12/24/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 12/24/2025 02:36
Over the past three months, many have been asking what the real objective of US military operations against Venezuela actually is. Since September, more than 20 vessels suspected of transporting drugs have been sunk, causing around 90 deaths. Official US statements continue to frame these actions as part of the fight against drug trafficking, yet several recent initiatives appear more consistent with an attempt to overthrow the Maduro regime and facilitate the emergence of a government politically closer to the Trump administration. The substantial military deployment near Venezuela's coastline seems disproportionate to the relatively limited volume of drug trafficking transiting the country, while appearing far more suited to choking off economic resources and accelerating a potential internal collapse.
On December 11th, the day after the seizure of the oil tanker Skipper off the Venezuelan coast, the US Treasury Department announced new sanctions against six oil shipping companies and four Venezuelan citizens, including three nephews of First Lady Cilia Flores. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that these measures were intended to block financial flows to Maduro and his 'criminal associates', accused of flooding the United States with drugs responsible for thousands of deaths.
In official statements, the fight against drug trafficking therefore continues to be presented as the central objective, likely also for reasons of domestic political consensus among Trump's electorate. However, doubts about the real weight of this goal are well founded. Venezuela is not a cocaine producer but a transit country, and a marginal one at that, in the flow of narcotics bound for the United States. Moreover, President Trump's recent decision to grant a pardon to former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández raises further questions about his genuine commitment to combating drug trafficking. Hernández, sentenced to 45 years in prison in 2024, was pardoned after Trump claimed - without evidence - that the conviction was politically motivated.
Why, then, does Trump seek a change of regime in Venezuela? Maduro's departure would make the rise of a government led by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia highly likely, paving the way for an administration favourable to the United States. Venezuela, extraordinarily rich in strategic raw materials and home to the world's largest estimated oil reserves, would thus become another country in the Western Hemisphere ideologically aligned with Trump's America. María Corina Machado, winner of the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize and leader of the opposition, maintains excellent relations with President Trump. Barred from running in the 2024 presidential election, she was replaced as the opposition's candidate by González Urrutia, who according to opposition tallies won nearly two thirds of the vote, though Venezuelan authorities refused to recognise his victory.
Maduro's Venezuela meets almost all the criteria identified by the Trump administration's recent National Security Strategy for defining a threat: strong Chinese or Russian influence in a Western Hemisphere country, control of strategic resources by hostile powers, a government that facilitates migratory flows, the presence of state-backed cartels and a broader context of regional instability directly affecting US interests.
Looking beyond Venezuela to Latin America as a whole, the common thread of Trump's policy increasingly appears to be support for governments, current or prospective, that are ideologically aligned with him. Examples include tariffs imposed on Brazil to defend his ally, former president Jair Bolsonaro, or the financial support extended to Argentine president Javier Milei, which helped the country avert a currency crisis on the eve of the October 26th midterm elections. The pardon granted to Hernández also fits this geopolitical logic, signalling Trump's backing for the former president's political ally, Nasry Asfura, in Honduras's recent presidential election.
What, then, can be expected in the coming weeks? It is likely that military operations inside Venezuelan territory will begin, involving drone or missile strikes against targets linked to drug trafficking, alongside continued seizures of sanctioned oil tankers to deprive the regime of vital economic resources. The risks associated with a direct deployment of US ground troops, however, appear too great to make this a realistic scenario.
There is no doubt that the current US administration is displaying a level of determination against the Maduro regime greater than that seen during Trump's first term. Even so, this may still prove insufficient, as Maduro has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to cling to power over the past decade. Thanks to the loyalty of the armed forces and the backing of Cuba and Russia, he has retained control amid a devastating economic and social crisis. Venezuela's GDP collapsed to 82 billion dollars in 2025, down from 260 billion in 2013; around 8 million Venezuelans have left the country and 80 per cent of those who remain live in conditions of extreme poverty. Hyperinflation and repeated currency devaluations have been so frequent that the government has been forced to redenominate the currency twice, eliminating a total of 11 zeroes.
The US strategy of targeting illicit trafficking and oil exports to drain the regime's financial resources will almost certainly require a long time before it can decisively weaken Maduro. One crucial question therefore remains unanswered: for how long will President Trump be willing to maintain against Maduro's Venezuela the largest US military deployment seen in the region in decades?