• Med this Week Middle East and North Africa
  by Sara Isabella Leykin
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The MED This Week newsletter provides informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions and reliable foresight into future scenarios. Today, we continue to shed light on the anti-regime protests across Iran.

"Watch and see." This appears to be the posture adopted by US President Donald Trump in response to the protests in Iran, following hours of heightened anxiety during which a US attack against the country seemed imminent. On 14 January 2026, tensions escalated rapidly: US troops were withdrawn from Al-Udeid base - the largest US military installation in the Middle East, located in Qatar and already targeted by Iranian attacks in June 2025 -, several countries closed their embassies and urged their citizens to leave Iran, while commercial flights began avoiding Iranian airspace. Trump suggested that military action was postponed after assurances were received that the Iranian regime would refrain from executing protesters, amid reports from Iranian sources indicating that executions were about to begin. For its part, Iran appears determined to avoid provoking a US strike, mindful of the attacks it sustained last summer and fully aware that a direct American blow could prove fatal to the regime's survival. Yet Iran is not the only actor in the region to have breathed a sigh of relief. This wait-and-see posture also aligns with the attitude of other key Middle Eastern players, particularly the Gulf states, which have urged restraint amid fears of retaliation against US bases on their territory. The same goes for Israel, where officials believe that a premature escalation could prove counterproductive. Meanwhile, repression inside Iran continues unabated. At least 2,400 protesters have been killed since the crackdown last month, according to the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), and more than 10,600 Iranians have been arrested. The internet blackout imposed by the regime since 8 January continues to hamper the independent verification of events on the ground, preventing communication with the outside world and allowing human rights violations to remain largely hidden from global view. And while it is evident that this round of protests differs from the past ones in terms of both anger and scope - with the protest movement united around the same objective of dismantling the Islamic Republic - questions continue to be raised over the post-regime and the future of the country.

Experts from the ISPI network discuss the protests in Iran.

No easy strike: why a US military intervention will not solve Iran

"As I write this, the US has yet to carry out President Trump's repeated threats to take military action against Iran. The US leader on 14 January asserted that Iran had heeded his call to stop killing its own people. However, there is no assurance that the famously mercurial president will not change his mind or that Iran will stop its repression. In fact, the US has few good military options to produce meaningful political change in Iran. If it kills Iranian leaders, others will take their place. The exiled son of the late Shah is not going to parachute in to save the day. In a worst-case scenario, protests could devolve into civil strife that would send more Iranians crossing into Turkey or other neighbours as refugees. The US will not take them; indeed, Trump has put Iran on a no-visa list and deported hundreds of Iranians as part of his anti-immigrant campaign. Iran's military would likely retaliate against American bases in the Middle East, angering US Arab allies already shaken by the June war, which led to an Iranian strike on Al-Udeid air base in Qatar. Trump's claim of establishing "peace" in the region for the first time in 3000 years would ring even more hollow."

Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Stimson Center

The limits of the Iranian diaspora's mobilisation

"The Iranian diaspora has organised its usual protest actions in countries around the world to show solidarity with the movement in Iran. But they are rather divided and even acrimonious now. The monarchists and non-monarchists now unfortunately come to blows. The former insist on monarchist slogans, which alienate others. They also use slogans such as 'Death to the Left' that show obvious hostility. In places, they've shown hostility to slogans such as Women Life Freedom, seen as too progressive, and Death to Dictator (which they see as potentially targeting their own leader as well). There have been soft or hard clashes between Iranians in demonstrations in Vienna, Los Angeles, Toronto and Paris. The demonstrations are also less well-attended than previous examples as a result, and they haven't happened in as many places. Overall, the actions by diaspora are currently unlikely to play a key role in the movement in Iran, given the diaspora's division and its lack of a concentrated political power in one place where it really matters, i.e. the United States. Individual initiatives by politicians of Iranian heritage, such as Congresswoman Yasemin Ansari in the US or Iranian-origin legislators in Sweden, Norway, Belgium and Germany, might play a role, but it will be relatively small. From his American exile, Reza Pahlavi has played a significant role, now being chanted for as a leader by many in Iran. But he, like the rest of the Iranian diaspora, has also failed to build organisations that can lead the protests or play a decisive political role."

Arash Azizi, Postdoctoral Associate and Lecturer, Yale University, Program in Humanities

Protests in dark: repression, blackouts and disinformation in Iran's protests

"On 28 December 2025, Iran's anti-regime protests started in Tehran and quickly spread to several cities. However, in an authoritarian regime like Iran's Islamic Republic, free journalism - covering the country's events and developments - is not allowed. As a result, citizen journalism via various social media platforms has been the only source of information about the country during critical moments. Since 8 January, a total internet blackout has prevented people within the country from communicating with the outside world, resulting in the regime's deadly crackdown on protesters and other human rights violations remaining hidden from global view. Informal sources report over 2000 deaths, and the figure is rising. Meanwhile, to regain control over the protesters, the regime's media apparatus has launched a vigorous war of disinformation against the population, including spreading fake news about foreign state involvement in the protests, the presence of armed clashes, and activities that threaten Iran's territorial integrity. All these regime strategies are aimed at one goal: justifying the regime's brutal massacre of civilian protesters. All of this takes place while the international community observes passively, ignoring the Iranian people's peaceful call for change."

Allan Hassaniyan, Senior Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter

Iranian protesters: united on regime change, divided on what comes next

"The protesters, perhaps unwisely, appear focused almost exclusively on removing the Islamic Republic, with little attention paid to what - or who - might follow. Increasingly, calls for Mr Reza Pahlavi's return to Iran have become the protesters' most prominent chant. This owes less to his effectiveness as a political leader than to the fact that he functions as a blank slate onto which many Iranians project their hopes and aspirations. For many, he evokes a near-mythical era when groceries were affordable, the air was cleaner, and taxi drivers were polite. Yet after forty-seven years in exile, Mr Pahlavi has still not clarified whether he wishes to be a king or a president, or whether he supports constitutional monarchy or more extrajudicial authority - positions he has, at different times, appeared to endorse. For a population exhausted by the Islamic Republic, however, this ambiguity seems largely irrelevant. If he can serve as a unifying symbol and help bring down the regime, what he actually stands for becomes a secondary concern. Some ethnic minority groups, meanwhile, advocate varying degrees of regional self-rule and, at times, even independence or the partition of Iran. These movements, however, appear to resonate primarily within their own communities - and even there, support is limited rather than universal."

Ali Alfoneh, Senior Fellow, Arab Gulf States Institute

Avoiding chaos to protect self-interests: GCC's quietist approach to Iran's protests

"Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members are observing and reacting to the unrest in Iran with their own national interests in mind. Focused on their own economic development and diversification visions, Gulf states desire stability on the Arabian Peninsula and throughout the wider region. Policymakers in the Gulf want to prevent turmoil in Iran from spilling into other countries in the neighborhood. Last year's 12-Day War, which saw Iranian missile and drone strikes on al-Udeid in Qatar, left Gulf leaders fearing renewed conflict and further Iranian attacks on military installations hosting US military forces on their soil. Gulf policymakers take very seriously Tehran's threats to retaliate against possible US strikes on Iran by launching counterstrikes against such bases in the Gulf. They also understand how future Iranian strikes could be far less pre-signaled and more destructive than what Qatar experienced on 23 June 2025. As such, the GCC states are strongly urging the Trump administration to avoid actions vis-à-vis Iran that could exacerbate regional insecurity. Whether the Gulf leaders can use their significant influence to successfully persuade Trump that dealing with Iran diplomatically, rather than militarily, is the wisest path remains to be seen."

Giorgio Cafiero, CEO and Founder, Gulf States Analytics

For Israel, strategic patience is the best option

"In Israel, the ongoing anti-government protests in Iran are being closely monitored for their potential implications for the country's national security as well as its regional and international standing. However, contrary to what might have been expected just a few weeks ago - when an Israeli strike on Iran's ballistic missile programme appeared increasingly likely - Israel has adopted a predominantly cautious, wait-and-see approach. Certainly, the collapse of the current regime in Iran would likely be a positive development for Tel Aviv. It is difficult to imagine a worse state of relations between the two countries than the one that currently exists. Yet Israel is also keenly aware of a major risk that could negate any potential benefits: miscalculation. As the prospect of a US military action against Iran draws nearer, Israeli officials have called for restraint, warning that a premature or pre-emptive strike could prove counterproductive. Rather than weakening the regime, early military action could allow Iran's establishment to shift attention away from domestic protests and towards foreign interference, elevating national security concerns over internal dissent, ultimately undermining the momentum of the protest movement. This cautious posture, however, does not mean that Israel's security establishment is unprepared. On the contrary, Israeli defence and intelligence agencies continue to plan and prepare for the possibility of an Iranian attack - an eventuality that Tehran itself has repeatedly threatened."

Sara Isabella Leykin, ISPI MENA Centre

The Iranian protests viewed from Iraq

"Instability in a neighbouring country is always a cause for concern, and for Iraq, there is fear that the situation could escalate to a level at which the United States becomes involved by attacking Iran. This would open the possibility of retaliatory attacks by Iran on the American presence in the region. Such a scenario would put Iraq in danger not only because of its proximity to Iran but also because it hosts the largest physical US embassy in Baghdad and the largest physical US consulate in Erbil. This significant American diplomatic presence is accompanied by security forces still stationed in Iraq as part of the global coalition against ISIS. For over two years, Iraq has managed to avoid being dragged into regional violence, but involvement does not necessarily have to take the form of armed engagement. Instead, Iraq could use its diplomatic relations with both Iran and the United States to ease tensions through dialogue, regardless of how unwilling either ally may be. If there was ever a time for Iraqi diplomacy to rise to the occasion, it is now."

Hamzeh Hadad, Adjunct Fellow, Center for a New American Security

Is Europe's era of appeasement towards Iran coming to an end?

"Europe's approach to Iran has historically been characterised by appeasement, with hopes for diplomatic engagement consistently overshadowing substantive policy measures. This approach has allowed Iran to exploit European countries through transnational repression, money laundering, hostage diplomacy, and sanction circumvention. However, Europe now stands at a historical inflection point. The war in Ukraine has fundamentally altered perceptions of Iran, transforming it from a distant regional concern into an immediate security threat. Iran's provision of military drones and other weaponry to Russia has directly implicated Tehran in a conflict on European soil, making the costs of continued appeasement increasingly untenable. Not to mention the years of systematic human rights violations that European policymakers largely overlooked, making them appear hypocritical when championing democratic values elsewhere. The most significant indication of this shift is Europe's serious consideration of designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation. This represents a marked departure from previous policies and signals a potential hardening of Europe's approach. Whether this momentum translates into sustained, comprehensive policy change remains uncertain. Europe faces competing pressures, including energy security concerns and the desire to preserve diplomatic channels. Nevertheless, the convergence of factors (i.e. ongoing violent crackdown on protests in Iran, the Ukraine war, and growing recognition of Iran's destabilising activities within Europe itself), suggests that the era of unconditional appeasement may be drawing to a close. The question is whether European powers will follow through with concrete actions matching their increasingly critical rhetoric."

Sara Bazoobandi, Research Fellow, GIGA; Associate Research Fellow, ISPI

China's dualistic perceptions of the protests in Iran

"China observes the unfolding unrest in Iran through a lens of strategic caution and a prioritisation of state stability over domestic chaos. On the one hand, it views the protests not merely as domestic grievances but as a potential theatre for "colour revolutions" instigated by external forces. China consistently emphasises non-interference and supports Tehran's efforts to maintain order. This reflects China's core political value: stability is the prerequisite for development. It perceives the unrest as exacerbated by Western sanctions, which suffocate the Iranian economy and radicalise the populace. On the other hand, there is a rising concern. While China supports the Iranian state, Chinese scholars are not blind to its internal fragility. The recurrence of these protests - from 2022 to the present - signals structural dysfunction that purely security-based solutions cannot fix. For China, Iran is an important partner in the "Belt and Road Initiative" and a key energy supplier. Indisputably, a destabilised Iran is a strategic liability. Therefore, China's perception is dualistic: while it stands with the regime against "Western hegemony", China views the situation as a cautionary tale of how economic stagnation and external pressure can erode the legitimacy required for long-term governance."

Shoujun Cui, Professor and Deputy Director, Institute of International Development Studies, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China

Not only against Iran: US actions' implications for China

"China is looking to the situation unfolding in Iran with a mixture of unease, concern, and disbelief, with an eye on the other tables where the bloody crackdown of the Iranian protests may have an effect. The Islamic Republic is a close partner of China, but - despite the strategic cooperation agreement signed five years ago - not a strategic one. So, similarly to what it did last summer during the war with Israel, Beijing is not likely to get materially involved in supporting the Iranian government: instead, the foreign ministry is urging the government and the people in Iran to 'overcome the current difficulties' and ensure stability. In particular, China is concerned by the possibility that Donald Trump might decide to get the US military involved to support the protesters and warned him that Beijing opposes foreign interference in the internal affairs of other countries. But there is another aspect that puzzles Chinese leaders, that is Trump's announcement of a 25% tariff on any country doing business with Iran. China is the biggest buyer of Iranian oil and, if such a tariff was imposed, it would automatically reignite the harsh US-China trade war which just recently was halted after a truce agreed in late October by Trump and Xi Jinping. Is the US willing to resume that fight with Beijing over Iran?"

Guido Alberto Casanova, ISPI Asia Centre