WATCH: In SASC Strategic Forces, Kelly Questions if Golden Dome Will Trigger Another Arms Race

During a Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on Golden Dome for America, Arizona Senator and Navy combat veteran Mark Kelly questioned experts on whether the administration's proposed missile defense system could actually make the United States less safe by pushing Russia and China to build more nuclear weapons and develop new ways to defeat U.S. defenses, potentially fueling an arms race. Kelly also expressed concerns over whether the program's extraordinary cost is worth it if Russia and China simply build more weapons to defeat it in the near future.

Sen. Kelly questions David J. Trachtenberg.

Kelly opened by questioning whether Golden Dome would push Russia and China to build up their arsenals rather than deter them: "Deterrence is about perception. And this administration might see Golden Dome as a defensive system. But what also matters here for strategic stability is how does China and Russia see this? For decades, U.S. nuclear strategy has recognized the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces. They're connected. The basic concern is pretty straightforward. If one side builds defenses that could substantially reduce the effectiveness of the other side's nuclear deterrent, the other side has an incentive to build more or better offensive weapons with more countermeasures. And that dynamic was part of the rationale behind negotiating limits on offensive and defensive systems during the Cold War."

Kelly expressed that his biggest concern with Golden Dome is that America would be spending an outsized amount of money for a system that would become irrelevant as Russia and China build up their arsenals to defeat it: "Suddenly, they're building thousands of more ICBMs. The Chinese are building thousands of more ICBMs. This system isn't sized to handle it. We spent $1.2 trillion on a system that then becomes irrelevant…People don't have health care coverage. They can't afford their lives anymore. We're investing trillions of dollars into the defense industry. And what we get out of it is, we get five, ten years down the road even after this thing is built. And we got a system that doesn't even provide us what the level one requirements for the system was in the beginning on the piece of paper that the President signed."

Click here to download a video of Kelly's opening remarks. Click here to download a video of Kelly's questions. See the transcript below:

Senator Kelly:

Mr. Trachtenberg. I've got some major issues on the physics of this system, especially the space-based interceptor part of this. The physics favors the offense in a big way. Interceptors can be defeated by countermeasures. And often when we test these things, we don't account for those. But the other issue here is deterrence is about perception. And this administration might see Golden Dome as a defensive system. But what also matters here for strategic stability is how does China and Russia see this? For decades, U.S. nuclear strategy has recognized the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces. They're connected. The basic concern is pretty straightforward. If one side builds defenses that could substantially reduce the effectiveness of the other side's nuclear deterrent, the other side has an incentive to build more or better offensive weapons with more countermeasures. And that dynamic was part of the rationale behind negotiating limits on offensive and defensive systems during the Cold War. We considered this very seriously. So, we need to understand what the response and expansion of U.S. strategic missile defense could generate. If Russia and China believe that the goal that Golden Dome could reduce the effectiveness of their retaliatory forces, they could respond by expanding their arsenals, developing new ways to penetrate our defenses, or seeing the United States as willing to take a lot more risk if we're in a crisis. So, Mr. Trachtenberg, what do you assess Russia and China are thinking about Golden Dome today?

Honorable David J. Trachtenberg:

Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your comments. I think Russia and China have been moving out, irrespective of what the United States plans to do or may do in the future. As I said, both Russia and China have been modernizing their own nuclear systems, and I believe that they're doing that because their goals and objectives don't align with ours. I do think Russia and China will oppose Golden Dome, just as they have opposed all U.S. missile defense efforts.

Kelly:

But you sound like it sounds like you think they're on a path, regardless of any steps we take, as I think, Senator King pointed out. The Chinese are watching this today.

Trachtenberg:

Yeah, sure. What I'm saying, Senator, is that there is no mechanistic action-reaction formula. And historically, the belief that the United States generates reactions on the part of adversaries has not been proven to be so. And I go back, you mentioned the Cold War-

Kelly:

But isn't it logical that if we were to build, let's just say-when you study math, right, you look at things at the limit. If we were to build a system that they perceive is able to take out, let's say, a large salvo of ICBMs, what would it be? What would the logical thing for them to do? What would be a logical response?

Trachtenberg:

I think the logical thing for them to do would be not to consider attack in the first place.

Kelly:

You don't think the logical thing would be a larger salvo in nuclear weapons? This is going to be sized for something.

Trachtenberg: Sure, sure. But, Senator, again, if you look at history.

Kelly:

So you think that is logical that if let's say just theoretically-

Trachtenberg:

No, no. If you if you look at the historical record, I think you see the Russians and the Chinese moving out based on their own considerations, irrespective of what the United States has or has not done. You may recall-

Kelly:

On all kinds of things, and we do exactly the same thing.

Trachtenberg:

You may recall the ABM Treaty of 1972 was intended to prevent the Soviet Union at the time from building up its offensive capabilities because we issued defense of the national territory, so they had no defense to counter. In reality, what happened was the greatest increase in Soviet ICBM weapons and warheads occurred after the signing of the ABM Treaty. So, their reaction suggests-

Kelly:

The greatest increase after the signing of the treaty of the ABM Treaty. And how many ICBMs does the Russians have today as a percentage of compared to what they had previously?

Trachtenberg:

The Russian, the Russians put most of their nuclear capability on large land-based missiles,

Kelly:

But isn't it true that because of treaties that we have signed, we have reduced the size of our nuclear arsenal and the Russians have reduced considerably the number of nuclear weapons that they have today?

Trachtenberg:

It is true that we have reduced as a result of arms control treaties, the number of nuclear weapons in our arsenal. It is also true that we currently really don't know what the Russians have, because the Russians suspended inspections under the New START Treaty years ago and have refused to allow them to continue. And without on-site inspections, it's very difficult to know whether the Russians have continued to MIRV missiles or build up their capabilities. What we do know, Senator, is that they have been aggressively working to modernize their own nuclear capabilities for many, many years while the United States has not.

Kelly:

Well, we're in the process of doing that as we should.

Trachtenberg:

We've been thinking about doing well.

Kelly:

Well, we've got a program to modernize Minuteman III. And we're building more ballistic missile submarines, and we should be modernized our forces. My biggest concern here is that this system, because they have-their perception of this matters, and that this sets off another arms race. And suddenly we're having to build-they're building thousands of more ICBMs. The Chinese are building thousands of more ICBMs. This system isn't sized to handle it. We spent $1.2 trillion on a system that then becomes irrelevant. Let's just say, theoretically, not what the real numbers are. I don't like to talk about those. Let's say we could shoot down 100 ICBMs while they fire another 100. Or maybe they fire 500. And then our system was we spent $1.2 trillion. People don't have health care coverage. They can't afford their lives anymore. We're investing trillions of dollars into the defense industry. And what we get out of it is, we get five, ten years down the road even after this thing is built. And we got a system that doesn't even provide us what the level one requirements for the system was in the beginning on the piece of paper that the President signed.

Trachtenberg:

Senator, I appreciate your perspective, I do. I don't think it's an accurate reflection of how history has evolved throughout the Cold War and the post-Cold War period in terms of U.S. actions driving some kind of an armed.

Kelly:

But, Mr. Trachtenberg, you said after the ABM Treaty that that's when the Russians accelerated their development of ICBMs. I'm way over my time. Thank you, Madam Chair.