Could the Pakistani-Saudi Defense Pact Be the First Step Toward a NATO-Style Alliance

Critical Questions by Diya Ashtakala, Doreen Horschig, and Bailey Schiff

Published October 6, 2025

On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA), a defense pact that considers "any aggression against either country" as "an aggression against both," echoing NATO's Article 5 language and signaling their intent to strengthen deterrence amid rising tensions in the Middle East. For Saudi Arabia, the agreement provides a formalized security partnership that reassures domestic and regional audiences of its ability to deter aggression, particularly in a volatile Gulf environment. For Pakistan, the pact offers strategic, political, and economic benefits, including a stronger footprint in the Middle East.

The pact suggests that Riyadh is diversifying its security partnerships beyond its reliance on Washington, with the recent Israeli strikes in Doha providing the final political cover needed to execute the shift. U.S.-Saudi defense ties are anchored in a decades-long security partnership in which the United States provides advanced weapons systems, training, and security guarantees, illustrated by major arms sales including F-15 fighter jets and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missiles, U.S. military training programs for Saudi officers, and U.S. deployments to protect Gulf oil infrastructure. The SMDA reconfigures regional power dynamics by deepening the Pakistani-Saudi relationship, intensifying India's security balancing act, and raising questions about Israel's regional access to air corridors.

While the pact's NATO-like language signals an intent to strengthen collective deterrence, the SMDA currently lacks the necessary provisions for nuclear deterrence and regional political consensus to evolve into a joint defense framework. Instead, one of the pact's main implications is a heightened U.S. and international focus on the credibility of Riyadh's nuclear nonproliferation commitments, as the security partnership reinforces existing concerns over Riyadh's potential shortcut to a nuclear weapon via Islamabad.

Q1: What current developments or triggers caused Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to formalize a mutual defense pact?

A1: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia reportedly discussed the pact for over a year, influenced by Riyadh's longstanding concerns over Tehran's and Washington's reliability, but it appears to have gained momentum due to renewed fears of regional spillovers following Israeli strikes in Doha.

Saudi Arabia has long viewed Iran's missile capabilities, nuclear advances, and proxy activities as persistent threats, relying on an implicit U.S. security umbrella to counter them, rooted in arms sales, military basing, and political assurances. Saudi leaders sought to formalize U.S. protection through NATO-style security guarantees in 2022-2023 and the pursuit of F-35 jets in May 2025. However, several U.S. decisions, including non-retaliation after the 2019 Houthis strikes on Abqaiq oil facilities, the 2021 withdrawal of missile defenses, and the end of support for Saudi operations in Yemen, weakened Riyadh's confidence in U.S. protection. These moments have defined Saudi strategy: pressing the United States for stronger guarantees while hedging through alternative partnerships.

A turning point came on September 9, 2025, when Israeli jets struck a residential compound in Doha, killing five senior Hamas leaders, underscoring the risk of Israeli operations spilling over into neighboring states with minimal U.S. pushback. Across the Gulf, states recalibrated their defense strategies: Qatar strengthened its defense agreement with the United States, the Arab League convened an emergency summit, and Egypt reportedly proposed forming a NATO-style Arab defense force. For Saudi Arabia, the pact is less reflective of concern about direct strikes in its territory, given its quiet coordination with Israel against Iran, Saudi policies against proxy operations in the kingdom, and Israel's ambitions for a normalization deal.. Rather, the strike reinforced longstanding doubts about relying solely on the United States amid widening Iranian proxy activity and what Saudi Arabia views as unconstrained Israeli operations. The attack, nonetheless, created both a sense of urgency and political cover for Riyadh to formalize the pact.

For Pakistan, the pact serves distinct but complementary strategic, economic, and political goals. Strategically, the mutual defense clause comes not only after the Doha strikes but also after the May 2025 crisis with India, an important driver in Pakistan's security calculus. Politically, it provides a baseline for Pakistan to formalize security partnerships in the Middle East. Economically, the pact opens possibilities for Saudi investment, loans, defense purchases, and technology cooperation, which could offer Islamabad a potential financial lifeline amid economic turmoil.

Q2: Does the defense pact mean Pakistan provides extended nuclear deterrence to Saudi Arabia?

A2: The pact does not establish extended nuclear deterrence, making such an arrangement unlikely in the near term. But statements by political figures have fueled speculation about future possibilities. In a media interview, Pakistan's Defense Minister Khwaja Asif stated that "what we have, our capabilities, will absolutely be available under this pact." He later walked back these comments, clarifying that nuclear weapons "were not on the radar." Meanwhile, a Saudi official proclaimed that the agreement "will utilize all defensive and military means deemed necessary, depending on the specific threat."

Other press releases, however, adopted a more measured tone. Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs described a broad defense pact without implying formalized extended nuclear deterrence. Saudi Arabia's press attaché in Islamabad emphasized that the newly signed agreement expands existing military cooperation through enhanced operational readiness, joint military exercises, and intelligence sharing.

Beyond political rhetoric, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine complicates the prospects for extended nuclear deterrence. Islamabad's nuclear arsenal primarily deters conventional aggression and nuclear threats from India and maintains a first-use option designed to offset its neighbor's conventional superiority. Pakistan has not publicly indicated that its doctrine extends beyond this framework, making any extended nuclear deterrence guarantee to Saudi Arabia a departure from its established strategic orientation.

Q3: How have key regional and international stakeholders responded?

A3: Initial reactions to the pact from Iran, India, and Israel have ranged from strategic interest to silence.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, in his recent address to the United Nations General Assembly, envisioned a "radiant future" where Iran, alongside its neighbors, ensures "collective security" through "genuine mechanisms of defensive cooperation and joint response to threats." Senior Iranian advisors to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei echoed the sentiment that the pact was a positive development toward a regional defense pact. Similarly, Iranian state media cast the pact as non-adversarial and even constructive, with news outlets Tasnim and Al-Alam portraying it as a boost of Saudi deterrence against Israel, while Fararu, the Islamic Republic News Agency, and Tehran Times suggest it could evolve into a broader NATO-style alliance, including Iran. Together, these narratives indicate that Tehran does not view the pact as a direct threat and is exploring how it can leverage it.

India maintains a neutral stance on the defense pact, noting that New Delhi knew about the pact's formalization and will study its implications for national security and regional stability. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs emphasized the importance of ties with Riyadh and urged that parties to the SMDA "keep in mind mutual interest and sensitivities." This response reflects the complexity of India's position, shaped by its growing relationship with Saudi Arabia through the 2019 Strategic Partnership Council Agreement, which established a high-level council to promote cooperation in defense production and the energy sector. The partnership has since expanded, as demonstrated by joint naval exchanges in August 2025. India will closely monitor how the SMDA affects its strained relationship with Pakistan. Defense Minister Asif's remarks suggest that Saudi troops could intervene in India-Pakistan border disputes, though he noted that the SMDA does not name any particular country. Any Saudi involvement in an India-Pakistan conflict would complicate the strategic stance of all three parties, given Riyadh's ties with both New Delhi and Islamabad.

The Israeli government, by contrast, has remained silent on the topic. Since Pakistan gave Israel assurances in the late 1990s that it would not provide nuclear technology or knowledge to any Middle Eastern countries, Israel has not factored the country into its regional security strategy. Pakistan's formal defense ties with Saudi Arabia, however, inject uncertainty for Israel's regional posturing, which has quietly relied on Saudi airspace, refueling corridors, and radar data during limited operations against the Houthis and long-range strikes on Iran. If the pact expands into a multi-lateral arrangement, it risks complicating Israeli access to other Gulf air corridors, particularly over the United Arab Emirates and Jordan.

Q4: Could the pact translate to a NATO-style collective defense agreement for Arab nations?

A4: Although the pact's language echoes NATO-like commitments, its durability and potential to expand to other countries remain uncertain. Whether SMDA can evolve into a multilateral arrangement resembling NATO will depend on what scenarios constitute collective retaliation, the role of nuclear weapons, and overcoming regional politics.

First, the pact leaves the scope of collective response broad and undefined. By contrast, NATO's Article 5 commits members to act in the event of "an armed attack," with Article 6 specifying what type of attack would constitute a response. The SMDA declares that "any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both." The press release uses the term "aggression" instead of "armed attack," leaving it more expansive than NATO's terminology, and could include terrorism, proxy attacks, or minor incursions.

Second, the Pakistani-Saudi agreement does not address nuclear deterrence. From NATO's 1954 Military Committee document MC 48 through its latest strategic concept, nuclear weapons have been the core of its Article 5 mutual security guarantee. In contrast, the SMDA's press release makes no mention of nuclear deterrence or nuclear weapons. Given Pakistan's nuclear status, this omission prompted observers to question whether the pact could both garner regional support and project credibility without visible signaling, institutional planning, or deployments.

Finally, expanding the SMDA beyond Pakistan and Saudi Arabia into a NATO-style arrangement with Arab states would face significant political obstacles. Efforts to deepen regional defense cooperation have stumbled: At the Doha Summit in September 2025, Qatar and the UAE allegedly rejected Egypt's proposal for a joint Arab military force over fears of worsening regional polarization, while other Gulf states withheld support amid concern over including Iran or Turkey. These divisions highlight why countries in the region often prefer bilateral mutual defense arrangements, such as the recent U.S. defense assurance to Qatar. Pakistan has suggested opening SMDA to additional Arab nations, but without full details of the agreement's provisions, the proposal's feasibility remains uncertain.

Q5: What does the new pact mean for Saudi nuclear interests?

A5: The defense pact with Pakistan could influence Saudi Arabia's interest in and prospects for nuclear weapons. While Riyadh has emphasized that its nuclear program is intended for civilian use, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (known as MBS) said that the kingdom "will have to get" a nuclear weapon if Iran acquires one, suggesting that the civilian program is contingent on regional developments. While the new defense pact with Pakistan does not explicitly include extended nuclear deterrence for Saudi Arabia, it fuels concerns over the kingdom's ambitions to preserve an option to obtain its own nuclear weapons should it feel the need to do so.

The long-held "bomb in the basement" theory-that Saudi Arabia could quickly acquire a nuclear weapon-has gained credibility over time. Evidence includes visits by the former Saudi defence minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz al Saud to the Pakistani nuclear research centre in 1999 and 2002, a statement from MBS that he could simply "buy [a nuclear bomb] from Pakistan," and the acquisition of nuclear-capable missiles. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia provided financial lifelines, including oil credits, deposits, and direct aid, that mitigated the impact of Western sanctions on Pakistan and emboldened Islamabad to pursue further nuclear tests. Riyadh might have expected to eventually access or receive nuclear capabilities in return.

If Saudi Arabia views relying on Pakistan for a nuclear weapon as a viable shortcut to the bomb, it may abandon possible interests in indigenous development, which requires more time, money, and technical expertise. So far, Saudi Arabia has rejected the U.S. "gold standard" in negotiations over a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. That standard would bar the kingdom from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel-essential elements in the pathway for building nuclear weapons from scratch. A sudden Saudi willingness to accept these U.S. restrictions could signal that Riyadh intends to rely on Pakistan instead, raising the risk of nuclear proliferation through that partnership. In either case, the deepening Pakistani-Saudi relationship should heighten U.S. and international focus on both Saudi nuclear ambitions and the credibility of its nonproliferation commitments.

Q6: What comes next?

A6: The pact comes amid growing uncertainty for regional and international security and countries weighing how to defend themselves. Looking ahead, three critical developments could influence the direction of the Pakistan-Saudi pact:

First, on nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may not see eye to eye: Saudi Arabia appears interested in some form of extended nuclear deterrence, while Pakistan has publicly walked back statements suggesting it would provide such guarantees. Policymakers should watch for clarifications from both governments, including whether Saudi officials signal continued interest in nuclear options and whether Pakistan establishes formal limits on the pact's scope regarding nuclear capabilities. These statements and policy signals will determine the long-term feasibility of any nuclear-related assurances.

Second, the pact may reshape alliances in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia could further deepen ties with Pakistan through joint military exercises, arms or technology transfers, or closer consultation on nuclear issues. Meanwhile, India may strengthen security cooperation with Israel, leveraging technology, intelligence, and defense support to protect its interests. In July 2025, the director general of Israel's Ministry of Defense visited New Delhi to meet with the Indian defense secretary. The two leaders agreed to create an institutional framework to further deepen their defense cooperation. Analysts should track joint exercises, defense agreements, and other bilateral initiatives that reflect these evolving alignments.

Lastly, the idea of a NATO-modeled alliance will continue to spark discussion despite political obstacles. Policymakers should watch whether the SMDA clarifies what constitutes collective action, how it addresses nuclear signaling, and whether additional countries that join would shape a future regional security framework. Although the SMDA currently leaves collective response undefined and excludes nuclear deterrence, NATO's founding 1949 North Atlantic Treaty also initially omitted the term "nuclear weapons." Like NATO, the pact could evolve over time, with subsequent agreements or strategic planning defining the role of deterrence and the scope of collective defense.

Diya Ashtakala is a research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Doreen Horschig is a fellow with PONI at CSIS. Bailey Schiff is a program coordinator and research assistant with PONI at CSIS.

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