DDG Nordquist highlights role of trade remedies amid global trade challenges at Seoul Forum

Speaking at the 24th Seoul International Forum on Trade Remedies on 23 June, WTO Deputy Director-General DJ Nordquist underscored the importance of transparent and predictable trade remedy practices in a period of heightened uncertainty for the global trading system. She highlighted the continued resilience of global trade, the growing use of WTO-consistent trade remedy instruments by members, and the need for WTO reform to ensure that the multilateral trading system remains responsive to contemporary economic realities and emerging trade challenges. Her full remarks are below.

DDG Nordquist highlights role of trade remedies amid global trade challenges at Seoul Forum

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• Deputy Director-General Jennifer Nordquist
• Anti-dumping
• Subsidies and countervailing measures
• Safeguard measures

I'm honored to be here to address the 24th Annual Seoul International Forum on Trade Remedies.�

First of all, I'd like to thank Chairman Jaehyoung of the Korea Trade Commission for his kind invitation, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources for its continued support of the Forum, and to everyone involved for all the hard work that went into making this Forum a success.

This is my first trip to Korea, so I am excited to be here!�

I am an econ nerd, so wanted to note that that your economy has undergone one of the most striking development transformations of the modern era-rising from a post-war aid recipient in the 1950s to a high-income, innovation-driven economy.�

Your investments in education, infrastructure, and technology, paired with sound economic management, fueled this shift. Bravo!

From 1980 to 2024, real GDP grew an average of 5.6% annually, and GNI per capita increased from $67 in the early 1950s to $36,624 in 2024. Pretty remarkable!�

With a trade-to-GDP ratio of around 85%, South Korea has a strong interest in a stable, predictable, and rules-based trading environment, including the consistent and transparent application of trade remedies.

Now, looking specifically at the trade piece which is part of the overall macro picture: this Forum is the only event of its kind that brings together trade remedy officials from around the world each year.

For nearly a quarter century, it has been a place for trade remedy experts to share their experiences, learn from one another, and explore practical solutions to trade enforcement challenges.�

This type of dialogue is incredibly useful - and now more necessary than ever given the current geoeconomic challenges facing the global trading system. So thank you again for continuing to provide this important space for us to meet.

Before other speakers delve into the technical details, I would like to begin with a broader overview of recent developments at the WTO and in the global trading system, including, of course, advances in the area of trade remedies. I hope this wider perspective will provide a useful backdrop for our discussion today.

Let me start by noting what many of you here who work in the trade trenches on a daily basis know only too well: the global trading system is experiencing some of the most significant changes starting 25 years ago, affecting the rules-based architecture that was conceived after World War II.

These shifts have engendered rising uncertainty, changing trade policies, and heightened geopolitical tensions. These developments have affected many WTO Members, creating considerable questions at both the political level and within business communities around the world.

Companies, consumers, and countries (I got the 3 Cs in there!) are grappling with the impacts of these developments, which continue to unfold, while also contending with the uncertainty, disruption, and human costs associated with ongoing physical conflicts, including in Ukraine and the Middle East.

These challenges did not emerge out of nowhere. They reflect broader concerns among some WTO Members that the current trading system is not working for them as it was intended, and that the carefully negotiated balance of rights and obligations that was agreed to when the WTO came into being has gotten a little out of whack.

Many of the expressed concerns are well founded. Yet WTO Members have, over time, been unable to bridge their differences and deliver effective solutions to these concerns - even though meaningful reform in a Member-driven organization depends precisely on such collective action.

This inability to update the global trade rulebook and to address current realities has fuelled much of the frustration and policy responses we are witnessing today.

These concerns, along with recent crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath, highlighted certain structural overdependencies and potential supply chain risks within the trading system.

These vulnerabilities include the concentration of global demand in a limited number of markets, including the United States; dependence on China for rare earths and other strategic inputs; reliance on Chinese Taipei for advanced semiconductors; and the concentration of vaccine innovation and exports in a small number of countries.

Classic economic theory makes the case for comparative advantage. The global trading system was designed to foster that interdependence, bringing countries together in support of peace and prosperity - but not overdependence. Ricardo's theory did not anticipate the degree of cross-border mobility that characterizes today's global economy. It is therefore unsurprising that the vulnerabilities exposed by highly concentrated supply chains and mobile production networks, have contributed to economic anxiety and political tension.

Concerns about supply chain resilience, geopolitical instability, and economic security have strengthened calls to reduce reliance on international trade and to question both the architecture and benefits of the trading system.

Some of these concerns are understandable. Open trade can transmit shocks across borders, and its costs can fall heavily on particular regions or communities. But trade has also repeatedly helped countries absorb and adapt to disruptions. Let me give you a few examples.

• The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 was initially marked by export restrictions on suddenly scarce products, such as personal protective equipment - PPE. But international supply chains quickly adapted to expand the production and distribution of essential medical goods.
• At the same time, the production of a reliable COVID vaccine depended on inputs and components sourced from up to 19 different countries. The WTO helped by providing timely information to policymakers, identifying bottlenecks, and encouraging measures to speed the movement of vaccine inputs and other critical products.
• In 2022, when the war in Ukraine disrupted Egypt's traditional grain supplies, the depth of global cereal markets enabled the country to secure wheat from alternative suppliers, including the United States and the European Union.
• Developments in the Strait of Hormuz created a significant chokepoint for global trade flows, with implications for energy, chemicals, and other critical supply chains. At the same time, there is an important silver lining. We have observed that policy responses to the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz have so far been notably less restrictive than those seen during the pandemic and the war in Ukraine.�
• Of the approximately 78 trade-related measures introduced to date, around 70% have been trade-facilitating, including steps to increase supplies of oil, gas, and refined products, ease export restrictions, and streamline customs procedures for energy, fertilisers, and food.
• We therefore welcome the ceasefire, not least because of the relief it will bring to those affected by the conflict, and hope it will support a smooth resumption of commerce and help ease pressures on global supply chains.

The multilateral trading system, embodied by the WTO, has been a cornerstone of this adaptability. By providing transparent and predictable trading conditions, it has enabled countries and businesses to diversify their sources of inputs and finished goods across a wide range of suppliers. This flexibility has allowed trade flows to be redirected when disruptions occur, helping to mitigate the impact of successive global shocks and strengthened economic resilience.

While headlines often emphasize fragmentation, de-risking, and growing trade frictions, the data paint a more nuanced picture. Global trade expanded by approximately 4.7% in 2025 - almost twice the rate of global economic growth (2.9%) and far exceeding even our own economists' expectations, who had projected a slight contraction of 0.2%.

While our economists expect merchandise trade growth to slow to 1.9% in 2026, trade is projected to expand again to 2.6% in 2027. �(As you can tell, it's pretty hard to model something predicated on geoeconomic variables).�

The bottom line is that commerce is still chugging along.

But the continued challenges facing the global trading environment compel us to ask whether the existing rules remain fully responsive and fit-for-purpose in today's realities. And we should acknowledge candidly that important shortcomings persist.

When the multilateral trading system took shape in 1947 through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, it brought together just 23 largely like-minded economies. With the creation of the WTO in 1995, membership expanded to 128 economies.

Today, the WTO comprises 166 Members with different economic interests and models, development levels, and policy priorities.

This growing diversity is a testament to the WTO's enduring utility, as is the fact that more than 20 other economies are seeking accession - they want to join the club.

But it has also made consensus-based decision-making (which in practice has meant "unanimity") increasingly difficult, underscoring the need for more effective and flexible ways of working.

At the same time, much of the WTO rulebook has remained largely unchanged since the 1990s, despite profound transformations in the global economy.

If the WTO is to continue serving as the foundation of an open, stable, and predictable trading system, its Members must be capable of adapting to the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

And it's one of the rare points on which all WTO Members align: the WTO needs reform. The real challenge is agreeing on what that reform should look like.

At our most recent Ministerial Conference in Cameroon, Ministers held the first-ever discussion on WTO reform at the ministerial level. That was an important milestone, because meaningful reform will require political guidance and engagement from capitals.

As many of you may know, however, Members have not yet been able to adopt the Cameroon package of reforms. The main obstacle has been the lack of consensus on extending the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions.

As a result, the discussions have returned to Geneva, which is not unprecedented. While progress may not be as fast as we would like, the conversation is moving forward. Trade agreements usually take years if not decades.� We hope Members will soon be able to bridge their remaining differences and focus their efforts on the broader reform agenda that everyone agrees is necessary.

But the WTO is about much more than Ministerial conferences. While these meetings are important, they are only milestones. The substantive work of negotiation, consensus-building, and implementation happens every day in Geneva before and after those meetings. And many aspects of the system continue to function well. Let me highlight a few examples.

• First, the WTO's rules on tariffs, regulatory measures, customs valuation, and intellectual property continue to provide the common framework that underpins global trade. They create a shared set of expectations and disciplines that enable goods and services to move across borders with greater predictability, transparency, and confidence.
• Second, despite the rapid growth of bilateral and regional trade agreements over the past three decades, 72% of global merchandise trade still takes place on core most-favoured-nation (MFN) terms under WTO rules. Regional agreements undoubtedly play an important role but they are built upon a multilateral framework that continues to provide the foundation for global commerce. The WTO remains the baseline.
• Third, although the Appellate Body remains non-operational, many Members continue to use WTO panels, interim appeals arrangements, and WTO-facilitated mutually agreed solutions to resolve disputes. Over the past two years, 21 new disputes have been initiated, and the number of disputes resolved has been higher than the number of cases appealed to the non-functioning Appellate Body.
• Fourth, Members also continue to retain significant interest in applying traditional, WTO-sanctioned tools to remedy the effects of unfair and injuriously traded imports and unforeseen import surges - including market distortions that may result from potential trade diversion.�

Indeed, according to Member-provided data for 2025, anti-dumping and countervailing duty activity increased significantly. The number of Members launching proceedings, the total number of investigations initiated, and the number of measures applied in 2025 all exceeded historical trends.

In addition, in 2025 four Members - Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Iceland - reported to the WTO that they had established new investigating authorities to conduct trade remedy proceedings.

These notifications build upon similar recent developments in 2023 and 2024 when Georgia and Mauritius, as well as Cabo Verde and Cameroon respectively, also established similar trade remedy authorities.

As of the end of 2025, a total of 82 Members (almost half of the membership) notified the WTO that they have established a trade remedy authority, up from 72 in 2015.

Members also continue to demonstrate their engagement with trade remedies through active participation in the regular work of the committees on Anti-Dumping, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and Safeguards, including the Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention and the Working Group on Implementation.

These bodies - often the unsung heroes of the system - play a vital role in allowing Members to raise concerns early and to address issues collaboratively, often avoiding the need to resort to formal dispute settlement.

Indeed, the data show that since 1995, even where Members have requested formal consultations on trade remedy matters, more than one-third of those cases have not proceeded to the panel stage.

Trade remedy investigations are not easy - I don't need to tell this audience that -- neither for administering authorities nor for the parties involved. They require the handling of large volumes of information, a series of complex determinations, strict timelines, and detailed procedural steps that must be carefully followed to ensure compliance with the rules.

That said, there is broad recognition that trade remedies play a vital role in the global trading system. They provide Members with WTO-authorised tools to address the effects of unfair and injurious trade practices. And it is worth recalling that Article VI of the GATT 1947 explicitly states that dumping "is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury."

As such, I think one can fairly say that these tools play a foundational role in the system and help promote confidence across Members - and their respective publics - that they will have the means to counter unfair trade practices and to respond to sudden import surges.

The fact that Members broadly support remedies does not, of course, mean that all WTO Members agree on all remedy-related questions all the time!�

Indeed, as you well know, remedy investigations can have very real market and financial impacts on manufacturers, exporters, importers, downstream consumers, and of course, workers.

And so, these investigations are carefully scrutinized - both during the investigation itself and afterwards -- when the parties may challenge an authority's decisions in domestic court or at the WTO, where fully half of all dispute settlement proceedings that have been filed involved trade remedies.

When it comes to the WTO and to WTO disputes that involve remedies, we must acknowledge that, although they are clear on many things, the texts of the antidumping, SCM, and safeguard agreements may not potentially address all conceivable sets of circumstances and fact patterns.

Depending on one's perspective, this may be good or bad; and that perspective may change depending on whether you happen to be a petitioner, a respondent, an investigating authority, or a WTO Member.

Either way, questions about novel trade remedy practices are frequently raised by Members in WTO Committees and before WTO dispute settlement panels, often on the basis of treaty texts drafted three decades ago. These issues include concerns related to overcapacity and so-called "transnational" subsidies.

Let me be clear: I am not taking, and the Secretariat is not taking, a position on either of these issues.

But to bring this discussion full circle, I believe these types of questions point to an important opportunity - an opportunity for Members to take a fresh look at the existing rulebook and to update it to reflect current economic realities.

Updating the rules - including those on subsidies and dumping - would help promote certainty in the market, and minimize negative spillovers and related trade tensions, while supporting the efficient use of public resources.

Coming to an agreement on how to revise the rulebook - including reaching agreement on so-called "level playing field" concerns related to the proper role of industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, industrial policy, and other forms of intervention that may distort competition - will be a challenge.�

But WTO Members seem to be increasingly committed to meeting one another to map out problems, to identify potential solutions, and to find common ground on how to reform the system so that it continues to deliver the benefits of trade that it has delivered for so many years.

This Forum is certainly part of that process.� So I again, thank the Korea Trade Commission for all of your work in organizing and supporting the Forum.� And I look forward to the discussion.�

Thank you.

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