Chokepoint: How the War with Iran Threatens Global Food Security

Critical Questions by Emma Curtis, Joely Virzi, and Caitlin Welsh

Published March 11, 2026

Following joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, and Iran's subsequent strikes across the Middle East, the Strait of Hormuz has effectively closed, squeezing a critical chokepoint in global oil, natural gas, and fertilizer trade. Strikes on three commercial vessels this week and the suspected deployment of sea mines in the strait's waters have elevated the risk of commercial transit, deepening uncertainty over how quickly shipping lanes can be restored. The United States has struck Iran's mine-laying ships and put forward the possibility of military escorts to facilitate trade through the strait, although thus far the U.S. Navy has declined near-daily requests from commercial operators.

Fertilizer prices have spiked, and fears over near-term supply issues have plunged farmers across the Northern Hemisphere into greater uncertainty ahead of the spring planting season. How will the conflict impact global fertilizer and agricultural markets, and which countries face the greatest exposure? What factors will determine whether today's energy- and fertilizer-market shock translates to a prolonged food security crisis?

Q1: What does the conflict mean for global fertilizer markets?

A1: Of the three major nutrient groups used as fertilizers-nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium-nitrogen is the most consumed, accounting for approximately 59 percent of total global fertilizer use in 2023, compared to 21 percent for phosphate and 20 percent for potash (potassium). Nitrogen is an indispensable input at every stage of the growing cycle, including protein synthesis and photosynthetic efficiency (and therefore crop yield). Roughly 45 percent of global nitrogenous fertilizer use is for growing staple grain and cereal crops like wheat, rice, and maize, which provide over 40 percent of global caloric intake.

Grain and cereal producers are vulnerable to disruptions in nitrogenous fertilizer markets, while the geographic concentration of fertilizer production compounds this vulnerability. The Middle East is home to leading exporters of both liquified natural gas (LNG), a major feedstock for synthetic nitrogenous fertilizers, and fertilizers themselves, including urea and ammonia, the most common forms of nitrogenous fertilizers. A vast majority of these exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. All told, the strait supports 20 percent of global LNG exports and 20-30 percent of global fertilizer exports, including 35 percent of global urea exports.

Phosphate fertilizer trade carries its own exposure. Approximately 20 percent of global phosphate fertilizer trade originates from countries affected by the strait's disruptions or the regional conflict more broadly, with Saudi Arabia and Israel together accounting for 17 percent of global phosphate fertilizer exports. Furthermore, sulfur, a byproduct of oil and gas processing, is also critical for phosphate fertilizer production. Approximately 45 percent of global sulfur trade is affected by the conflict's disruptions. If energy shipments through the strait remain curtailed, and sulfur output falls alongside fuel exports, then the ability of many countries to produce phosphate fertilizers will be diminished.

At the same time, other major suppliers of fertilizers are not able to increase production to offset the potential reduced supply from the Middle East. Russia, for example, is responsible for approximately one-fifth of global fertilizer trade, including 14 percent of global nitrogenous fertilizer exports. Today, Russia is contending with domestic export limits and recent Ukrainian attacks on production plants, with industry sources reporting that companies are focused on meeting domestic demand. China imposed restrictions on phosphate fertilizer exports in the spring of 2021 to ensure fertilizer affordability in domestic markets. While the restriction is set to expire in August of this year, which could increase Chinese supplies on global markets, recent market shocks may encourage China to extend export restrictions to continue to protect domestic markets.

Q2: How are global fertilizer and food markets reacting to the conflict?

A2: The Strait of Hormuz is a chokepoint in global fertilizer production and trade, affecting several major suppliers of fertilizer inputs and end products in a highly concentrated industry. Prior to the onset of war with Iran, global fertilizer prices were already high: In 2025, fertilizer prices had jumped 18 percent, remaining above pre-pandemic levels. The closure of the strait is considered a "worst case scenario" for global fertilizer markets. Soon after conflict broke out, fertilizer prices increased, and prices have remained elevated as concerns over the Gulf's production and export capacity solidified. By March 11, global urea prices had increased nearly 26 percent, from $465.5 per metric ton to $585 per metric ton, compared to prices immediately pre-war.

Disruptions in the Gulf region pose risks across global agricultural markets. No region is completely insulated, and the effects of any sustained disruption could reverberate globally through higher input costs, lower crop yields, and, ultimately, higher food prices.

Asian markets are particularly exposed in light of the strait's closure. In 2024, 83 percent of LNG transiting the Strait of Hormuz went to Asian markets, with China, India, and South Korea accounting for 52 percent of LNG imports. India, in particular, faces immediate exposure, with fertilizer manufacturers, including Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Limited, already cutting urea output as high LNG prices raise production costs. These pressures come at a critical juncture: India's monsoon season begins in June, and fertilizer demand typically peaks in the preceding months. Prolonged shipping disruptions could leave Indian farmers facing fertilizer shortages and higher input costs. These pressures extend across the region, with Southeast Asian granular urea prices jumping over 40 percent since the conflict began.

Brazil imported about 49.11 million metric tons of fertilizer in 2025, making it the world's largest importer of fertilizer, with key suppliers in the Middle East. Although Brazilian officials have noted that the country is well positioned to weather short-term disruptions, any prolonged disruption to production or shipping in the region could tighten fertilizer availability and raise costs for Brazilian farmers.

Fertilizer use is low across sub-Saharan Africa, so many of the region's producers are less exposed to fertilizer price increases than regions with higher input intensity. Given the relative strength of the dollar, the currency in which fertilizers are traded, many African producers do not have the financial capacity to absorb price increases and could reduce use, further cutting yields and deepening food insecurity for those who rely on local markets.

Agricultural commodity prices have also been affected, though the full picture remains to be seen. Two early patterns are worth noting. When fossil fuel prices rise, renewable fuels made from agricultural feedstocks, like soybeans and corn, become more attractive. Within the first week of the war, soybean oil futures hit their highest price in two and a half years. For similar reasons, Brazilian cane mills are expected to prioritize ethanol-a cane-based biofuel-over sugar, potentially increasing global sugar prices.

Q3: To what extent is U.S. agriculture exposed to fertilizer market disruptions?

A3: The United States relies heavily on nitrogenous fertilizer imports, with Russia and Qatar as its top suppliers of urea. Urea prices at the New Orleans import hub jumped 32 percent, from $516 per metric ton on Friday, February 27, to $683 on Thursday, March 5. According to one advisory firm, one ton of urea cost U.S. farmers the equivalent of 75 bushels of corn in December 2025, while this week, one ton of urea costs the equivalent of 126 bushels. The firm estimates that urea prices jumped 77 percent from mid-December 2025 to March 9, 2026.

The strait's closure is particularly ill timed for U.S. agricultural producers, as the spring planting season sees the largest volumes of fertilizer imports on average (see Figure 1). Vessels traveling from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. Gulf coast typically take 30 days, meaning supply disruptions today could adversely affect peak spring planting windows in March and April. U.S. fertilizer markets lack strategic reserves and domestic production cannot scale quickly enough to offset sudden import disruptions, especially during spring planting seasons.

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