Automated license plate readers raise new questions about privacy

A version of the following public comment was submitted to members of the New Jersey Assembly Committee on Public Safety and Preparedness on October 19, 2026.

Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) are not new, but the technology is evolving

Proponents of ALPRs often note that police have used the technology for decades. That is true, but misleading. In 2014, about 59% of agencies with 100 or more officers used ALPRs, and researchers projected that figure would reach roughly two-thirds by 2016. However, adoption was far more limited among smaller departments. In 2020, only about 22% of all local police departments used ALPRs. In New Jersey, the State's most recent audit found that 523 of roughly 530 law enforcement agencies used ALPRs in 2025.

Earlier iterations of ALPRs were mounted on patrol vehicles and collected data only while those vehicles were on the road. At around $25,000 per unit, the equipment was expensive, so even agencies that adopted it owned only a handful. In 2014, three-quarters of large agencies using ALPRs had just seven or fewer units. Today, ALPRs are cheaper, more capable, and far more connected:

• Falling costs have made dense networks possible. A leading vendor's cameras now cost $3,000 to $5,200 each per year. Edison, New Jersey, recently approved a contract to install 90 new ALPRs, bringing the township of 109,000 residents to about 110 ALPRs. The cameras will cover every road in and out of the township.
• Fixed cameras powered by solar energy and connected via cellular networks can operate around the clock, so monitoring no longer depends on where patrol vehicles happen to drive.
• Artificial intelligence now allows systems to recognize a vehicle's make, model, color, and distinguishing features like bumper stickers or damage, so tracking no longer depends on reading license plates.
• Early systems generally stored data on local servers, which limited data sharing across jurisdictions. Today's systems pool and share data across agencies and integrate it with dispatch systems, drones, and other cameras.

Evidence on the effectiveness of ALPRs remains limited

ALPRs have legitimate uses, including toll collection and criminal investigations. However, evidence that they reduce crime remains limited. In New Jersey, an evaluation of Atlantic City's ALPR network expansion in 2022 found that shootings, auto thefts, and property crime declined after the expansion. However, the city launched a separate crime-fighting initiative the same month the cameras went live. Without a counterfactual, the analysis couldn't separate the two interventions or distinguish the measured declines in crime from broader national trends.

The most rigorous recent study, which has not yet been peer-reviewed, examined the deployment of Flock Safety ALPRs in 216 jurisdictions between 2017 and 2023. It found the deployments were associated with an 11% reduction in motor vehicle thefts. However, there was no significant effect on other property crimes and no improvement in the share of stolen vehicles recovered. The study did not examine violent crime.

The currently available evidence does not justify the scale at which ALPRs are being deployed, nor does it support the marketing claims of ALPR vendors. More evidence is needed to guide government decision-making about procuring and operating these systems. Ultimately, though, evidence on the efficacy of ALPRs shouldn't change what people can reasonably expect about the privacy of their movements.

Assembly Bill 5483 gets several things right

• Preserving the use of ALPRs to check plates in real time against a defined list of vehicles of interest, such as stolen vehicles, active warrants, and missing persons.
• Requiring a warrant or court order identifying the specific data requested before ALPR data can be shared outside of New Jersey.
• Prohibiting vendors from sharing or selling ALPR data and specifying that data collected under contract belongs to the government.
• Barring the government from using unlawfully obtained ALPR data, or evidence derived from it, in court.

Assembly Bill 5483 could be improved in several ways

Focus on government use, not private operators. The bill would ban private ALPRs entirely, but the privacy concerns that justify regulation arise from government use of the technology, not from private actors operating cameras on their own property. Private operators should remain free to use ALPRs and voluntarily share information with law enforcement. However, vendors operating cameras under contract with a government entity should be held to the same rules as governments.

Require a warrant to search historical location data. The bill's two-day retention limit is both too strict and insufficient. Two days is often too short for investigators to identify relevant records, especially when crimes are not reported in a timely manner. At the same time, the bill would allow law enforcement to retain data indefinitely simply by identifying it as evidence. A better approach would allow data to be kept for up to 30 days, while requiring a warrant to search data more than 24 to 48 hours old, with narrow exceptions for emergencies and cases where vehicle owners provide consent to locate a stolen vehicle.

Strengthen accountability. The bill requires logs of ALPR data access, but those logs should also record the purpose of each search. Searches of historical data should also require supervisor approval. New Jersey's annual State Police audits provide a strong foundation for transparency, but the published reports currently list little more than which agencies completed the audit and any reported violations. Annual audits should also provide information about how often agencies search ALPR data and for what purposes. Officers who misuse the system should face penalties.

Require verification before acting on alerts. ALPRs sometimes misread plates and produce false alerts. Before stopping a vehicle based on an ALPR alert, officers should confirm that the vehicle's plate matches the alert and that the underlying record is still current.

Protect sensitive locations. The bill should prohibit fixed cameras within a specified distance, such as 500 feet, of sensitive locations including medical facilities, houses of worship, and domestic violence shelters.

Conclusion

Assembly Bill 5483 rightly starts from the premise that New Jerseyans should not have their movements recorded and searched without limits. With these amendments, the bill would uphold that principle while preserving legitimate uses. We would welcome the opportunity to work with the sponsor and the Committee on this legislation.