure objects.

Figure 2 shows an example of running enumeration using SCCMHunter tool via the command line.

Python sccmhunter.py find -u <username> -p <password> -d <domain> -dc-ip <dc ip>

Table 1 present LDAP queries are commonly used by SCCM enumeration attack tools:

Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)

Attackers can enumerate SCCM configurations directly from client agents using WMI.

When an attacker gains access to a machine with the SCCM client agent installed, they can query the root\ccm namespace to retrieve information about the local client's Management Point and Site Code by leveraging the SMS_Authority class.

Figure 3 demonstrates execution of the command SharpSCCM.exe local site-info, this command executes WMI query that extracts the information about management point and site code of the client.

SCCMContentLib$ Shared Folder

SCCMContentLib$ is the default share hidden in each distribution point.

This share stores package contents, software updates, applications and scripts.
Even though this share contains sensitive data, such as credentials or private keys, it requires no special permissions and it is readable by all users.

cmloot.py is an open-source tool which is used to enumerate sensitive files on SCCMContentLib$ shared folder.

Figure 5 show example of execution of the command
python cmloot.py <domain>/<username>:<password>@ip -cmlootdownload sccmfiles.txt.

SCCM Log Files

SCCM logs are stored locally on client machines, by default under C:\Windows\CCM\Logs. These logs contain detailed information about software deployments, management points and communication behavior. Attackers might enumerate these logs to uncover operational insights, identify distribution points, and extract references to potentially sensitive scripts or configuration data.

Highly targeted native logging paths:

• C:\Windows\CCM\Logs: This folder contains client-side logs which are generated by the SCCM client.
• C:\Windows\CCMCACHE: This folder contains client cache, it stores temporarily downloaded content for software installations and updates. SCCM clients download content from Distribution Points into this folder before installation.
• C:\Windows\CCMSETUP: This folder used during initial installation or reinstallation of the SCCM client.

Figure 5 Shows execution of the command SharpSCCM.exe local triage that enumerates logs stored on SCCM client.

Detection Strategies

After we understand how it works, it's relatively easy to detect suspicious activity in an SCCM environment.

Tracking LDAP Enumeration

To detect LDAP enumeration attempts, monitor Event ID 1644, Microsoft-Windows-ActiveDirectory_DomainService. Although not enabled by default, this event is recorded on Domain Controllers if the Windows registry is updated to activate it. Filtering for queries that target SCCM-related objects and originate from accounts that don't typically interact with these resources can reveal potential enumeration attempts.

A strong indicator of malicious reconnaissance is the usage of broad wildcard searches such as "*sccm*" or "*mecm*". These terms are commonly associated with attack tools that look for SCCM-related objects.

Another monitoring option is the collection of Windows event log Event ID 4662, which logs access attempts to objects in Active Directory.
Specifically, monitor access to the "System Management" container.

It is used by SCCM to publish critical configuration data such as site boundaries, site codes, management points and distribution points.
Unauthorized or unusual access to this container may indicate enumeration activity by an attacker attempting to map the SCCM infrastructure.

Figure 6 shows an example of a Cortex XDR alert that detects this activity.

Hunting WMI-Based Enumeration

To counter WMI-based enumeration, organizations can monitor WMI queries targeting the SMS_Authority class.
Unusual or high volumes of queries to this class from non-standard processes or user accounts could be a sign of malicious enumeration.

Figure 7 shows an example of a Cortex XDR alert that detects this activity.

Watching SCCMContentLib$ Share Folder

To detect potential abuse of the SCCMContentLib$ shared folder, organizations can monitor Windows Security event log, Event ID 5140. This event logs access attempts to network shares. Look for high volumes of access events to the SCCMContentLib$ share by unusual user accounts, to detect behavior like first-time access, accounts that are not typically associated with SCCM content, and access attempts from suspicious IP addresses. In addition, a high volume of file access to the SCCMContentLib$ path is also an effective indicator when searching for malicious activity.

Figure 8 shows an example of multiple access to SCCMContentLib$ in Event 5140.

Figure 9 shows an example of a Cortex XDR alert that detects this activity.

Monitoring SCCM Logs for Malicious Activity

To detect enumeration of SCCM native log files, organizations can monitor for high volumes of file access (read or open operations) to the following directories:

• C:\Windows\CCM\Logs
• C:\Windows\CCMCACHE
• C:\Windows\CCMSETUP

Look for access by user accounts or processes that are not typically associated with routine SCCM client operations.

Figure 10 shows an example of a Cortex XDR alert that detects this activity.

Conclusion

Organizations must recognize that SCCM is not just an IT management platform, but a privileged infrastructure component and critical security dependency. Securing it requires more than routine patching - it demands visibility, context-aware detection, and proactive monitoring.

Part two of this series will delve into advanced attack techniques like credential access and persistence, along with practical strategies for detecting and mitigating these threats.

Alert Table

The alerts discussed in this blog are located under the 'Microsoft SCCM Analytics' UI tag on Cortex XDR.

Additional Resources

Tools

• GitHub - Mayyhem/SharpSCCM - A C# utility for interacting with SCCM
• SCCMHunter - A post-exploitation tool built to streamline identifying, profiling, and attacking SCCM-related assets in an Active Directory domain

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