Commentary by Kari A. Bingen

Published January 30, 2026

This week marks one year since President Trump announced his ambitious vision for the "Iron Dome for America" (now referred to as the "Golden Dome for America"). He described it as a "cutting-edge missile defense shield to protect our homeland from the threat of foreign missile attack," which includes "next-generation technologies across the land, sea, and space, including space-based sensors and interceptors," that will be "fully operational before the end of [his] term." Since then, little information has been released about the initiative, leading to doubts about its necessity and speculation about its feasibility and cost. The case for Golden Dome is strong, but it remains largely unmade by the administration.

That conversation starts with a simple but often overlooked fact about the nation's current defenses. Simply put, many Americans would be surprised by how limited current missile defenses are in protecting the United States. Over the past several decades, defense investments have prioritized systems designed to protect deployed forces and allies against regional air and missile threats, spanning the Middle East to East Asia. For much of that period, homeland protection rested primarily on nuclear deterrence rather than active defense.

Yet the threat environment has changed profoundly. Today's risks extend well beyond nuclear attack: The U.S. homeland is increasingly accessible and vulnerable to a wide range of conventional and nuclear threats delivered en masse-and in novel ways-across land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace. From Iran's massive, coordinated missile and drone strikes against Israel to Ukraine's surprise drone operations launched from deep inside mainland Russia, recent conflicts underscore how distance and geography no longer provide the protection they once afforded the United States. The assumption that such threats cannot reach American shores is outdated and increasingly dangerous. The U.S. homeland defense strategy must adapt accordingly.

The Gradual Shift in the U.S. Homeland Missile Defense Strategy

Throughout most of the Cold War, the United States approached homeland missile defense through the lens of nuclear deterrence. The central threat was a large-scale Soviet nuclear missile attack, where protection rested not on interception but on the promise of massive nuclear retaliation in response. This logic shaped both strategy and architecture. A nuclear triad and diverse warhead inventory, early-warning satellites and ground-based radars optimized to detect launches and track missiles over the North Pole, and durable nuclear command, control, and communications enabled U.S. leaders to respond with survivable nuclear forces should that time ever come.

That approach largely held for decades. The few defensive systems that existed were limited in scope and constrained by arms control agreements, most notably the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The second major epoch of homeland missile defense emerged in the early 2000s. In 2002, the United States formally withdrew from the ABM Treaty and adopted a new policy focused on defending the homeland against "limited ballistic missile attack." The objective was not to counter Russia or China, but to protect against smaller-scale threats-such as an accidental, unauthorized, or even deliberate missile launch-from rogue states like North Korea.

This policy led to the development and deployment of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, which today consists of 44 interceptors based in Alaska and California. These interceptors rely on space-based sensors for launch detection and terrestrial radars for tracking, and they are designed to engage a limited number of ballistic missiles in the middle of their flight ("midcourse" defense). Over time, the United States also expanded regional air and missile defenses-Aegis ships, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot, and Short-Range Air Defense systems-to protect forward-deployed forces and allies from shorter-distance threats.

To address aerial threats in the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. air defenses were improved, but largely concentrated over Washington, D.C. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) also beefed up its air surveillance and defense mission.

Throughout this period, "strategic deterrence" remained the foundation of U.S. strategy toward major nuclear powers. Even as missile defenses improved and China and others built up their own homeland "anti-access and aerial denial" capabilities, official policy continued to rely on our nuclear arsenal to deter Russia and China. The most recent Missile Defense Review, published in 2022, reaffirmed this approach, emphasizing deterrence for peer adversaries while maintaining missile defenses aimed at limited attacks.

That posture, however, is no longer well matched to the threat environment now emerging.

The End of Geographic Sanctuary

Today's challenge is not simply more missiles, but more diverse, capable, and complex threats-many now conventionally armed-that can reach U.S. shores.

Russia and China are expanding their nuclear and conventional arsenals in ways that stress existing defenses. As documented by the Defense Intelligence Agency and annual intelligence community threat assessments, these include advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads and hypersonic glide vehicles. Last September alone, China showcased no less than six long-range missile systems capable of reaching the continental United States. Hypersonic missiles, capable of traveling at five to ten times the speed of sound while maneuvering unpredictably, compress decision timelines and complicate tracking and interception. Adding further complexity are cruise missiles, which fly low, exploit terrain, and approach from unexpected directions, and novel systems-from China's space-based fractional orbital bombardment capability demonstrated in 2021 to Russia's tested Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and undersea vehicles-that are designed to evade traditional defenses.

Beyond missiles, the homeland now faces a broader array of advanced aerial threats. The appearance of a Chinese high-altitude balloon over the United States in 2023, combined with the widespread use of drones in conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East, underscores that the air and space domain above the homeland is no longer uncontested. These systems are cheaper, more proliferated, and harder to attribute, creating new opportunities for probing, coercion, and surprise. Ukraine's daring use of over 100 drones in its June 2025 Operation "Spider's Web"-striking Russian strategic air bases deep within the mainland-challenged the assumption that distant territory and sensitive targets remain out of reach and off limits. Even more concerning than any single capability is how these systems are increasingly employed together. Missiles and drones launched simultaneously and in coordinated waves to achieve massed effects-from Russia's September 2025 aerial assault on Ukraine with more than 600 drones and missiles, to Iran's April 2024 strikes on Israel using over 300 drones and missiles.

Taken together, these developments expose a stark and sobering reality: The U.S. homeland is more vulnerable today than the existing defense architecture was designed to handle. Current systems were built for limited, largely ballistic threats. They are not postured for this mix of hypersonic weapons, advanced cruise missiles, unconventional trajectories, and aerial systems that can approach U.S. territory from multiple vectors.

Golden Dome represents a recognition of this gap-and a decision to enter a third epoch of homeland defense.

The Third Epoch of Homeland Defense

Anchoring homeland missile defense strategy going forward is the recognition that a new class of powerful, nonnuclear weapons can reach the United States by land, air, sea, and space, and the United States must defend against them alongside traditional nuclear threats. At its core, this next epoch of homeland defense is about restoring balance between offense and defense in a rapidly changing strategic environment.

More capable homeland defenses will not replace nuclear deterrence, nor should they promise perfect protection. Instead, they can limit damage, complicate adversary planning and targeting, and raise the threshold for coercion or attack. Such active defenses force opponents to consider higher levels of escalation to achieve their objectives-making an already grave decision even more unpalatable. By reducing confidence in an adversary's ability to strike the homeland cleanly or cheaply, defenses can reinforce deterrence by denial alongside deterrence by punishment.

While little is publicly known about the Golden Dome architecture, it has been described by administration officials as a layered "system-of-systems" that will be "fielded in phases, prioritizing defense where the threat is greatest." It is likely to build on existing systems and knowledge rather than start from scratch, making it-in the near-term-an engineering and integration challenge. As its director has noted, "the technology that we need to deliver Golden Dome exists today." Ground-based interceptors, early warning radars, regional missile defense systems, counter-uncrewed aerial system capabilities, air and maritime surveillance assets, and communications networks already provide pieces of homeland protection. The task is to knit these building blocks into a coherent, layered architecture that is resilient, scalable, and adaptable to a wider range of threats-an effort that hinges on data sharing across services and agencies, sensor fusion, modern command and control, and rigorous testing.

To be sure, emerging technologies and continuous technology development will be required as the architecture matures and adapts to changes in the threat. Automation, artificial intelligence (AI), and advanced computing power will be central to its operational feasibility. The speed and complexity of modern threats demand rapid decision-making, efficient weapon-target pairing, and continuous reassessment as situations evolve. AI-enabled tools can help manage this complexity, enabling operators to focus on judgment and oversight rather than manual correlation and calculation.

One of the key insights driving Golden Dome is the importance of early engagement: ideally, defeating threats before they launch. Intercepting missiles in their boost phase-before they release warheads or begin maneuvering-also offers significant advantages. The missile is hotter, brighter, and slower, and the number of objects is smaller. But boost-phase interception is technically demanding and time-constrained, often requiring engagement within minutes of launch. That reality pushes an architecture toward space, where sensors and interceptors can provide global coverage and rapid response.

Even when boost-phase interception is not possible, tracking and engaging hypersonic maneuvering threats requires persistent, high-fidelity sensing that terrestrial systems alone cannot provide. Space-based sensors offer the ability to maintain continuous custody of targets across long distances and multiple domains. Layered defenses-combining space-based and terrestrial systems-create multiple opportunities to detect, track, and engage threats, increasing the likelihood of success.

Golden Dome is also about economics as much as capability. Traditional missile defense suffers from a cost-exchange problem: shooting million-dollar interceptors at thousand-dollar drones. During the 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran, roughly a quarter of the entire THAAD interceptor inventory was reportedly expended in just 12 days. At the same time, space-based interceptors have historically been cost-prohibitive in large part due to the high cost of launch and a limited ability to produce and operate satellites at scale. Some of these assumptions are shifting. SpaceX ushered in dramatic decreases in launch costs and broke barriers in high-volume satellite manufacturing. The emphasis by program leaders on magazine depth, production capacity, and affordability, paired with the Department of War's announced acquisition reforms, including plans for long-term munitions production deals, holds promise. But they must be realized through defined contracts and resources.

A Necessary and Enduring Strategic Evolution

Golden Dome reflects a broader shift in U.S. thinking about homeland defense. After decades focused primarily on overseas contingencies, policymakers are increasingly recognizing that the homeland itself is a contested domain. Defending it will require sustained coordination across military services, federal agencies, and, in some cases, state and local authorities. It also requires enduring political support and long-term investment.

Certainly, many critical questions remain unanswered, and the process of answering them is only beginning. Costs will be substantial, and future budgets must sustain momentum beyond initial down payments. The administration will need to present clear analysis, cost estimates, and implementation plans. Congress must have confidence that taxpayer dollars will produce concrete, achievable outcomes. The relationship between missile defense and strategic stability will continue to be debated. Allies and partners will seek clarity on how homeland defenses intersect with regional missile defense cooperation. And, as with any complex system, technical and operational risks will require careful management.

Perhaps the greatest challenge is communication. Golden Dome is difficult to explain succinctly, and public discussion has been limited. Yet building long-term support-among policymakers, industry, and the public-will require a clearer articulation of the problem it is meant to solve and the principles guiding its development.

At a basic level, the logic is straightforward. The threats to the U.S. homeland are more varied, more capable, and more accessible than in the past. The systems designed to defend against earlier generations of threats are no longer sufficient on their own. Golden Dome represents an effort to adapt, using available technologies and new integration approaches to reduce vulnerability and strengthen deterrence. And to give policymakers more options to deal with an array of threats through active defenses, short of having to resort to nuclear responses.

In that sense, Golden Dome is less a radical departure than a necessary evolution. It acknowledges that the strategic environment has changed-and that homeland defense must change with it.

Kari A. Bingen is the director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

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