Cantwell Demands Federal Agencies Immediately Address Coordination Failures, Aviation Safety Risks of Counter-Drone Activities

"We need leadership at your respective agencies to allocate appropriate resources and attention to fix these coordination problems without delay-before a preventable tragedy occurs."

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Attorney General Pam Bondi, Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Bryan Bedford demanding they immediately address the interagency coordination failures that led to two major incidents last month involving counter-drone high energy laser systems near El Paso and Fort Hancock Texas, and Santa Teresa, New Mexico.

"The Federal interagency coordination process for counter-drone activities is clearly broken," wrote Sen. Cantwell. "In the past month, federal officials deployed a novel counter-drone high-energy laser near the Texas-Mexico border on multiple occasions. It does not appear these actions served their intended purpose of mitigating specific drone threats. Instead, these incidents highlighted serious process failures that expose the flying public to unacceptable safety risks."

During a March 4, 2026 classified briefing on the counter-drone incidents, leaders from the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FAA acknowledged serious interagency coordination failures. The El Paso incident was the first known domestic use of a counter-drone laser system conducted outside of a controlled environment and led to a shutdown of the airspace around El Paso and Santa Teresa that was abruptly lifted just hours later after causing some airlines to cancel flights. Just two weeks later, DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not notify the military about its own drone operations in DoD's vicinity, leading to the military downing a CBP drone.

"Both incidents highlight fundamental coordination and communication failings that resulted in unnecessary risks to the national airspace system," wrote Sen. Cantwell. "This leads me to question who should have authority to use the high-energy laser technology and whether the federal government is prepared to properly execute its responsibilities with state and local authorities on the use of counter-drone technologies and systems that Congress recently granted in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act."

"With the 2026 FIFA World Cup events," her letter continued, "including six matches that will be hosted in Seattle this June and July - and the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics fast approaching, each agency with counter-drone responsibilities needs to be prepared now to act swiftly in the face of any such threat without jeopardizing aviation safety."

The text of today's letter can be found below and HERE.

March 11, 2026

Secretary Hegseth, Attorney General Bondi, Secretary Duffy, Secretary Noem, and Administrator Bedford:

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has exclusive authority to ensure the safety of the national airspace system and efficient use of the nation's airspace. Each Federal agency granted counter-drone authorities to detect, identify, mitigate, or neutralize drone threats is required under Federal law to coordinate with the FAA so the FAA can ensure that the use of counter-drone technologies or systems do not adversely impact or interfere with the safe and efficient operation of the national airspace system. Congress required relevant agencies to coordinate with the FAA because counter-drone actions may result in unintended risks to aviation safety if not conducted responsibly. These statutory interagency coordination requirements must not be relegated to mere box-checking exercises.

The Federal interagency coordination process for counter-drone activities is clearly broken. In the past month, federal officials deployed a novel counter-drone high-energy laser near the Texas-Mexico border on multiple occasions. It does not appear these actions served their intended purpose of mitigating specific drone threats. Instead, these incidents highlighted serious process failures that expose the flying public to unacceptable safety risks. With the number and type of drone incursions into the United States potentially expected to increase significantly, your agencies must resolve these deficiencies without delay.

Following a March 4, 2026 classified briefing from relevant agencies, I am deeply concerned about the lack of a clear and effective coordination plan for the responsible use of counter-drone systems. During the briefing, leadership of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the FAA acknowledged that serious interagency failures and missteps impacted last month's incidents related to the use or potential use of counter-drone high energy laser systems near El Paso, Texas, Santa Teresa, New Mexico, and Fort Hancock, Texas.

The shutting down of the El Paso and Santa Teresa airspace made the public and Congress aware of the first known domestic use of a counter-drone laser system outside of controlled environments. It is unacceptable that this system was deployed without adequate coordination with FAA, which likely violated the law. And it is unacceptable that yet another incident occurred just two weeks later when DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) failed to notify the military about its own drone operations in DoD's vicinity, leading to the military downing a CBP drone near Fort Hancock.

Both incidents highlight fundamental coordination and communication failings that resulted in unnecessary risks to the national airspace system. Simply put - the current interagency process is not working. This leads me to question who should have authority to use the high-energy laser technology and whether the federal government is prepared to properly execute its responsibilities with state and local authorities on the use of counter-drone technologies and systems that Congress recently granted in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. In extending these authorities, Congress required DHS and the Department of Justice to issue regulations governing personnel training and certification to ensure anyone operating counter-drone systems below the Federal level knows how to properly identify drone threats and safely mitigate those threats without putting civilian aircraft at risk. With the 2026 FIFA World Cup events - including six matches that will be hosted in Seattle this June and July - and the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics fast approaching, each agency with counter-drone responsibilities needs to be prepared now to act swiftly in the face of any such threat without jeopardizing aviation safety.

We need leadership at your respective agencies to allocate appropriate resources and attention to fix these coordination problems without delay-before a preventable tragedy occurs.

Your agencies have indicated they are actively working to address the process failures that contributed to last month's incidents. To ensure rapid progress is being made, I request that you brief the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee on the actions you have taken or plan to take to fix the interagency coordination process, your plans for implementing the new counter-drone authorities at the state and local level, the results of FAA's safety risk management analysis of DoD's counter-drone high-energy laser technology, and other relevant updates. I request that this briefing occur no later than March 25, 2026.

Sincerely,

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