(As prepared for delivery)

The conflict in Ukraine is about to enter its fifth year. It continues to pose the world's biggest threat to nuclear safety.

As you are aware, the IAEA teams are on the ground at all the nuclear power plants affected by this conflict, and we have been publishing regular updates on the nuclear safety and security situation there.

The Seven Pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict clearly lay out necessary conditions, including that there must be secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites. This is pillar number four.

Principle 3 of the Five Principles for protecting the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) states that all efforts should be made to ensure offsite power remains available and secure at all times.

Both the IAEA's Seven Pillars and the Five Principles, which I delineated in response to the nuclear safety situation, have wide international support, including by the parties directly involved in this conflict.

I have repeatedly - both in this room and at the UN Security Council - called for adherence to them, especially when it comes to maintaining the essential offsite power supply, without which a nuclear power plant cannot operate safely.

On the ZNPP the latest, as you know, is that over past months, I have negotiated, together with Ukrainian and Russian counterparts, four separate temporary ceasefire agreements between both sides, for five separate repairs of power lines connected to the plant.

Most recently, on Monday, 19 January, Ukraine's ZNPP was reconnected to its last remaining backup power line after successful repairs were completed under the latest temporary ceasefire. This 330-kilovolt (kV) backup line had been damaged and disconnected since 2 January, reportedly because of military activity. Until its reconnection, ZNPP relied on its last remaining 750-kV main power line to provide the off-site power needed to operate safety systems to cool the NPP's six shutdown reactors and spent fuel pools.

IAEA teams continue to monitor ZNPP's ability to deal with winter conditions, including in keeping water in the cooling pond and sprinkler ponds from freezing.

I once again restate the need to abide by the Five Principles to avoid a nuclear accident at the ZNPP by making all efforts to avoid future damage to these lines, which could fatally affect the plant.

The offsite power supply to the nuclear power plants in Ukraine depends on crucial substations. Damage to them undermines nuclear safety and must be avoided. This stems from the internationally agreed nuclear safety standards.

In addition to IAEA teams being stationed at the 5 Nuclear Power Plants in Ukraine, our teams have also been on missions to assess the impact on nuclear safety of the situation at electrical substations.

The IAEA will, as a priority, continue to assess the functionality of these substations, within the parameters of its mandate.

As we speak, an IAEA expert mission is underway at Ukraine's electrical substations amid ongoing strikes on the country's power infrastructure. The mission will assess 10 substations crucial to nuclear safety. It is following up on some of the sites visited in December 2025 and examining additional sites not previously assessed.

Elsewhere in Ukraine, IAEA teams have reported military activities within proximity of nuclear power plants, including the Chornobyl NPP site, where they damaged a critical substation. Chornobyl NPP suffered the disconnection of one 750-kV power line, one 110-kV line and two 330-kV lines. Though the site received power from other offsite power lines, emergency diesel generators - both for the New Safe Confinement and for the Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility-2 - needed to be resorted to, either because of line disconnection or due to power fluctuations. The affected lines have since been reconnected.

Further detail on this is available in Update 338 on the IAEA's website and will, of course, be included in the upcoming report to the ordinary session of the Board.

As I have said before, the best way to ensure nuclear safety and security and the safety and security of the people who have suffered over almost four years of fighting is to bring this conflict to an end.

And allow me to make a final reflection. We are all, of course, extremely concerned by the ongoing war, and here at the IAEA, by its impact on nuclear safety. We have demonstrated, from the start, how it is possible to make good use of an international institution like the IAEA to prevent escalation and provide certain stability and predictability in the inevitably fluctuating scenario of an ongoing war. This requires focus, compromise, and a sense of responsibility. Our main goal is to ensure the continuity of our work. For this, I count on all of you. Thank you very much.