The Shield of Americas Gathering and an Amplified Strategy to Counter China in the Western Hemisphere

Commentary by Ryan C. Berg

Published March 5, 2026

On March 7, President Donald Trump will host the Western Hemisphere's pro-Washington leaders for a conference dubbed the "Shield of the Americas." Public reporting suggests the conference, to be held at the Trump National Doral resort in Miami, could seek to build a more robust counter-China strategy in the region. The attendance list has expanded to include both presidents and presidents-elect (in the case of Chile's José Antonio Kast), reflecting Latin America's ongoing rightward political shift. Contingent upon upcoming election results, future iterations of this gathering could include presidents from Colombia and Peru, as well as possibly from Brazil.

The Shield of the Americas conference comes at an auspicious time, as the gathering builds on the Trump administration's 2025 National Security Strategy and its sharp focus on the Western Hemisphere. Given that the triannual Summit of the Americas, slated to be held in the Dominican Republic, did not transpire in December 2025, the Shield of the Americas conference also represents the first multilateral meeting with Latin American heads of state convened by the United States in the second Trump administration. It will also occur just weeks before President Trump's summit with Xi Jinping in China. Public reporting suggests that security, counternarcotics, and anti⁠-money laundering policy will be the principal foci of the gathering. Indeed, in the effort to "enlist and expand" partnerships, the United States recently announced joint counter-drug operations with Ecuador and plans to do so with other countries in the region.

Beyond counter-drug, counter-cartel, and now Middle East issues, however, President Trump has the opportunity to amplify the administration's early successes and continue a robust strategy to push back on China in the Americas, all in accordance with the National Security Strategy's "Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine." For several decades, Beijing had unfettered access to the United States' shared neighborhood. China's trade with the region hit a record $518 billion in 2024, with Beijing loaning more than $120 billion to governments across the Western Hemisphere. These investments have manifested themselves in a three dozen-strong port network, more space infrastructure than any region of the world outside of mainland China, and state-owned Huawei burrowed into at least a dozen telecommunications networks across the region. Increasingly, China is dumping its excess industrial capacity on Latin America's markets, with trade increasing in 2025 by 7 percent, much of it in areas where China is known to have overcapacity.

The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine concerns itself with two main areas: (1) control and operation of strategic assets in the Western Hemisphere by great power adversaries and (2) control of strategic geographies. The Trump administration's early focus on the Panama Canal, foreign-operated ports, and critical minerals demonstrates that the principal concern of the Trump Corollary is China. Furthermore, several countries, such as Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala, have already signed reciprocal trade agreements that include strong counter-China clauses, some of which are unrelated to trade specifically but encompass areas such as space cooperation. Just one week after the release of the National Security Strategy, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs released its third policy paper on China⁠-Latin America relations, showing no signs of slowing its efforts despite U.S. pushback. Sensing its grip over the Western Hemisphere slipping, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a "task force" aimed at preserving its gains in the region and anticipating future U.S. actions.

Starting with the leaders most likely to align with Washington, the Shield of the Americas conference may be the best opportunity for the Trump administration to lay out more counter-China strategies in the Western Hemisphere. The time is ripe for renewed and revitalized economic partnerships across the Western Hemisphere, and invitees will likely form the nucleus of those pushback efforts.

The following areas are ripe for further partnerships that would reduce China's influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Economic

Infrastructure: The United States may seek to announce an "Americas Infrastructure Compact," setting aside $50-$100 billion for a U.S.-backed alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) inroads in Latin America. Preference could be given to public-private partnerships to catalyze private sector investment. This could include U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) financing for ports, highways, energy grids, and telecommunications networks, all areas where China has been outpacing all other countries and building considerable leverage over Latin American countries in the process. Cofinancing with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the European Union, and the Inter-American Development Bank could be considered to broaden the pool of expertise and resources.

Economic Security and Supply Chain Initiatives: While erecting large tariff walls on Chinese exports, the United States should look to the Americas for important elements of supply chain security. Latin America's proximity and the unlikely weaponization of supply chains make it an ideal candidate for supply chain security initiatives focused on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors (assembly, testing, and packaging), critical minerals (building on the recently announced Project Vault), and agriculture and food systems. In such an initiative, leaders could seek to construct supply chain corridors with tax incentives, tariff reductions, and a set of common rules of origin in order to avoid Chinese transshipment. For the latter, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement-style rules of origin could be considered, raising regional content requirements but also boxing out China. This initiative could be institutionalized in an "Americas Economic Security Dialogue," an annual meeting of foreign ministers and finance ministers, along with the U.S. secretary of state, to focus on supply chain security initiatives (and building on the recent and highly successful Critical Minerals Ministerial), debt sustainability, comprehensive screening for critical infrastructure risks, and even BRI-related renegotiations of infrastructure projects.

Americas Energy Compact for Economic Growth: The Trump administration may seek to launch an "Americas Energy Compact" to offer Latin American countries the opportunity to buy more U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG), in particular. The Trump administration's National Energy Dominance Council efforts have helped to make energy exports a key point of influence for the United States in multiple theaters. Energy is also the critical link to economic development and productivity gains, complementing supply chain security initiatives. Beyond opportunities to buy more U.S. LNG, the United States should seek to reduce China's hold on energy generation and electricity distribution in many countries. As China's inroads in this area demonstrate, Latin American countries are ripe for grid modernization. Lastly, building on the recent Critical Minerals Ministerial, Latin American countries that were not part of that gathering could seek to broker critical minerals agreements with the United States for offtake and increased production.

Digital Networks and Telecommunications Infrastructure: As Latin America enters the next digital age, many countries are rapidly building their 4G and 5G networks. The United States should seek to build on successful efforts in Panama to "rip and replace" Huawei and ZTE digital networks across Latin America. Doing so should be the baseline for follow-on discussions about data centers and export of the U.S. tech stack, which many Latin American countries desire. Digital security and a reduction of Chinese influence in telecommunications and digital networks should be a prerequisite. As part of the same conversations, the United States should seek to include standard-setting for AI, leading with innovation and balancing public trust, and ensuring that technology standards augur well for the region's democracies. This would help push back on China's Digital Silk Road Initiative.

Subsea Cable Security: The United States should include undersea cable transparency and security in any agreements, through which 85 percent of the world's data flows, and which are vulnerable to data theft and espionage. Recent U.S. actions against Chilean officials involved in a potential subsea cable from Valparaíso to Hong Kong have helped to send a message about the Trump administration's redlines on the importance of subsea cable and data security. Similar efforts in the first Trump administration led to a successful deal between Google and the Chilean government to build one of the world's longest subsea cables and box out China. As part of these efforts, the Trump administration may wish to establish a cyber incident reporting network as well, in an effort to track the quantity and location of Chinese intrusions into regional networks.

Debt Conversion Partnerships: Reducing China's debt leverage in many parts of the world has been a U.S. goal across administrations. Indebtedness to China could frustrate or stymie broader U.S. efforts in Latin America. In order to avoid debt to China becoming a spoiler, the United States could consider a program, led by international financial institutions, to refinance BRI debts. These conversions would involve debt swaps, conditional refinancing, and increased transparency in contracting, as well as infrastructure tender and contract reform in countries seeking these conversions, thereby reducing opportunities for opaque, debt-laden deals by Chinese state-owned enterprises.

Defense and Security

Hemispheric Security Network: Consistent with the National Security Strategy's stated goal to "enlist and expand" regional partnerships, the Trump administration should consider a "Hemispheric Security Network" that goes beyond fighting the scourge of drugs, human trafficking, and illegal migration, taking a broad view of security. While serving as a coordination body for security efforts, this network would aim to box out China's Global Security Initiative from the region and its "safe cities" programs. Both are mentioned in China's Third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean as priorities in relations with the Americas. For aligned countries gathering in Miami, the United States should encourage intelligence sharing on Chinese (as well as Russian and Iranian) covert operations in the region and United Front activities meant to destabilize countries, capture elites, and build influence networks. An expanded definition of security should clearly include enhanced maritime domain awareness efforts to combat China's predatory fishing practices. U.S. Ambassador to Peru Bernie Navarro, for instance, has sounded the alarm on the extent of Chinese Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing fleets in waters around the country.

Port Transparency and Security Initiative: Many Chinese-built and operated ports raise dual-use concerns. In building a port transparency and security initiative, the United States should push for voluntary audits of port security, offering U.S. Coast Guard security assistance if requested. On the technology side, the Trump administration should make funding available to upgrade port scanning systems, both to complement the fight against drug trafficking and to remove Chinese scanners built by state-owned enterprises such as Nuctech from security systems, as well as ship-to-shore crane systems. As part of these efforts, the grouping could outline measures that would certify a "Secure Port of the Americas," a port that could be given preference in building supply chain security initiatives with the aforementioned tax breaks and selective tariff reductions. Exports from ports that do not meet minimal security requirements could face tariffs.

Cyber Shield Initiative: Latin America remains vulnerable to cyber intrusions and the threat posed by Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, often state-sponsored hacking groups focused on penetrating government networks, industrial espionage, and critical infrastructure. Cyber team training and grants for cyber upgrades would complement a focus on telecommunications networks. Costa Rica's experience with 2022 ransomware attacks and APT groups, and the subsequent development of the National Cybersecurity Operations Center, could serve as a regional hub for training. Meanwhile, Latin American countries should be encouraged to continue developing the human capital necessary for the digital sector jobs of the future.

Governance

Latin America Transparency Compact: China's modus operandi features operations that are often shrouded in secrecy. Tracking China's loans and indebtedness in the region has often been difficult. A Transparency Compact would require the public disclosure of foreign loans, the fine print on infrastructure projects, and a screening of Chinese state-owned enterprises. The objective of a Transparency Compact would be to construct a legal framework that makes opaque contracting less attractive for regional governments.

People's Liberation Army (PLA) Influence Mapping Task Force: One challenge in countering China in Latin America is the lack of comprehensive information on the extent of its influence in multiple domains. In particular, an effort should be made to map the influence of the PLA and companies linked to it within the region. Such a mapping exercise would identify dual-use infrastructure risks and offer recommendations for standards to be met as part of the "Secure Port of the Americas" certification program, for instance. Flagging investments with strategic-military implications in real time would be another important function. As a means of articulating and establishing the Trump administration's redlines, the task force could release a declassified "Threat Landscape" document prepared collaboratively with information provided by countries at the Shield of the Americas conference.

Stabilization Compact for Venezuela: Following the highly successful Operation Absolute Resolve, a post-Maduro Venezuela represents an opportunity for an entire regional reset, given Venezuela's outsized ability to determine regional trendlines. A stabilization compact for Venezuela could include a desire to see Venezuela reduce the geopolitical influence of China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba, along with a potential stabilization fund with investments that would be conditioned on limiting foreign military presence. Both the United States and the region have been deeply affected by transnational organized crime networks with roots in Venezuela. A regional statement on a set of expectations for the interim authorities in Venezuela could give partners some sense that Venezuela is moving in the right direction on security, transnational crime, corruption networks, and accountability measures.Top of FormBottom of Form

Conclusion

The Shield of the Americas gathering is a terrific opportunity for the Trump administration to continue its foreign policy pivot to the Western Hemisphere. The durability and value of U.S. relationships with the region is perhaps the single most important factor in determining its future allegiance in a bipolar world dominated by the United States and China. In its first year back in office, the Trump administration managed to open important channels of influence to counter China in the Americas. The Shield of the Americas gathering is the ideal place to continue filling those openings with agreements, compacts, memoranda of understanding, and initiatives in the economic, defense and security, and governance domains.

Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

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