01/17/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 01/17/2026 06:13
The President late last week called for a yearlong 10 percent cap on credit card interest rates. The proposal sparked immediate concerns from lawmakers, business leaders and academics warning about the potential consequences for the economy and consumers' ability to obtain affordable credit, a point highlighted in a joint statement by a coalition of trade associations representing banks of all sizes. Nearly 90 percent of current cardholders - 175-190 million American cardholders - would effectively lose access to credit cards nationwide under such a rate cap, according to an Electronic Payments Coalition study. Citigroup CEO Jane Fraser warned about the economic consequences this week: "Studies in the US have shown a vast majority of consumers and businesses would lose access to credit cards," Fraser said. "They'd be forced to pursue more predatory alternatives, and you'd only be left with the wealthy having access to credit cards. And nobody wants that."
The Senate Banking Committee this week delayed a much-anticipated markup on crypto market structure legislation that has driven debate for months among lawmakers and industry. The markup, which had been scheduled for Thursday, was postponed by Committee Chairman Tim Scott (R-SC) shortly after Coinbase CEO Brian Armstrong announced that the firm was withdrawing its support for the bill. Armstrong expressed opposition to DeFi prohibitions, restrictions on tokenized equities, "erosion of the CFTC's authority" and draft amendments that would "kill rewards on stablecoins." A number of other matters, including ethics and insider trading prohibitions sought by Senate Democrats, also remain sticking points in the negotiations. Armstrong's announcement was quickly followed by prominent industry voices urging Congress to stay the course and advance the bill through the markup process:
The Department of Justice issued grand jury subpoenas to the Federal Reserve on Jan. 9, threatening to indict Chair Jerome Powell over his testimony before the Senate Banking Committee last year regarding the renovation of the Fed's office buildings. In response to the action, Powell released a statement in which he described the subject of the indictment threat as a pretext: "The threat of criminal charges is a consequence of the Federal Reserve setting interest rates based on our best assessment of what will serve the public, rather than following the preferences of the President. This is about whether the Fed will be able to continue to set interest rates based on evidence and economic conditions-or whether instead monetary policy will be directed by political pressure or intimidation."
The House Financial Services Committee Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity held a hearing Wednesday, titled "Striking the Right Balance Sheet". Bill Nelson, BPI executive vice president and chief economist, testified, examining the systemic costs of the Federal Reserve's "floor system," including the deterioration of private interbank markets and the lack of a natural constraint on the Fed's size.
Here are some takeaways from the hearing:
1. The Fed's current "floor system" weakens financial stability by increasing discount window stigma.
Task Force Chairman Frank Lucas (R-OK): Dr. Nelson, the Fed maintains that a floor system provides more rate control, safer banking system, a more resilient Treasury market. You share that view. What are the risks? What are the downside risks of a large balance sheet?
Bill Nelson, BPI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No, I don't share that view. There's, in fact, generally widespread agreement across the folks that have studied this that both a scarce reserve system and an ample reserve system provide good interest rate control in normal times. Now, it's true that when the Fed has to expand its balance sheet in response to a crisis, and reserve balances go up, what happens at that time is a corridor system naturally becomes a floor system. And the ECB indeed moved in and out of a corridor and floor system with no difficulty during the European banking crisis, and that demonstrates that it's not necessary for the Fed to operate a floor system all the time with the attendant costs in order to be able to handle times of a crisis. Moreover, it's not true that the banking system is more resilient under a floor system. In fact, as we saw, one of the things that a floor system does is that it increases discount window stigma, and it reduces the incentive for banks to be prepared to use the window. And as we saw in August 2023, the banking system is much less resilient if the banks are not prepared to use the discount window.
2. Recent supplementary leverage ratio reform improved banks' Treasury market intermediation, but more work is needed.
Rep. Scott Fitzgerald (R-WI): What concrete metrics should Congress use to decide when the Fed's balance sheet is too large in size relative to GDP, reserve balances relative to bank assets, market functioning indicators maybe, or taxpayer exposure? And if none of these work, what measurable limits should replace that, I guess is the question?
…
Bill Nelson, BPI: So, while it's one way that the Federal Reserve's large balance sheet does distort Treasury markets is through the creation of reserve balances, which tends to make leverage ratio requirements more binding on the part of the banking system, because leverage reserve balances are a low risk, zero risk weight asset when they're very high leverage ratios tend to be more binding. That discourages banks and the broker dealers owned by bank holding companies from intermediating in Treasury markets, because that requires them to take on similar low risk assets. Now the banking agencies have addressed that to some extent recently by adjusting the supplementary leverage ratio requirement, but there remains the tier one leverage ratio requirement, which is binding on other banks and continues to discourage Treasury market intervention, intermediation.
3. It is difficult for the Federal Reserve to shrink its balance sheet because reserve demand contains an upward ratchet.
Rep. Mike Flood (R-NE): If the Federal Reserve already has a $6 trillion balance sheet, when the next recession hits, the Federal Reserve will be more, will need more assets on top of their already elevated holdings. My concern is whether this is sustainable long term. If quantitative easing remains a tool in the Federal Reserve's toolbox in the event of economic turbulence, wouldn't a larger balance sheet in good times blunt the economic impact of that tool when things get tough? My first question, Dr. Clouse, Dr. Nelson, Dr. Schrager, would you mind reacting to that sentiment? How should we be thinking about the implications of a larger Federal Reserve balance sheet for future bouts of quantitative easing?
Bill Nelson, BPI: So, I think the big challenge, the particular challenge, is that once, every time the Fed increases its size, that size gets locked in, and it has to increase it further. So, for example, as I noted in 2008, the staff judged that 30 billion was needed to conduct policy of the floor system. Now it's 3 trillion. But importantly, when the Fed decided to adopt a floor system, the staff estimated that it would require 1 trillion in reserves, and at that time, in large part because Chair Powell wanted to be able to demonstrate that QE could be reversed, he indicated that, "Well, 1 trillion. I will support it at that level, but if it turns out to be 1.5 trillion, then I'll have buyer's remorse." 11 months later, the staff revised its estimate of the amount needed to 1.5 trillion. So, I think that that's the fundamental tendency for the balance sheet to just have to keep growing is part of the severe problem with their approach.
4. Adjustments to liquidity regulations, including recognizing banks' use of the discount window as part of those requirements, could help to reduce the demand for reserve balances.
Task Force Chairman Frank Lucas (R-OK): [B]anking regulations like liquidity coverage ratio resolution requirements and liquidity stress test incentivize financial institutions to hold reserves, growing the Fed's balance sheet. Should the regulators contemplate the impacts liquidity requirements have on the size of the Fed's balance sheet? What regulations need to be adjusted?
Bill Nelson, BPI: Yes, they should. So last week, we conducted a survey of our member banks and published the results of that survey this morning on what leads banks to demand reserve balances and what policies could change them. The things that the banks listed was first and foremost their own risk management, but then also needing to pass liquidity requirements as well as discount window stigma, and they indicated that the things that would most effectively allow them to reduce their demand for reserve balances was to recognize discount window capacity in the liquidity requirements to which they're subject.
5. The Fed's "unbounded" balance sheet creates an "attractive nuisance" that erodes independence.
Rep. Troy Downing (R-MT): There's been a lot of discussion this Congress about maintaining the independence of the Fed, which I strongly support. This question is for Dr. Schrager and for Dr. Nelson: Is it easier for the Fed to lose its independence if its balance sheet is too large, and if so, are there policy recommendations that you have for Congress to consider?
Bill Nelson, BPI: I do think that it puts risk to the Fed's independence. Back the way the Fed used to conduct policy, reserve balances were extremely low, so the Fed could get no bigger than the public's demand for currency in the Treasury's general account. But, if the Fed tried to get bigger, it would lose control of monetary policy under the old regime. Under the current regime, the Fed's balance sheet is effectively unbounded, and that makes it a more attractive target, as several FOMC participants have indicated, for political manipulation. And we've seen that with the CARES Act, which directed the Fed to extend credit to middle market firms, rather than Congress doing so itself and the Fed did. We saw it with the FDIC borrowing from the Fed, rather than the Treasury, which was bound by the debt limit at that time, to fund its bailouts of uninsured depositors in the spring of 2023.
Banks' demand for reserves plays a critical role in the Fed's implementation of monetary policy and banking system functioning. It also determines how large the Fed has to be. Reserve demand is driven by many factors, including liquidity requirements and discount window stigma. To understand the current landscape of reserve demand, what drives it and how it is changing, BPI conducted a survey of bank treasurers. The survey asked:
Regulatory Factors. As flagged in a recent speech by Fed Governor Stephen Miran, regulatory requirements can exert significant influence over banks' demand for reserves. Through this interaction, regulation can drive or inhibit the implementation of monetary policy, with major economic implications.
This note summarizes the results of BPI's survey.
After the President proposed a 10 percent, yearlong cap on credit card interest rates, he also expressed support this week for legislation sponsored by Sens. Roger Marshall (R-KS) and Dick Durbin (D-IL) - the Credit Card Competition Act (CCCA) - which purports to lower credit card interchange fees by forcing large banks to allow at least two unaffiliated payment networks to process transactions for their cards. The lawmakers reintroduced the bill this week. A broad coalition of bank and credit union associations emphasized the dire consequences of the Durbin-Marshall credit card mandate, which the President supports, in a separate statement this week.
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