09/03/2025 | Press release | Archived content
Contents
Introduction. 2
Competitiveness and Resilience. 3
General 3
Scaling up. 3
Resilience and Value Chains 8
Enhancing Investment and Innovation. 10
Merger Control and Globalisation. 14
Assessing Market Power Using Structural Features and Other Market Indicators 15
General Assessment of Guidelines 15
Structural Indicators and Presumptions 16
Coordination Effects and Market Conditions 17
Non-Horizontal Mergers and Foreclosure. 18
Innovation and Other Dynamic Elements in Merger Control 18
General 18
Innovation and Investments 19
Elimination of Potential Competition and Entry as Countervailing Factor 21
Counterfactual and Failing Firm Defence. 23
Type and Quality of Evidence on Future Market Developments 24
Sustainability & Clean Technologies 24
General 24
Theories of Harm & Risks 24
Competitive Benefits 26
Global Dynamics and Chilling Effects 27
Digitalisation. 28
General 28
Competitive Dynamics and Parameters of Competition. 28
Frameworks of Analysis and Entrenchment 29
Ecosystem and Interrelated Products 31
Data-Related Concerns and Aggregation of Data. 31
Targeted Foreclosure 32
Interoperability Issues and Access 32
Future Market Dynamics and Technological Changes 33
Privacy and Data Protection. 33
Efficiencies 34
General 34
Benefit to Consumers 35
Merger-Specificity 37
Verifiability 37
Public Policy, Security, and Labour Market Considerations 39
Security and Defence. 39
Media Plurality 39
Labour Markets and Workers 40
Other Sectors 42
Other 43
On May 8, 2025, the European Commission launched an in-depth consultation on the EU Merger Guidelines, focusing on technical and detailed questions across seven thematic topics related to merger enforcement, including dynamic competition, sustainability, digitalisation, efficiencies, and other competition policy considerations. The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), the world's top-ranked science and technology policy think tank, greatly appreciates the opportunity to respond to the European Commission's call for information in this important public consultation.
ITIF filed both general comments and in-depth comments for this consultation. An abbreviated version of the in-depth comments follows. (Check content against the final PDF.)
No, to an insufficient extent.
The focus of the guidelines is to help assess whether a merger would significantly impede effective competition or create or strengthen a dominant position. Unfortunately, this structural understanding of competition differs from a conception of competition as either a dynamic process or a consumer welfare proscription, both of which are far better suited to having a productive and growing economy. For example, there are numerous cases where transactions may impede effective competition or create a dominant position but drive the process of innovation competition-the greatest driver of long run-economic growth-or result in static efficiencies that far outweigh any de minimis competitive harms that result from a loss of rivalry.
Ability and incentives of SMEs and mid-sized companies to scale up; Benefits of companies' gaining scale; Ability and incentives of companies to invest and innovate.
If the target company having the ability or incentives to scale-up is a merger-specific benefit of a transaction, that may count as a prime facie efficiency gain that could be weighed against any competitive harms that transaction may pose.
Analyzing the "but-for world" where the merger does not occur should, in general, analyze the sorts of financing and contractual relationships a firm would be likely to enter upon analysis of internal business documents and relevant historical industry behavior (e.g., a similar firm being unable to enter a contract that would have achieved the merger benefits). In general, the Commission should not treat a merger with another company as a likely result in a but-for world: like the post-merger world (e.g., efficiencies) to which the but-for world is compared, the but-for world should be based on reliable and verifiable evidence, and alternative mergers may only in very rare cases satisfy these criteria (e.g., the Commission is considering two proposed mergers of the same company).
The failing-firm defense is a legitimate justification for approving mergers that may result in some short-run competitive harms and the grounds that, but-for the merger, the firm will ultimately exit the market, making current conditions unpredictive of future competitive effects. To make the failing-firm defense, it is typically required that the firm be unable to meet its financial obligations in the future, be unable to reorganize successfully using bankruptcy, and that the merger reflects the least restrictive way to keep its assets productive relative to other transactions. Importantly, even if a firm may not be failing, a prima facie case showing that a merger present a risk of short-run harm can also be rebutted if a firm is sufficiently weak that it would unlikely be able to compete as vigorously in the future.
Increased scale is generally important for any firm that faces a downward sloping average cost curve: the more output there is, the cheaper production becomes on a per unit basis. Increased scale is often also particularly important in markets that have high fixed costs, which decrease on an average basis for each unit produced.
By lowering costs through economies of scale, firms will be able to lower prices and increase output-benefiting consumers and competition. Increased scale can also enhance a firm's incentives and ability to innovate by, for example, increasing the ability for the firm to recoup the costs associated with R&D.
Mergers can result in network driven efficiencies, both direct and indirect.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to intangible capital, such as IP and brand synergies.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to a greater ability to attract capital that, for example, can be used to fund innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies that increase a firm's incentive and ability to invest, such as increasing the incentive to protect its market position through innovation, or by increasing its ability to recoup the costs of R&D.
Mergers can result in efficiencies that increase a firm's incentive and ability to innovate, such as increasing the incentive to protect its market position through innovation, or by increasing its ability to recoup the costs of R&D.
Mergers can result in scale and scope driven data efficiencies that benefit consumers.
Mergers can result in efficiencies that improve market access.
Mergers can result in countervailing buyer power that lower supplier costs and benefits consumers with lower prices.
The Commission should focus its competitive analysis within the relevant geographic markets at issue.
Mergers can result in countervailing bargaining power that counteracts inefficiencies in markets with powerful or monopsony buyers.
There are countless examples of how mergers can result in these and other types of efficiency benefits. Guidelines should attempt to specify an exhaustive list of which types of benefits count as efficiencies.
Even where efficiency benefits do not exist, the vast majority of mergers do not pose any meaningful risk of competitive harm.
Mergers can result in network driven efficiencies, both direct and indirect.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to intangible capital, such as IP and brand synergies.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to a greater ability to attract capital that, for example, can be used to fund innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies that increase a firm's incentive and ability to invest, such as increasing the incentive to protect its market position through innovation, or by increasing its ability to recoup the costs of R&D.
Mergers can result in efficiencies that increase a firm's incentive and ability to innovate, such as increasing the incentive to protect its market position through innovation, or by increasing its ability to recoup the costs of R&D.
Mergers can result in scale and scope driven data efficiencies that benefit consumers.
Mergers can result in efficiencies that improve market access.
Mergers can result in countervailing buyer power that lower supplier costs and benefits consumers with lower prices.
The Commission should focus its competitive analysis within the relevant geographic markets at issue.
Mergers can result in countervailing bargaining power that counteracts inefficiencies in markets with powerful or monopsony buyers.
Efficiency benefits may flow from a merger even if it creates or strengthens market power or a dominant position. Indeed, in one important U.S. study which analyzed 130 transactions across various industries where the average combined market share was over 20 percent, the average HHI over 3,300 and the average delta HHI over 120, the data showed that "merging parties are more likely to lower prices drastically than non-merging parties, while the probability of substantial price increases is similar across the two groups," with one explanation being "cost synergies that are large enough to induce the merging parties to lower prices." Bhattacharya et al., "Merger Effects and Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence From U.S. Consumer Packaged Goods" (2023).
Both transactions that do and do not result in a risk of competitive harm can bring about the same types of general efficiency benefits.
In cases where a transaction results in both prima facie competitive harms and scale-driven efficiency benefits, the Commission should attempt to determine the net effect in deciding whether a transaction should be approved.
Evaluating whether scale-driven efficiency benefits do or not outweigh possible competitive harms must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. For example, if competitive harms are de minimis, it is likely that they will be outweighed by a transaction's efficiency benefits. By contrast, if efficiency benefits are not merger-specific or verifiable, it is unlikely that they will outweigh the competitive harms posed by a transaction.
Efficiencies that result in variable cost savings will typically be passed on to consumers through lower prices or increased output in the short-run. Indeed, efficiency benefits can still accrue to consumers in a way that outweighs competitive harms even if they are only partially passed on. However, even efficiencies that may not be immediately passed on to consumers substantially or in part should not necessarily be discounted if they result in other short-run benefits, such as an increased incentive and ability to innovate.
To determine whether efficiencies are sufficiently substantial enough to outweigh any competitive harms, data-driven economic modeling of a merger's future effects can be particularly helpful. To be sure, calculating which efficiencies will be passed on to consumers can be difficult to measure in practice and is one reason why analyzing a merger's effects on total welfare, rather than consumer welfare, can lead to a more administrable enforcement regime. As such, it is inadvisable to apply strict or rigid tests that risk over-excluding efficiency benefits on the grounds that they will not be passed on to consumers. Typically, here as well the use of economic models will be important to confirm which efficiency benefits will likely be passed on to consumers.
In markets defined by economies of scale, a firm that procompetitively increases its efficiency will increase sales and gain economies of scale, which can result in higher costs to competitors who lose scale as a result. This, however, is a procompetitive outcome that benefits consumers and competition, even if competitors may be harmed.
The question of whether a merger results in merger specific benefits should be treated as independent from the issue of whether it also results in harm to consumers and competition. For example, a merger may be necessary to achieve the benefits of scale, while also resulting in potential harm to competition. By contrast, in other cases a merger may not yield substantial merger-specific efficiency benefits but pose little risk to competition or consumers.
Expansion into a different geographic or product market can generate economies of scope and scale, and whether they are viable alternatives to a merger to achieve scale benefits must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Typically, however, geographic economies of scale and economies of scope are not interchangeable with the benefits achieved from economies of scale in a given market.
Merger enforcement should focus on consumer welfare and competition by analyzing price, output, quality, and innovation effects. To the extent that reduced resiliency negatively affects consumer welfare and competition, it may indirectly factor into merger analysis.
The extent to which a merger's effects on resilience can result in unilateral, coordinated, or vertical harms should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
A merger that results in a substantial increase in concentration may lessen resilience (e.g., reduced number of suppliers) and at the same time result in anticompetitive effects (e.g., increased coordination).
The same sorts of elements that the Commission uses to assess coordinated, unilateral, and vertical effects should be used in cases where resiliency is a relevant factor toward determining whether these effects will occur.
Vertical integration may be a way to increase resiliency in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies.
Mergers may promote better access to input through new contracts in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies.
Mergers may promote diversification of supply in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies (e.g., acquisition of a supplier that allows for expanded production in another jurisdiction).
Mergers may promote better conditions of purchase of inputs in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies (e.g., increased buyer power).
Mergers may promote better access to critical infrastructure in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies.
As the economist Joseph Schumpeter recognized long ago, increased concentration can enhance the ability for innovation by giving firms greater resilience in managing the risks associated with engaging in R&D. As such, enhancing innovation through increased resilience can constitute an efficiency benefit of a merger.
The Commission should not treat reduced resilience as competitive harm in and of itself, but rather assess the extent to which it will lead to unilateral, coordinated, or unilateral effects.
Vertical integration may be a way to increase resiliency in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies.
Mergers may promote better access to input through new contracts in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies.
Mergers may promote diversification of supply in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies (e.g., acquisition of a supplier that allows for expanded production in another jurisdiction).
Mergers may promote better conditions of purchase of inputs in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies (e.g., increased buyer power).
Mergers may promote better access to critical infrastructure in a way that results in procompetitive efficiencies.
As the economist Joseph Schumpeter recognized long ago, increased concentration can enhance the ability for innovation by giving firms greater resilience in managing the risks associated with engaging in R&D. As such, enhancing innovation through increased resilience can constitute an efficiency benefit of a merger.
The same efficiency benefits associated with resiliency that can occur in mergers that do not create or enhance market power can occur in those that do create or enhance market power.
In cases where a transaction results in competitive harms and efficiency benefits that derive from a merger's effect on resilience, the Commission should weigh harms and benefits to determine the merger's overall likely net competitive effect.
See response to Question A.6.a.
See response to Question A.6.b.
See response to Question A.6.c.
Transactions that may affect resiliency in a way that results in efficiency benefits can occur throughout the economy. However, to the extent that increased resiliency leads to a greater ability to innovate by economizing upon the risks associated with research and development, it may be particularly important in industries where innovation competition is a key parameter of competition.
Mergers can result in network driven efficiencies, both direct and indirect, that enhance innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to intangible capital, such as IP and brand synergies, that enhance innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to a greater ability to attract capital that, for example, can be used to fund innovation.
Mergers can result in economies of scope that enhance innovation.
Mergers can result in economies of scope that enhance innovation.
Mergers can combine know-how, data, and patents in a way that enhances innovation.
Mergers can result in vertical integration that enhances innovation.
Mergers can enhance innovation by increasing a firm's incentive to innovate in order to protect its market position and facilitate its ability to recoup the costs associated with research and development.
N/A.
Mergers can result in network driven efficiencies, both direct and indirect, that enhance innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to intangible capital, such as IP and brand synergies, that enhance innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to a greater ability to attract capital that, for example, can be used to fund innovation.
Mergers can result in economies of scope that enhance innovation.
Mergers can result in economies of scope that enhance innovation.
Mergers can combine know-how, data, and patents in a way that enhances innovation.
Mergers can result in vertical integration that enhances innovation.
Mergers can enhance innovation by increasing a firm's incentive to innovate in order to protect its market position and facilitate its ability to recoup the costs associated with research and development.
The same innovation benefits that can be obtained in mergers that do not create or strengthen market power can also flow from mergers that do create and strengthen market power.
Mergers can result in network driven efficiencies, both direct and indirect, that spur investment in innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to intangible capital, such as IP and brand synergies, that spur investment in innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to a greater ability to attract capital.
Mergers can result in economies of scope that spur investment in innovation.
Mergers can result in economies of scope that spur investment in innovation.
Mergers can combine know-how, data, and patents in a way that spurs investment in innovation.
Mergers can result in vertical integration that spurs investment in innovation.
Mergers can spur investment by increasing a firm's incentive to innovate in order to protect its market position and facilitate its ability to recoup the costs associated with research and development.
N/A.
Mergers can result in network driven efficiencies, both direct and indirect, that spur investment in innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to intangible capital, such as IP and brand synergies, that spur investment in innovation.
Mergers can result in efficiencies related to a greater ability to attract capital.
Mergers can result in economies of scope that spur investment in innovation.
Mergers can result in economies of scope that spur investment in innovation.
Mergers can combine know-how, data, and patents in a way that spurs investment in innovation.
Mergers can result in vertical integration that spurs investment in innovation.
Mergers can spur investment by increasing a firm's incentive to innovate in order to protect its market position and facilitate its ability to recoup the costs associated with research and development.
The same benefits to investment that can be obtained from mergers that do not create or strengthen market power can also flow from mergers that do create and strengthen market power.
It has long been documented how the relationship between market structure and innovation can take the form of an inverted-U, whereby increased concentration can increase innovation up until concentration reaches so high a level that innovation decreases. See: Philippe Aghion at al., "Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship," 120 Q. J. Econ. 701 (2005); Michael R. Peneder & Martin Woerter, Competition, "R&D and Innovation: Testing the Inverted-U in a Simultaneous System," 24 J. of Evolutionary Econ. 653 (2014) (Switzerland); Michael Polder & Erik Veldhuizen, "Innovation and Competition in the Netherlands: Testing the Inverted-U for Industries and Firms," 12 J. of Ind. Competition and Trade 67 (2012) (Netherlands); Chiara Peroni & Ivete Gomes Ferreira, "Market competition and innovation in Luxembourg," 12 J. of Ind, Competition and Trade 93 (2012) (Luxembourg). There is some evidence that, in certain industries, smaller entrants may be more likely to engage in disruptive innovation large incumbents may be more likely to engage in incremental innovations that constitute the greatest share of overall innovation driven gains to economic growth. See, e.g., Garcia-Macia et al., "How Destructive Is Innovation?" (May 2018).
Consistent with the inverted-U framework, mergers that result in an industry moving from a market structure defined by effective or monopolistic competition to one that reflects an oligopoly or has a dominant firm can result in an increased incentive and ability to innovate and invest. For example, large firms may have a greater incentive and ability both to appropriate the costs of R&D as well as have more to lose from disruptive innovation such that they will invest more in innovation than an upstart rival. However, mergers that create a monopoly market structure may not increase incentives to innovate and invest-in this scenario, incentives for the monopolist to avoid cannibalization and an "exit competition" effect may dominate.
In defining innovation markets to assess a transactions effect on innovation, geographic markets may be defined more broadly than in existing product markets if the R&D programs in different countries are reasonably interchangeable and pose competitive constraints on one another.
Mergers may regularly have competitive effects globally but not in the relevant geographic market the Commission may be analyzing. Indeed, even if the geographic market is global (i.e., firms from around the world compete for European consumers), the Commission should nonetheless focus on the effects on European consumers and competition,
Antitrust analysis typically seeks to identify the narrowest relevant product and geographic markets for assessing a merger's effects on competition. As such, it is not uncommon that a merger may reduce competition in a more narrow geographic market (and thus be deemed unlawful) even if it results in efficiencies on a global basis.
Less regulation outside Europe may give a company a competitive advantage in Europe, for example, by providing them with a better environment to innovate and ultimately market those new products in Europe.
Lower costs outside Europe may give a company a competitive advantage in Europe, for example, by more resources to innovate and ultimately market those new products in Europe.
Better access to raw materials/manufacturing outside Europe may give a company a competitive advantage in Europe, for example, allowing it produce at a cheaper cost including for European products.
Better access to finance/equity outside Europe may give a company a competitive advantage in Europe, for example, helping them to fund R&D and scale more quickly and ultimately market new products in Europe.
Avoid the costs of regulation may give a company a competitive advantage in Europe, for example, by avoiding the costs associated with regulation and having more resources to invest in innovation.
There are myriad reasons why a company may benefit from a global presence in ways that give it a competitive advantage in Europe.
The Commission should not treat a company differently simply because it may be a multinational and enjoy benefits from a global scale when assessing whether a transaction will result in anticompetitive effects.
A merger resulting in increased competitive advantages linked to a global presence does not constitute cognizable antitrust harm. However, the Commission should evaluate whether a merger can result in efficiencies that benefit European consumers through increased geographic scale, such as by more efficiently moving production facilities to lower cost areas.
Whether a firm obtains efficiencies from operating globally cannot be discerned by analyzing its market share alone. However, a firm that benefits from economies of scale by operating globally may as a result have a competitive advantage against rivals that increases its market share.
Subsidies in other markets can be a competitive advantage to the extent they allow a firm to reduce prices, increase output, or better innovate in the other relevant market.
See response to Question A.19.a.
Consolidations and partnerships in global strategic sectors can be critical to driving innovation that benefits the Single Market. These can include transactions between large American technology firms and European AI startups that provide the latter with the scale, resources, and know-how they need to innovate more quickly and effectively-benefiting competition in the Single Market.
No, to an insufficient extent.
In general, the Guidelines' focus on condemning transactions that impede effective competition or result in a dominant position will chill transactions that benefit consumers through either static or dynamic efficiencies.
Structural indicators / market features to assess likelihood of anticompetitive effects in horizontal mergers; Structural indicators / market features to assess dominance; Structural indicators / market features to assess likelihood of anticompetitive effects in non-horizontal mergers; Framework to assess likelihood of coordination in non-horizontal mergers; Framework to assess potential foreclosure in conglomerate mergers.
Structural evidence like market shares and industry concentration levels (e.g., HHIs) can be a starting point to assess the anticompetitive effects of mergers, especially when evaluating coordinated effects.
Structural indicators should be stricter so as to ensure that any structural rebuttable presumption of anticompetitive harm avoids false positives. Specifically, low thresholds for structural presumptions may chill transactions that enhance dynamic competition given the inverted-U relationship that exists between market structure and innovation.
Structural indicators should only give rise to a rebuttable presumption of harm in cases where the transaction results in both very high HHI and delta-HHI levels (e.g., a merger that creates a duopoly or monopoly). Presumptions based on the market share of a single firm market should be disfavored, such as a presumption that a merger that results in an over 50 percent market share is prima facie anticompetitive. While this would imply a market HHI of over 2500, which is typically understood to be highly concentrated, it is possible that the delta HHI from the transaction could be very small and thus the effects on competition and consumers de minimis (e.g., a firm with a 49 percent share acquires a firm with a 1 percent share and three other firms with 20 percent, 17 percent, and 13 percent shares remain in the market).
The analysis of whether a transaction may result in SIEC short of a dominant position should include an analysis of market structure, past industry behavior, intent, and future economic performance, particularly as it concerns the possibility of a merger resulting in oligopolistic collusion. In mergers that impede effective competition but where a dominant position does not exist, unilateral effects may be highly unlikely unless there is especially strong evidence that the merging parties are particularly close competitors.
While the Commission should rely on the same types of intent, structure, conduct, and performance evidence in all cases where it believes competition will be harmed, transactions that result in the creation or enhancement of dominance are ceteris paribus far more likely to be anticompetitive than those that merely impede effective competition.
The same sorts of intent, structure, conduct, and performance evidence that is generally used to evaluate a merger's effects are applicable to specific coordinated effects theory of harm.
Non-horizontal mergers can result in coordinated effects in some cases. For example, the acquisition of a key upstream supplier can be used to prevent a maverick firm from disrupting downstream collusion vis-à-vis the threat of withholding upstream supply.
There are a number of conditions that may affect whether a merger is likely to result in coordinated effects. These include the number of firms in a market and their market shares, the presence of maverick firms, whether firms can easily monitor one another's pricing, whether products in the market are homogeneous, whether sales are small and frequent, and whether the industry has a history of successful coordination.
In general, firms are more likely to engage in tacit collusion the easier it is to coordinate and the higher the costs associated with cheating. With respect to structural evidence, the more concentrated the market (except in the limit case of merger to monopoly), in general the more likely collusion will be. With respect to intent, internal documents showing an intent to engage in collusion post-merger will of course be highly probative. Natural experiments, such as a history of past successful collusion, can also shed light on whether coordinated effects are likely, as can evidence that there are no maverick firms. Price leadership models may also be a more quantitative way to assess the likelihood of collusion.
Even if a prima facie case that a merger may result in increased coordination, countervailing factors may exist that make coordination unlikely. These include entry as well as expansion by existing firms that greatly reduce the incentives and ability for the existing market players to coordinate.
Non-horizontal merger enforcement should focus on proscribing vertical transactions that raise rivals costs, either through input or customer foreclosure, and create power over price in a way that harms consumers. This is broadly consistent with the ability, incentive and effect framework. Conglomerate mergers, by contrast, should not be a part of non-horizontal merger enforcement: to the extent that the merged firm is able to engage in, for example, anticompetitive bundling as a result of the merger, this can enforced post-merger using Articles 101 and 102.
In order for a vertical transaction to harm competition, the merged firm must have substantial market power it can use to foreclose rivals (i.e., ability), it must make economic sense to exclude rather than do business with rivals (i.e., incentive), and ultimately be likely to produce the anticompetitive effect of increased power over price in a way that harms consumers (effect). And, unlike horizontal mergers, structural presumptions of harm should not be applied, as any incentives to foreclose are concomitant with incentives to lower prices through the elimination double marginalization (EDM). As such, that structural indicators may indicate a firm has both upstream and downstream market power are not sufficient to demonstrate that a vertical merger will be anticompetitive.
To weigh incentives to foreclose with incentives to lower prices, a case-by-case analysis is required, as the theoretical economic literature is unclear as to which incentives generally dominate. Most importantly, given the interrelation between foreclosure and EDM incentives, both must be evaluated together in evaluating the merged firms incentives, and which can typically be analyzed using empirics like margin and diversion data.
No, to an insufficient extent.
While the current horizontal mergers correctly note how merger efficiencies can include "new or improved products or services, for instance resulting from efficiency gains in the sphere of R&D and innovation," there are a number of transactions which may enhance innovation and benefit consumers even if they result in dominance or a lack of effective competition. This is consistent with the long established "inverted-U" literature showing how increased concentration can result in greater innovation, including in oligopoly markets that may have a dominant firm or lack effective competition. Future guidelines should attempt to address this "innovation gap" by moving away from structural metrics like dominance and effective competition to a more direct focus on the competitive process and welfare effects.
Innovation; Investments; Potential Competition; Entry as countervailing factor; Counterfactual; Failing firm defence; Standard of proof and evidence on future market developments.
Mergers may harm innovation if they lead to a reduction in quality such as through reduced incremental product improvements. Mergers may also harm innovation to the extent that there are adverse coordinated or unilateral effects in a market for research and development for more disruptive innovations where the parties compete.
The Commission should consider the same sorts of unilateral, coordinated, and vertical effects when evaluating reductions in quality or a loss of competition in an innovation market.
Whether a transaction is likely to lead to a reduction in incremental or more disruptive R&D competition must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, but are more likely to occur in markets that are defined by these types of quality or innovation competition.
The same sorts of intent, structure, conduct, and performance evidence that are used to evaluate price and output effects are generally informative when assessing whether a transaction will result in a reduction in quality or incremental product improvements. However, in analyzing competition in an R&D market, structural presumptions are inappropriate given the inverted-U relationship between market structure and innovation, although mergers to monopoly will still likely be treated as unlawful unless entry or efficiencies considerations negate the likelihood of anticompetitive harms.
See response to Question C.3.
See response to Question C.3.b.
Horizontal mergers that eliminate a small competitor that poses a significant risk of dynamic expansion can result in harm to innovation competition are a particular concern in markets where either incremental or more disruptive innovation is a key dimensionality of competition.
The Commission should always consider dynamic expansion by competitors when assessing the potential for a merger to harm competition, both with respect to the merging parties, and with respect to third-party competitors who are able to expand in a way that limits the merged firm from exercising market power post-merger.
Horizontal mergers that eliminate a small competitor that poses a significant risk of dynamic expansion can result in harm to innovation competition if the small competitor is a particularly close competitor with the other firm (unilateral effects) or is poised to act as a maverick disrupting collusion (coordinated effects). However, fears about underenforcement in the form of failing to protect potential competition in technology markets from "killer acquisitions" appear to be overstated. In particular, concerns about killer acquisitions may be more well-founded in pharmaceutical markets characterized by drastic innovations, where innovation milestones are easy to observe, rather than in technology markets.
Whether a transaction is likely to lead to a reduction in incremental or more disruptive R&D competition must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, but are more likely to occur in markets that are defined by these types of quality or innovation competition.
In assessing the competitive effects of mergers of firms that are poised to expand through innovation, market shares are typically not predictive by virtue of underemphasizing the competitive significance of the expanding firm. For this reason, intent, conduct, and performance evidence are in general more informative as to likely post-merger conditions.
Mergers can enhance innovation in two general ways. First, horizontal mergers may enhance innovation by providing firms with increased scale that increases their incentives and abilities to engage in R&D and innovation. Indeed, even mergers that result in a three firm oligopoly may in some cases improve consumer welfare by enhancing dynamic competition. Second, non-horizontal mergers can enhance innovation capabilities through the combination of complementary assets. An example would be an innovative pharmaceutical company being bought by a large incumbent who has the resources and know how to more efficiently bring new drugs to market.
Balancing the dynamic and innovation benefits of a merger with potential short run static harms like higher prices can be extremely difficult and may not admit of suitable quantitative evidence that can help predict the overall effect on market performance. With respect to structural evidence, the inverted-U analysis provides a useful starting point: mergers that create a monopoly are more unlikely to have dynamic benefits that outweigh short run harms than mergers that may create oligopoly where the risk of coordination is not low (e.g., not a duopoly with market characteristics that make collusion possible).
See response to Question C.7.
Mergers that reduce perceived potential competition (i.e., the acquisition of a firm that is perceived as a potential competitor) or actual potential competition (i.e., the acquisition of a firm that has the ability to be enter the market and compete) can under certain circumstances harm competition.
Relevant factors in analyzing competitive effects from acquisitions that involve a potential competitor would include the existence of a highly concentrated market, a clear perception or capability of the potential competitor to affect competition, as well as an already existing or likely procompetitive impact on the market. For acquisitions that involve actual potential competitors where the firm poses no existing constraint on the market, the Commission should take particular care to ensure that it does not chill procompetitive transactions based on speculative theories of harm, in part by focusing its enforcement on consummated transactions where there is direct evidence of anticompetitive harm (e.g., the potential competitor quickly develops what would have been a superior competitive product post-merger). Coordinated and unilateral effects theories would remain the central bases for demonstrating competitive harm.
Transactions that are likely to harm consumers from a loss of potential competition can occur in any industry, but are of particular concern in markets where entry is a significant factor in ensuring competitive markets. Indeed, transactions that reduce perceived potential competition are typically more concerning than mergers which may reduce actual potential competition, as a perceived potential competitor is often already posing an existing competitive constraint on the market due to the perceived threat of entry.
In assessing the competitive effects of mergers that involve a potential competitor, market shares are typically not predictive by virtue of potential competitors not yet having any actual market share. For this, intent, conduct, and performance evidence are in general more informative as to likely post-merger conditions.
Timely, sufficient, and likely entry by potential competitors is often reason for approving mergers that may pose a risk of prima facie competitive harm.
Consistent with the focus of merger enforcement on short-run effects, timely entry should typically occur within 1-2 years. Whether entry is likely should be assessed by analyzing whether it is profitable for the merged firm to enter the market, and the extent to which entry barriers do or do not limit its ability do so. Sufficiency should be evaluated by analyzing, for example, the potential competitor's ability to compete at scale either as a maverick (coordinated effects) or with a product that is a particularly close substitute to those of the merging parties.
For firms identified as "rapid entrants," timeliness can effectively be presumed such that they already effectively fall within the relevant market. Similarly, for potential competitors that are already perceived as such, rigid evidence regarding sufficiency of entry need not be put forward due to already existing competitive pressures on the market. By contrast, firms that are would qualify actual potential competitors are by their very nature likely entrants, such that the emphasis should be on showing timeliness and sufficiency.
The same sorts of considerations about likelihood, timeliness, and sufficiency in determining whether entry can rebut a prima facie case of anticompetitive harm will apply in determining whether the acquisition of a potential competitor is anticompetitive.
The same sorts of analysis that is used to assess the but-for world generally in merger analysis are applicable in cases where the but-for world involves a failing firm.
Because the focus of merger enforcement is on short-term effects, significant short-term temporary crises can significantly impact whether a firm is a flailing or even, in certain cases, a failing firm.
Whether an event is structural, and thus more conducive to a firm's failure, as opposed to temporary, and as such more potentially more likely to result in a flailing firm, should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The same sorts of analysis that is used to assess the but-for world generally in merger analysis are applicable in cases where the but-for world involves a failing firm.
The failing-firm defence is a legitimate justification for approving mergers that may result in some short-run competitive harms and the grounds that, but-for the merger, the firm will ultimately exit the market, making current conditions unpredictive of future competitive effects. To make the failing-firm defence, it is typically required that the firm be unable to meet its financial obligations in the future, is unable to reorganize successfully using bankruptcy, and that the merger is the least restrictive way to keep its assets productive relative to other transactions.
In addition to the failing firm defense, a merger that involves a flailing firm may also obviate the risk of anticompetitive effects. This sort of defense applies if a firm is not able to compete effectively in the future due to, for example, steadily and substantially declining market performance, a lack of resources, and/or heavy financial difficulties.
The same sorts of analysis that is used to assess the but-for world generally in merger analysis are applicable in cases where the but-for world involves a flailing firm.
See response to Question C.16.
The Commission should focus on the short-run competitive effects of a merger, typically within two years of consummation.
The analysis of longer-term historical industry trends can be helpful in understanding short-run competitive effects-for example, evidence that an industry is undergoing another cycle of disruptive economic change that makes anticompetitive effects unlikely.
Not at all.
The Guidelines should be focused on promoting competition through lower prices, increased output, improved quality, and greater innovation-not sustainability. However, promoting competition and innovation is consistent with sustainability goals: fostering innovation through merger enforcement will, ceteris paribus, lead to greater and greener energy innovation.
The revised Guidelines should not reflect any of these areas.
To the extent that, in certain markets, sustainability may be a parameter of competition (e.g., more innovative green products), it may factor into merger analysis. For example, if a merger risks reducing R&D competition for new and more sustainable technologies, that would constitute an actionable anticompetitive effect. However, that a merger may reduce sustainability does not by itself, as distinct from any reduction in quality adjusted prices, innovation, or other dimensionality of competition in a relevant market, constitute cognizable antitrust harm and can actually reflect efficiencies (e.g., a merged firm will more utilize less clean energy in production to lower costs).
Reduced ability and incentives to invest and develop clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services; Risks of discontinuation of clean and decarbonised products', technologies' and services' R&D; Foreclosure of access to critical inputs for clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services; Increased prices and lower quality of critical inputs for clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services; Foreclosure of access to clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services; Increased prices and lower quality of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
The same considerations about the general relationship between concentration and innovation are relevant to markets involving clean and decarbonized products, technologies and services. Consistent with the inverted-U relationship between market structure and innovation, a merger between competing providers of clean and decarbonized products, technologies and services may increase innovation and benefit consumers even if the transaction impedes effective competition or creates a dominant position. Similarly, vertical mergers in energy markets may result in economies of scope that foster innovation.
The same sorts of unilateral, coordinated, and vertical theories that the Commission generally considers should be evaluated in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
The same sorts of conditions the Commission generally considers when assessing whether a merger will result in unilateral, coordinated, or vertical effects will be relevant in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
The same sorts of evidence and metrics the Commission generally considers when assessing whether a merger will result in unilateral or coordinated effects should be evaluated in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services. Moreover, these markets do not provide an exceptional case where the Commission should pursue conglomerate theories of harm.
Vertical integration involving critical inputs; Better access to, or better purchase conditions of, critical inputs through new contracts; Combination of complementary R&D capabilities and staff; Access to new know-how and patents; Other factors (please list)
The same myriad types of efficiencies that mergers can generally bring may obtain in markets involving clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
The Commission should conduct the same type of verifiability analysis it engages in generally to assess merger efficiency claims in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
The same sorts of circumstances and evidence the Commission generally considers when assessing whether a merger is likely result in dynamic efficiency benefits be evaluated in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
The same sorts of conditions the Commission generally considers when assessing whether a merger will result in dynamic efficiency benefits that outweigh competitive harms should be evaluated in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services. For example, to the extent that dynamic efficiency benefits are not-merger specific, they will not outweigh competitive harms resulting from a transaction. To be sure, weighing the innovation benefits of a merger in the energy space toward developing new sustainable technologies against short run harms to consumer welfare (e.g., higher energy prices prices) is a complex exercise that is unlikely to admit of any clear quantitative metrics for predicting post-merger market performance. However, and consistent with the inverted-U relationship between concentration and innovation, the innovation benefits are much more likely to outweigh short run competitive harms in cases where the merger does not involve the creation of a monopoly market structure.
The same sorts of conditions that are generally considered to assess when a merger's efficiency benefits are passed on to consumers should be evaluated in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
The same sorts of evidence and metrics that are generally used to assess when a merger's efficiency benefits are passed on to consumers should be evaluated in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
The same sort of analysis that is generally used to assess when a merger's efficiency benefits are merger-specific should be conducted in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
Mergers that enhance innovation in energy markets by increasing the incentive and ability for firms to develop clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services will be beneficial toward the transition to a climate neutral, clean, and sustainable economy.
The same sort of analysis that is generally used to assess when a merger's efficiency benefits are merger-specific should be conducted in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services.
The Commission should consider global competition dynamics when it comes to evaluating competitive effects in markets that involve the sale or development of clean and decarbonised products, technologies and services to the extent that the relevant geographic market is global.
No.
N/A.
Not at all.
The Guidelines should be focused on promoting competition through lower prices, increased output, improved quality, and greater innovation-not digitalization per se. However, promoting competition and innovation is consistent with digitalization goals: sound merger enforcement in digital markets, ceteris paribus, lead to greater digitalization through innovation.
Other.
There is no need for Guidelines to provide guidance that is specifically tailored to digital markets. Rather, the Guidelines should be industry-agnostic and set out general legal and economic principles that are applicable in digital markets. Indeed, phenomena like network effects, non-price competition, the use of data, and dynamic entry are not all unique to the digital space, even if they are often particularly relevant to analyzing competitive effects in these markets.
"Tipping" or "winner takes most" dynamics in an industry are not evidence that a merger is more likely to result in anticompetitive harm, but only that barriers to entry may exist. Moreover, the incidence of tipping occurring is often overstated, as leading dominant firms are often not the first-movers in digital markets, which also often display multi-homing.
Network effects, just like economies of scale more generally, are not evidence that a merger is more likely to result in anticompetitive harm, but only that barriers to entry may exist.
Product stickiness may constitute switching costs that factor into the analysis of whether barriers to entry exist in a given market.
Guidelines can make clear that data can be a key dimensionality of competition in many industries. For example, the combination of data achieved through a merger can be an important efficiency that benefits consumers and competition.
Guidelines can make clear that quality and incremental product improvements can be a key dimensionality of competition in many industries.
Guidelines can make clear that in platform markets, it is proper to define relevant markets in ways that encompass all sides of the platform to take into account indirect network externalities.
The presence of dynamic entry and technological changes in digital market may often counteract the likelihood that a transaction will result in harm to competition.
As a general matter, the continued digitalization of the economy should not be viewed with concern as it pertains to competition. For example, although some have expressed fears about increased concentration in the economy over the past two decades of digitalisation, these concerns are often overstated. Moreover, even where concentration or markups may have increased over the past several decades, that does not mean competition isn't working. On the contrary, studies continue to find that higher concentration and markups are not fueled by price increases, but instead cost reductions driven by the sort of efficiencies that bring lower prices for consumers-and which, for example, another AI wave of general-purpose technological innovation and digitalization would continue to empower.
Yes.
Unlike horizontal mergers, vertical mergers do not involve the elimination of a competitor and instead entail inherent procompetitive incentives to increase output through EDM. Vertical mergers may in some cases result in harm to competition through foreclosure, but this can be mitigated to the extent that competitors can employ counterstrategies or retaliation that reduce the merged firm's incentive to foreclose (e.g., entry and expansion).
There is no need to adapt the frameworks for horizontal and for non-horizontal relationships to assess the effects that digital and tech mergers can have on competition, which are the same unilateral, coordinated and vertical effects theories that the Commission generally considers. What differs is only the facts and dynamics that define any particular industry, which in the case of digital markets often reflects scale driven innovation competition and disruptive changes that facilitate entry.
The Commission should not assess the competition risks of non-horizontal mergers that are not based on foreclosure conduct-conglomerate theories of harm should not be the object of merger enforcement. Rather, anticompetitive bundling or tying should be addressed post-merger through Articles 101 and 102 where applicable.
See response to Question E.7.
See response to Question E.7.
See response to Question E.7.
Mergers that increase entry barriers may be anticompetitive to the extent they limit competition from a perceived potential or actual potential competitor. Mergers that reduce the ability of a rival to expand can harm actual competition, particularly if the rival was likely to be a particularly close competitor or maverick in a highly concentrated market.
While relevant product markets are almost always comprised of substitutes, broader markets that cluster non-competing products and services may in some cases be defined. Alternatively, in the case of some multi-sided platforms, broader markets that take into account the network externalities across the platform should also be defined.
Cluster markets can be defined where customers and sellers find it significantly more efficient to respectively buy and distribute the services together. Broader platform markets can be defined in cases where markets are multi-sided, there are reciprocal indirect network effects across the platform, and that platform enables a simultaneous transaction between users on different sides of the platform, as in a transaction platform.
The Commission should consider the same types of quantitative and qualitative evidence for assessing whether a cluster market or platform market should be defined as it does to define relevant markets generally. Quantitative tests can include the hypothetical monopolist test (with modifications), and qualitative evidence can exclude evidence of past substitution and other relevant data regarding market realities.
As distinct from data as a product offering, mergers that aggregate data do not in and of themselves raise any concerns about horizontal effects. However, data aggregation can under some circumstances enhance barriers to entry that limit the ability for a merger that otherwise presents anticompetitive effects to be mitigated. Moreover, to the extent data is an input, mergers that aggregate data can present vertical concerns under some circumstances.
The same general considerations that apply when analyzing barriers to entry and input foreclosure should be evaluated in cases where data may constitute a barrier to entry or vehicle for input foreclosure.
The same sorts of evidence and metrics that apply when analyzing barriers to entry and input foreclosure should be evaluated in cases where data may constitute a barrier to entry or vehicle for input foreclosure.
The question of whether data constitutes a barrier to entry or means of input foreclosure should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and many factors may be relevant to that assessment. However, in order for data to constitute a barrier to entry or means of input foreclosure, typically data must have substantially high levels of value, volume, quality, uniqueness, and (limited) accessibility (i.e., excludable).
Foreclosure can either occur through input foreclosure (i.e., when a competitor is limited from accessing an input it needs to compete) or customer foreclosure (i.e., when a competitor is limited from accessing the customers to whom it sells).
For both input and customer foreclosure to occur, there must be an incentive to foreclose, the ability to foreclosure, and likely effects in the form of increased power over price.
The Commission should evaluate the same types of intent, structure, conduct and performance evidence it generally uses to analyze the effects of mergers when it comes to vertical mergers that pose a risk of foreclosure. However, in the case of foreclosure, structural presumptions of harm should not be applied.
Limiting interoperability and access can be a way in which a firm engages in either input or customer foreclosure.
The same sorts of conditions that determine the incentives, ability, and effects associated with the merged firm's foreclosure incentives are relevant to cases where the vehicle for foreclosure is limiting interoperability or access.
The same sorts of evidence and metrics that the Commission considers when evaluating incentives, ability, and effects associated with the merged firm's foreclosure incentives should be applied to cases where the vehicle for foreclosure is limiting interoperability or access.
The Commission should generally focus on evaluating the short-term effects of mergers (approximately two years), including in markets driven by technological change. Moreover, the Commission should not attempt to distinguish between markets before or after "tipping," but merely consider the extent to which barriers exist that limit entry in the short-run.
The same sorts of intent, structure, conduct, and performance evidence that the Commission generally considers to evaluate whether a merger will result in anticompetitive effects should be analyzed to consider likely future market trends.
The Commission's decisions not to challenge that Apple/Shazam merger, and approve the Google/Fitbit merger with conditions agreed to by Google and which the Commission believed were needed to prevent harm to competition by limiting barriers to entry, were not inappropriate.
Mergers that may reduce user privacy are not, in and of themselves, anticompetitive. However, in cases where privacy is an important parameter of competition vis-à-vis product quality, a reduction in privacy may constitute anticompetitive harm.
The revised Guidelines should not provide guidance on the relationship between data protection and privacy considerations and the availability of sufficient alternatives and market power.
Yes, to some extent.
The Guidelines are correct that "[c]onsumers may also benefit from new or improved products or services, for instance resulting from efficiency gains in the sphere of R & D and innovation." Future Guidelines could, among other things, make clear that that this can occur not just by scale that increases the incentive (e.g., a greater incentive to protect strong market position) and ability (e.g., greater ability to recoup investments in R&D), but also through vertical transactions that enhance dynamic capabilities through economies of scope.
Calculating which efficiencies will be passed on to consumers can be difficult to measure in practice and is one reason why analyzing a merger's effects on total welfare, rather than consumer welfare, can lead to a more administrable enforcement regime. As such, it is inadvisable to apply strict or rigid tests that risk over-excluding efficiency benefits on the grounds that they will not be passed on to consumers.
The Guidelines should make clear that efficiencies will be considered merger-specific if a merger is reasonably necessary to achieve them.
Revised Guidelines should not conflate the quantum of evidence with the quantum of proof in demonstrating efficiencies-if quantitative evidence is not available, that does not mean a greater amount of efficiencies is needed to offset anticompetitive harms, but only that a greater amount of qualitative evidence may be required to prove verifiability.
Revised Guidelines should not categorically discount fixed cost efficiencies, but instead assess whether they may be passed on to consumers on a case-by-case basis.
N/A.
Efficiencies come in myriad forms and whether they will be passed on to consumers should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
In general, mergers (both horizontal and vertical) are a procompetitive form of business conduct.
The Commission should weigh in-market efficiencies with in-market competitive harms to determine the net effect of the merger. While out-of-market efficiencies are typically not considered in order to ensure an administrable merger regime, in platform contexts with network externalities markets should be defined broadly to ensure that they take into account efficiency benefits on all sides of the platform.
In some cases, such as when price discrimination is possible, the Commission could identify targeted customer groups that may be particularly harmed by a merger, even if other groups of customers are not.
The Commission should not condemn mergers that result in short-term efficiency benefits on the speculative grounds that they will result in long-run consumer harms; both merger benefits and harms should be evaluated using the same time horizon (i.e., short run).
Typically, the use of economic modeling will be important to confirm which efficiency benefits may not be passed on to consumers.
In general, variable cost efficiencies are more likely to be passed on to consumers in the short-run than relative to fixed cost efficiencies. However, the Commission should not categorically discount the possibility for fixed-cost efficiencies to benefit consumers, but rather make this assessment on a case-by-case basis.
There are countless examples of how mergers can result in these types of efficiency benefits. As one recent comprehensive study in the United States found, "There is zero basis to doubt the once-settled wisdom underpinning the basic framework for merger review: mergers can and do advance procompetitive business objectives….[T]here is evidence of mergers leading to efficiencies in a wide range of industries, including for both goods and services, and for both highly commoditized and highly differentiated products." See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Taylor M. Owings, Evidence of Efficiencies in Consummated Mergers, (June 2023).
Mergers that increase efficiency will ceteris paribus increase the incentives for rival firms to engage in their own efficiency enhancing behaviors to be able to better compete with the merged firm.
N/A.
The Commission should analyze the same sorts of evidence it generally considers when examining whether efficiencies will be passed on to consumers in cases where those efficiencies concern increased investment and innovation.
Consumers' willingness to pay as measured by actual purchasing behaviour can be a means to assess the cognizability of innovation efficiencies.
Consumers' willingness to pay as measured by consumer surveys can be a means to assess the cognizability of innovation efficiencies.
Benefits from improved zero-priced products/services measured by consumer engagement (e.g., trends in number of users or hours of engagement) can be a means to assess the cognizability of innovation efficiencies..
The fact that innovation efficiencies may not be easily quantifiable in some cases should not change the legal standards for assessing whether they are verifiable, merger-specific, passed on to consumers, and likely to outweigh competitive harms.
Timely efficiencies should be in the short-run (approximately 2 years).
The Commission should not attempt to balance the net short-run effect of a merger with speculative net long-run effects of a merger. For example, mergers that present substantial short run harms to competition are not generally outweighed by the prospect of long-run product innovations in the future. However, even where innovation may only occur in the long-run, more upstream benefits in terms of greater R&D and invention may occur in the short-run and can be considered cognizable efficiency benefits.
To determine whether efficiencies are merger-specific, the Commission should ask whether the merger is reasonably necessary to achieve them.
Conduct evidence is often highly probative in determining whether a merger is reasonably necessary to achieve efficiency benefits. For example, if efficiencies were unable to be obtained through a prior contract between the merging parties, that is strong evidence that the efficiencies may be merger-specific.
The Commission should evaluate whether the merger is reasonably necessary to achieve efficiencies relative to the alternatives that would have likely been pursued in absence of the merger.
Reasonably practicable alternatives are those which would have been likely to be attempted to achieve efficiency benefits without a merger.
Conduct evidence is often highly probative evidence in determining whether a merger is likely to result in efficiencies. Intent, as garnered through business documents, can also be instructive.
In some cases, non-price efficiencies, such as output expansion and quality improvements, can be sufficiently quantified and balanced against price harms. However, the Commission should not require quantitative evidence to justify efficiency claims as a general matter, even if it may require a greater amount of qualitative evidence to justify efficiency claims if quantitative evidence is absent.
In cases where it is unclear whether efficiencies are likely to materialize, economic tools like merger simulations are often the best and most objective way to determine the extent to which a merger is likely to result in efficiency benefits that offset competitive harms.
Internal documents, including those used by management to decide on the merger, often constitute important evidence in determining whether a merger will result in efficiency benefits.
Statements from management, owners and financial markets about expected efficiencies often constitute important evidence in determining whether a merger will result in efficiency benefits.
Historical examples of efficiencies and consumer benefit often constitute important evidence in determining whether a merger will result in efficiency benefits.
Pre-merger external experts' studies on the type and size of efficiency gains and on the extent to which consumers are likely to benefit often constitute important evidence in determining whether a merger will result in efficiency benefits.
Economic models, including those investigating the merging parties' and their rivals' ability and incentives to invest and innovate often constitute important evidence in determining whether a merger will result in efficiency benefits.
The above categories should not be viewed as exhaustive.
Other types of evidence may arise that attest to the verifiability of efficiencies that should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Other.
The Guidelines should focus on the Commission's competition analysis. To the extent that defence and security considerations factor into its broader merger control regime, that should be addressed separately.
ITIF is not aware of any mergers that were explicitly approved on competition grounds that should have been denied on defence grounds or vice versa.
For purposes of analyzing competitive harm the effect of defence mergers on government customers should be analyzed in the same way that effects would be measured on civilian consumers.
Not at all.
The current Guidelines rightly do not provide guidance upon whether a transaction will harm democracy or media plurality, but instead focus on its effects on competition and consumers.
Media diversity/plurality as a parameter of competition.
The Commission should seek to foster a merger regime where enforcement is focused at the EU level and on the analysis of whether a transaction will harm competition.
The claim that increased market power is a threat to democratic accountability does not bear scrutiny. Indeed, effective competition is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for democracy: a small pharmaceutical company may have tremendous market power but have little to no political influence; by contrast, a small well-connected firm may, for various reasons, have exceptional levels of political influence. Indeed, market power can support democracy by fostering innovation that empowers citizens and disrupts the economic power of entrenched incumbents that dominate the political status quo.
In media markets, protecting competition and consumer welfare may have direct second-order effects on protecting democracy and fostering media plurality, even if this should not be a goal of competition enforcement.
In media markets, protecting competition and consumer welfare may have direct second-order effects on protecting diversity of opinions, even if this should not be a goal of competition enforcement.
Not at all.
The current Guidelines rightly do not provide guidance upon whether a transaction will harm labor markets and workers.
Other.
Merger enforcement should focus on protecting competition, innovation, and consumers, not labor as a general matter.
To the extent necessary to protect competition and consumers, the Commission should define buying markets for labor using the same tests used to define markets when analyzing sell side market power. However, the Commission should make clear that a firm having sell-side market or monopoly power does not all mean that it has buyer or monopsony power in a labor market, as labor markets are typically much broader than product markets. For example, a software engineer who works for a monopoly firm may find robust competition for their labor from firms in other high-tech markets.
Unlike mergers that increase market power, mergers that create buyer power or a lack of effective competition in labor markets do not pose a prima facie risk of harm to consumers, as the former may result in both lower costs that are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices and increased industry output. As such, mergers that increase employer power should not be condemned unless they also result in harm to consumers and competition. This typically occurs only in mergers that result in the creation of a monopsony labor market where both workers and consumers could be harmed.
Mergers that create monopsony power for labor and will lead to consumer harm are rare and typically limited to circumstances involving a "company town" where one employer dominants a local community.
To assess whether a merger that increases buyer power over labor is anticompetitive, the Commission analyze whether downstream output has decreased and avoid any attempt to weigh any harms to labor with benefits to consumers.
In order to condemn a transaction that harms labor, the Commission should have to show harm to customers, typically through reduced output.
The Commission should define buying markets the same general tests (as modified appropriately) used to define markets when analyzing sell side market power.
Unlike mergers that increase market power, mergers that create buyer power or a lack of effective competition do not pose a prima facie risk of harm to consumers, as the former may result in both lower costs that are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices and increased industry output. As such, mergers that increase buyer power should not be condemned unless they also result in harm to consumers and competition. This typically occurs only in mergers that result in the creation of a monopsony where both sellers and consumers could be harmed.
Mergers that increase buyer power and harm consumers are most likely to occur in situations where there is a merger to monopsony between powerful buyers that have a demonstrated ability to obtain favorable terms from suppliers, such as through price discrimination.
The Commission should analyze the same sorts of intent, structure, conduct and performance evidence that is typically evaluated to understand the competitive effects of a merger, principally to determine whether the merger will ultimately reduce output downstream.
In order to condemn a transaction that results in increased buyer power, the Commission should have to demonstrate harm to consumers.
Yes.
By enhancing output and innovation in strategic sectors, mergers can improve their performance. By contrast, mergers that lead to a reduction in output or innovation can result in harm to strategic sectors. In its Hamilton Index, ITIF has identified 10 industries that are particularly strategic in the context of global competition with China: IT and Information Services, Computers and Electronics, Chemicals, Machinery and Equipment, Motor Vehicles, Basic Metals, Fabricated Metals, Pharmaceuticals, Electrical Equipment, and Other Transportation. See: Robert D. Atkinson and Ian Tufts, "The Hamilton Index, 2023: China Is Running Away With Strategic Industries" (Dec. 2023).
No.
N/A.
N/A.