How Civil Society Exposes the Human Rights Risks of the Digital Silk Road

Commentary by Andrew Friedman

Published January 27, 2026

No one understands the human rights implications of technology better than those who have been attacked by it. As new surveillance technologies like facial recognition cameras and "safe city" command centers proliferate, collectively understanding them requires the input of those on the ground-people are regularly the targets of new technology and push back on surveillance overreach. CSIS's Human Rights Initiative recently explored these deepening global challenges during a roundtable co-hosted with the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies. As Beijing expands its technological partnerships with countries across the globe through the Digital Silk Road (DSR), it has never been more important to work with local civil society organizations to understand the surveillance implications of these relationships and share strategies for addressing their risks. This roundtable, conducted under the Chatham House Rule of non-attribution, included representatives from civil society, the private sector, think tanks, and government. This analysis, while informed by the roundtable, is solely the work of the author.

The Digital Silk Road and Surveillance

The DSR is the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s "ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership." This initiative sits at the crossroads of Beijing's engagement with the world, in particular the Global South, and it positions the PRC as a critical provider of digital infrastructure and emerging technologies to governments. In the last 10 years, China and affiliated companies have invested billions of dollars into digital infrastructure projects across the world. A leading facet of PRC tech influence is telecom infrastructure, which is present in 83 percent of the 100 countries surveyed by Doublethink Lab's China Index. Other areas with major implications for privacy in importing states include the construction of subsea or land internet cables and the ownership of popular social media or messaging apps.

The DSR has led to a significant spread of surveillance equipment. Of the countries surveyed by Doublethink, 42 percent have received biometric surveillance technology from China. Further, this technology is often provided to governments with widely documented human rights concerns, such as Egypt, Venezuela, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar, and procured through opaque purchases without the possibility of public oversight. In one example, in Serbia, some such purchases were made under "confidential order" and were "particularly controversial because its use is not provided for under Serbian law. Serbian authorities maintain that facial-recognition software is not yet deployed through the Safe City project, but they have tried to legalize biometric surveillance multiple times before withdrawing their legislative efforts following intense public pressure." This equipment was "provided by Huawei at a substantial discount" without stated reasoning.

Such dissemination of surveillance technology does not stand alone. Tech dependence on PRC entities most often goes hand-in-hand with heavy PRC influence in other domains like the economy, the military, and academia.

How Do We Know?

The opaque nature of deals in which surveillance and other technological equipment are procured creates significant knowledge gaps that hinder policy responses. If the United States and its allies do not know where or what the focus of the DSR is, it is impossible to craft effective policies to counter its attacks on human rights and democracy. There has been no greater contributor to understanding the efforts, the geographies, or the implications of the DSR than local civil society organizations.

Local connections and on-the-ground trust are imperative in pulling back curtains on deals that are conducted in secret. This can require deep and long-running investigations conducted by civil society and journalists to understand processes that result in the procurement of surveillance equipment through the DSR. It can also require understanding stakeholders, power centers, and relationships that are well known to on-the-ground actors but more difficult to parse for outsiders. On-the-ground networks spanning different perspectives and areas of expertise may also be required to fully understand the scope of the problem.

The Serbian example is telling. As organizer of the #hiljadekamera (thousands of cameras) movement, the SHARE Foundation worked with the local community, crowdsourcing a map of cameras as well as information on their technical details. According to the organization's director, "the picture it presented was starkly at odds with the modest official list of camera locations the police had issued."

The value of strong civil society networks is not limited to discovering information but also includes effectively sharing it with the relevant stakeholders. In the roundtable, a representative of a country's civil society shared that a coalition of 20 organizations to which they belonged had briefed government officials on potential national security risks of a joint venture with a PRC telecom company. Their actions led to legislative reform that opened the telecom industry to more competition and introduced national security investment screenings.

The U.S. Role

Historically, many of the civil society organizations most involved in pushing back on authoritarian overreach, including excessive surveillance technology, have been grantees of USAID, the Department of State, the National Endowment for Democracy, or other U.S. agencies. The withdrawal from and pressure on this type of funding, including the cancellation of grants for pro-democracy and human rights groups, the dismantling of USAID, and the reorganization of the Department of State-which removed much of its funding and expertise on democracy and human rights issues-creates a financial gap that will make the work of local civil society organizations far more difficult to sustain.

Beyond funding, diplomatic support for human rights defenders has been a key role of U.S. embassies abroad. Both public engagement and private diplomacy with the host government have been used to raise issues and offer support for the causes of human rights defenders, including those investigating surveillance and government overreach. The United States, as recently as January 20, 2025, has provided guidance for human rights defenders on how to engage with U.S. embassies. This support has been limited and undermined by comments about civil society and its partnerships with the United States. Statements by the Trump administration and its allies have led to investigations of former recipients of USAID funding in multiple countries, including Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia, Nigeria, and others.

Funding and diplomatic support are not the only roles that the United States has traditionally played in this type of work. While they are on the frontlines, local civil society organizations are not alone in their capabilities. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), a longstanding product of Cold War competition, has historically had a substantial and trusted presence in former Eastern Bloc countries, giving it complementary access to invaluable context and sources. RFE/RL Investigates has worked with local civil society organizations to bring vital stories with national security implications to the fore, such as Serbian government efforts to skirt sanctions against Russia for dual-use technology or the construction of a secret military base in Belarus for use in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As the United States pulls back its presence and funding of efforts such as RFE/RL, the only remaining actors with such connections, presence, and trust are local civil society organizations.

Conclusion

For nearly two decades, the world has been becoming less free. Emboldened authoritarian actors are no longer content to consolidate control and repress human rights in their own countries but feel confident in their ability to share their tactics, strategies, and technology across borders. Beijing's DSR both enables this reality and benefits from it, fostering partnerships with governments and creating a more deeply surveilled and authoritarian world. Local civil society organizations stand at the front line against these mounting threats to freedom, conducting investigations into how such surveillance is manifesting and raising awareness about the dangers of surveillance and overzealous partnerships with the PRC. These actors provide a vital window for the U.S. and its allies into the tactics, strategies, and partnerships Beijing uses to expand its authoritarian influence.

Andrew Friedman is the director and senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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