The rules of reconstruction: Why the EU-Syria reset must put institutions first

Metadata

Half-century-old agreements rarely make headlines. But the full restoration of the 1977 EU-Syria Cooperation Agreement that took place on 11 May was more than a legal formality. By ending the partial suspension imposed after the Assad regime's violent repression of anti-government protests in 2011, the Council signalled that the EU is moving from emergency response to structured engagement with post-Assad Syria. On the same day, Brussels hosted the Syria Partnership Coordination Forum and the first EU-Syria High-Level Political Dialogue.

But the EU's real contribution will not be measured in euros disbursed or agreements restored. It will be measured in the rules and conditions shaping Syria's reconstruction. The restored agreement matters politically, but it should not be oversold economically. It was the main framework for EU-Syria relations until 2011, when sanctions and war hollowed it out. EU-Syria trade in goods fell from more than €7 billion in 2010 to €368 million in 2024. Reopening the old framework sends a signal, but it will not by itself revive the relationship. Many provisions are outdated, and trade normalisation is unlikely to have much effect as long as investors face corruption, weak judicial institutions, unreliable electricity supply and opaque regulations.

The modest pace of the reset should therefore not be read solely as a sign of Brussels caution. It also reflects the limits of the Syrian transition itself. The new authorities remain short of civil servants, technical expertise and functioning administrative systems, while their initial efforts have largely focused on gaining foreign recognition, consolidating security and securing external backing. Unresolved debt, much of it linked to Russia and Iran, weak public finances, damaged infrastructure and contested local authority make the task harder. Syria is being asked to absorb reconstruction support before it has rebuilt the state machinery needed to manage it.

Reconstruction needs rules, not just capital

The financing gap is huge. The World Bank estimates Syria's reconstruction needs at $216 billion. The EU's €175 million socio-economic recovery package and expected €280 million for 2026-2027 cannot match that scale, making Gulf and regional capital indispensable. As Syria's foreign minister met EU leaders in Brussels, Damascus hosted the first Syrian-Emirati Investment Forum; in February, Saudi Arabia signed multibillion-dollar agreements. However, headline investment announcements cover only part of Syria's needs, and many of these projects have not progressed beyond the memorandum of understanding stage. The wider regional conflict could also affect Gulf willingness to sustain large-scale spending.

But money is not the only constraint. Capital is arriving faster than institutions can absorb and govern it. Without clear procurement rules, competition policy, beneficial ownership transparency and independent regulation, this influx of capital risks reproducing the patterns of capture that drove Syria's crisis. It is therefore encouraging that, while in Brussels, foreign minister Asaad al-Shaibani stressed the government's new focus on improving the business environment and reforming investment legislation That recognition matters: reconstruction requires rules, not just capital. The test will be whether these reforms translate into transparent procedures, fair competition and effective safeguards against capture.

The EU's quiet leverage

This is where the EU's comparative advantage lies. It cannot outspend Gulf states, match Türkiye's proximity or replicate US leverage through sanctions. But it can help shape the institutional environment in which reconstruction happens: public administration, legal frameworks, anti-corruption safeguards, local governance, civil society support, technical standards and monitored conditionality.

This is why the €15 million Technical Assistance Hub announced at the Forum matters more than its size suggests. If it becomes a genuine one-stop shop for Syrian requests, European expertise and donor coordination, it can help reduce duplication and prevent overstretched ministries from being overwhelmed by competing initiatives. Ideally, it should also connect with non-European donors, especially from the Gulf, because Syria's recovery will require coordination far beyond Brussels.

Over time, that coordination could also include discussions on Syria's potential role as a land bridge between Europe and the Gulf. The ongoing regional war has underlined the need to reduce dependence on chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Since Syria will need to rebuild roads and railways anyway, these networks should be planned to support regional connectivity, while taking into account the security risks surrounding sensitive infrastructure.

The human face of reconstruction

Syria's recovery will ultimately be judged not by diplomatic choreography, but by whether people see tangible improvements in daily life: reliable electricity and water supply, functioning hospitals and schools, jobs and effective public services. Humanitarian needs remain immense across food, healthcare, education and housing; while returnees have to contend with missing identity documents, housing and property disputes, unexploded ordnance and limited livelihood opportunities. Most returnees so far have come from the region: by late January 2026, around 1.12 million people had returned to Syria since December 2024, mainly from Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan; only a smaller share came from the EU. Around one million Syrian citizens held legal residence in the EU at the end of 2024, while around 100 000 Syrian asylum cases were still pending in EU+¹ countries by the end of 2025. Migration gives the EU a direct reason to engage, but it should not become the organising principle of its Syria policy. Premature or politically-driven returns would endanger returnees, place additional strain on fragile communities and risk fuelling future instability.

The geopolitical context makes all this harder. Syria is trying to rebuild while managing the risk of spillover from wider regional tensions and balancing relations with Lebanon, Israel, Iran, Russia, Türkiye, the Gulf and Washington. The EU is less visible than many of these actors, but visibility is not the same as influence. Its comparative strength lies in areas such as institution-building, civic space, intercommunal dialogue, public-service capacity and resilience against disinformation. Disinformation can inflame sectarian tensions, distort perceptions around refugee returns and delegitimise transitional justice. EU support should therefore focus on strengthening transparent communication, media literacy and independent journalism, while steering clear of approaches that could facilitate censorship or surveillance.

The New Pact for the Mediterranean's April 2026 Action Plan points in this direction. Syria features prominently in the economic, digital, energy, skills, civil protection and migration spheres, but much less in justice, law enforcement, border and formal security cooperation. The pattern shows where future engagement is needed: not on heavily securitised cooperation, which would be politically sensitive, but on civilian governance mechanisms such as judicial reform, policing, local administration and public communication.

The High-Level Political Dialogue reopened the framework, but the harder work starts now: making sure that Syria's reconstruction is guided by rules and institutions before new power structures become entrenched. For the EU, this is not only about values. A Syria rebuilt through opaque deals and weak institutions would mean more instability on Europe's southern flank, less sustainable refugee returns, greater pressure on neighbouring host countries, and new openings for armed groups and foreign influence. Preventing fresh capital inflows into Damascus from calcifying into a new system of economic capture requires procurement rules, beneficial ownership transparency and credible judicial institutions. This is not only a Syrian priority, but also in Europe's direct interest.

⁽¹⁾ EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland.

Metadata Bottom

• MENA
• Syria
• EU Foreign Policy