Renewed China-DPRK Diplomacy: Symbolism or Substance

China's second-highest ranking official, Premier Li Qiang, visited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from October 9 to October 11, 2025, to celebrate the 80th anniversary of North Korea's ruling party, the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Li's trip marks the highest-level visit by a Chinese official to the DPRK since 2019. The premier's visit reciprocated an important historic visit by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping (and Russian President Vladimir Putin) in Beijing last month. The Chinese premier's visit constitutes the third high-level bilateral meeting with the DPRK this year.

Q1: What is the significance of Li's visit?

A1: The flurry of diplomatic activity in 2025 suggests a potential mending of bilateral relations between Beijing and Pyongyang, but absent any concrete policy deliverables, this activity does not amount to a substantial upgrading of the relationship. Nevertheless, optics and symbolism have been, and always will be, important for the two countries. Bilateral relations had been partially worn by North Korea's Covid-19 pandemic lockdown and the recent upward turn in DPRK-Russia relations as a result of the war in Ukraine. In the former case, North Korea's 3.5 year lockdown included the complete sealing of the border with China, limiting all economic and political contact. In the latter case, Putin's purchase of munitions and soldiers from the North has engendered a military alliance with Pyongyang not seen since the Cold War. Both developments diluted China's traditional influence on its neighbor. In this context, Li's visit constitutes an effort to restore relations.

This recent uptick in bilateral exchanges is identifiable, and a marked change from the recent past. Li's visit constitutes the third high-level China-North Korea exchange in 2025. Of note, in early September, Kim joined Xi and Putin in Beijing for China's commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. Xi then held a private meeting with Kim while he was in Beijing, the first time the two leaders had sat down with each other in six years. Xi and Kim vowed to strengthen strategic coordination and enhance their communication and understanding. Xi even went further to say the two countries should strengthen their coordination to "safeguard their common interests."

Last year, the two sides failed to host any public celebrations for the75th anniversary of diplomatic ties. This occurred even as China remains North Korea's main trading partner, accounting for more than 90 percent of its trade. China-North Korea ties also lagged behind the frenetic pace of Russia-North Korea meetings in the past three years-between 2023 and 2025, there were 25 Russia-North Korea engagements, compared to just 8 China-North Korea exchanges.

Q2: Why were there no deliverables from the meeting?

A2: The absence of any immediate new or major economic or military agreements between the two sides is noteworthy, but it does not mean the meetings were purely for optics. First, the two countries often do not disclose the entire spectrum of their political, economic, and security cooperation. Second, the timing of high-level statements to "strengthen strategic coordination" and "deepen practical cooperation"-coming after a period of intense DPRK-Russia cooperation-suggests the laying out of a policy direction for the two governments to implement. We should therefore not be surprised to see follow-on activities. The bilateral agreement for youth, cultural, educational, arts, and sports exchanges and a joint event to commemorate the75th anniversary of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army's (CPV) "Resist America, Aid Korea" operation are just two examples.

Q3: Does the flurry of China-DPRK diplomacy have implications for the United States?

A3: Yes. China's efforts to restore bilateral ties with the DPRK, in conjunction with the growth in DPRK-Russia relations, put Kim Jong-un in a "pivot" position that affords him material benefits as well as protection from international sanctions. If anything, this reduces Pyongyang's incentives to restart diplomacy with the United States. Nevertheless, during his August 2025 summit with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, Trump made clear his desire to engage with Kim before the end of the calendar year, and the president's scheduled trips to the region this fall for the East Asia Summit, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, Quad, and potentially an early 2026 trip to Beijing afford multiple opportunities for a face-to-face meeting. China's flurry of diplomatic activity may therefore reflect Beijing's own calculations that a meeting is highly likely to take place."

During the first Trump administration, there were spikes in high-level China-DPRK diplomacy around the 2018-2019 Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom meetings between Kim and Trump (see Figure 2). It is also noteworthy that when the summitry with Trump failed, there was a downturn in high-level diplomacy between Beijing and Pyongyang. If this is correct, then Beijing presumably is seeking to consolidate relations and exchange briefings with Kim on the potential U.S. meeting.

Q4: Why is China interested in strengthening relations with North Korea at this time?

A4: In addition to tactical considerations in advance of a potential U.S.-DPRK meeting, China has three main strategic interests in strengthening ties with North Korea now: maintaining its influence over Pyongyang, gaining advantage vis-à-vis the United States, and strengthening its position relative to South Korea.

First, Beijing seeks to maintain its hold over Pyongyang, particularly against growing influence from Moscow. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, North Korea has drawn closer to Russia, and the two sides signed a defense treaty in June 2024. North Korean troops, weapons, laborers, and ammunition have allowed Russia to perpetuate its war in Ukraine, while Russian technology, cash, food, and energy have flowed the other way to fill North Korean coffers. By CSIS Korea Chair estimates, North Korea has made between $9 to 12 billion from its support of Russia so far, with no contraction in sight.

Moscow's growing influence over Pyongyang and the relationship's seeming lack of transparency have made Beijing uneasy. Beijing does not view Moscow as having the same interests on the Korean Peninsula and worries that Moscow is more willing to accept risk and tolerate instability than Beijing. Indeed, Russia has also been more willing to push beyond traditional redlines, including the transfer of advanced weapons technologies and a de facto recognition of the North's nuclear weapons program. This Chinese unease contributed to frictions in China-North Korea relations and is also fueling Beijing to do more to shore up its influence over Pyongyang.

Second, a closer China-DPRK relationship affords Beijing advantages vis-à-vis Washington. Beijing viewed the September World War II victory day parade and festivities-which North Korea supported, and the United States and close U.S. allies such as Japan were absent from-as a major diplomatic success that elevated Xi's leadership and influence. North Korea can not only provide China with some degree of strategic support against perceived U.S. and allied pressure and encroachment, but Beijing's influence over Pyongyang also gives China a greater say in shaping regional security dynamics. Given the potential that Kim Jong-un may meet President Donald Trump, Beijing likely wants to maintain its influence over Pyongyang and leverage that relationship to China's advantage, much as it did during Trump's first term.

Third, Beijing seeks to keep Pyongyang close as leverage over Seoul. Beijing is watching the new Lee administration with some concern-it protested South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun's comments about China in early August, which were perceived as offensive, and is wary of Lee's public statement that South Korea cannot hedge between the United States and China and will align with the United States. Chinese media noted that shortly after Li's trip to North Korea was announced, Cho requested a call with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Beyond how South Korea positions itself between the United States and China, Beijing is also worried about growing discussions and support in South Korea for developing its own nuclear weapon. Greater Chinese sway over North Korea and Pyongyang's nuclear program gives China more cards to play to discourage South Korea from going nuclear.

Q5: Why is North Korea interested in strengthening ties with China at this time?

A5: In addition to touching base with Beijing in advance of a potential Kim-Trump meeting, Kim may desire to rebalance a growing reliance on Moscow and bring back an equidistant relationship with its two most important neighbors-benefiting economically with China, and defensively with Russia. Kim Jong-un understands a core dictum from his father and grandfather: North Korea must manage the complicated relationship with its two bigger neighbors and try to exploit any splits to its own advantage. While Kim has benefited tremendously from a Moscow willing to part with critical defense technologies and weaponry, overreliance is dangerous for a regime that famously prides itself on self-reliance (juche). And despite vows from Kim this month to Putin that their alliance will "invariably " carry on, there's no guarantee that the unbalanced transfer of goods, materials, and technologies will continue unfettered after an end to the conflict in Ukraine.

Furthermore, while Kim might have boasted in front of his Chinese and Russian friends about creating the "best socialist paradise" in the world last week, the reality couldn't be further from the truth. Behind the Potemkin facade is a floundering North Korean economy, one whose currency has reportedly lost half its value in the past year and is dealing with surging inflation, large trade imbalances, and continued food insecurity. This is where China, which continues to play an outsized role as North Korea's economic lifeline, comes in. While recent developments have focused attention on the new bridge construction between Russia and North Korea, China and North Korea have quietly expanded their respective border crossings to accommodate for burgeoning trade, where trade levels are now approximately four times higher than pre-pandemic levels.

Lastly, Pyongyang continues to seek from Beijing an acknowledgement of its nuclear power status. Russia appeared to have given Kim what he wanted earlier this summer, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov articulated "respect" and "understanding" for the North's program. For Kim, locking in his de facto nuclear status is a core component of his diplomatic strategy. Getting tacit agreement from his two friends will invariably increase his negotiating position in any future talks with the United States and President Trump.

Q6: What were the details of the Chinese premier's visit?

A6: This was a highly choreographed visit. Messaging from both sides prior to the visit described it as an "important opportunity" for the two friends to further enhance cooperation given the current complex and intertwined international situation. The Chinese ambassador to North Korea published a rare op-ed in North Korean state media just before the trip, touting the "unshakable" friendship. Li had several high-level officials accompany him, including Executive Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ma Zhaoxu, Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao, and Head of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party Liu Haixing.

During his visit, Li Qiang delivered a congratulatory letter from Xi to the North Korean leader. The letter emphasized that "no matter how the international situation changes," China is committed to developing China-DPRK relations. It also stated that "China is ready to work with the DPRK to strengthen strategic communication, deepen practical cooperation, enhance coordination and collaboration, and further advance bilateral relations." With greater alignment and cooperation, Xi wanted both countries to "make positive contributions to regional and global peace, stability, development and prosperity."

North Korea feted Li's itinerary with all the trappings expected for a close ally. During large-scale performances and a military parade to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the WPK, Li was the first to shake hands with Kim and was seated prominently to the right of Kim on the viewing stand, alongside Vietnam's general secretary of the Communist Party, To Lam, and Russia's deputy chairman of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev.

On October 9, Li met with Kim in a one-on-one meeting alongside the events. Li underscored that China is ready to work with the DPRK to carry forward their traditional friendship and deepen cooperation. Kim noted that DPRK-China relations are unbreakable regardless of the international situation and agreed to not only deepen bilateral cooperation, but also to strengthen multilateral collaboration. Kim also voiced support for the "One China" principle, stating his opposition to "separatist acts of 'Taiwan independence' and any external interference" and supporting China's positions on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet.

As part of his visit, Li Qiang paid his respects to former members of the CPV at the cemetery where they are buried. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the CPV's support of the North in the Korean War, and in Li's remarks at the site, he emphasized the two countries' long friendship and bond forged by this bloodshed.

Li wrapped up his trip with a meeting with North Korean Premier Park Tae-Seong on October 11. At the Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang, Li proposed that the two countries hold a major event to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the CPV's "Resist America, Aid Korea" operation.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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