08/10/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 08/10/2026 15:18
Today, a vessel operating company pleaded guilty and was sentenced, and the company's chief engineer was sentenced to pay a fine, following a June 2024 incident where the vessel MSC Michigan VII caused the evacuation of a large bridge in Charleston, South Carolina, and created a large wake that injured two people, damaged ships and piers, and led to the clearing of local beaches.
MSC Shipmanagement Limited (MSC), a vessel operating company, was sentenced to pay a criminal fine of $6 million and to serve a four-year term of probation for failing to report a hazardous condition on board the containership MSC Michigan VII and to obstructing a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) investigation. MSC must also conduct a root-cause analysis of the circumstances relating to the hazardous conditions onboard the MSC Michigan VII.
MSC's chief engineer, Fernando San Diego San Juan, was sentenced to pay a $2,000 fine. He previously pleaded guilty, also for failing to report a hazardous condition and obstructing the investigation.
"The hazardous condition onboard this vessel, and MSC's failure to report it, could have ended in a fatal bridge strike as occurred months earlier in Baltimore. Had the MSC Michigan VII been heading into port instead of out to sea, the result would likely have been catastrophic," said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Adam Gustafson of the Justice Department's Energy and Natural Resources Division (ENRD). "By their reckless actions, these defendants put a coastal community, critical infrastructure, and the marine environment at risk. Congress made clear in the Ports and Waterways Safety Act that safe navigation and the protection of our waterways are matters of national importance. The Department of Justice will continue to ensure that vessel operators who violate these obligations are held accountable."
"The Charleston Harbor is the lifeblood of the iconic Lowcountry coastal region, facilitating $88 billion in economic impact to our state each year, serving thousands of local residents and welcoming millions of visitors each year," said U.S. Attorney Bryan P. Stirling for the District of South Carolina. "The defendants' actions put all of that and lives in grave danger when it disregarded maritime law in a time of potential crisis. The true heroes here are our local law enforcement, who evacuated the Ravenel bridge and local beaches, and the harbor pilot who navigated the vessel safely out to sea. Today's sentencing reminds mariners and their operating companies that they have a responsibility to protect our waterways and communities when operating these enormous vessels."
"This guilty plea highlights the vital role that independent, rigorous law enforcement investigations play in protecting our nation's infrastructure," said Supervisory Special Agent Brian O'Sullivan of the Coast Guard Investigative Service. "This guilty plea is a direct result of the meticulous work of CGIS special agents working closely with the Department of Justice and the local Captain of the Port. We will continue to dedicate our resources to ensuring the safety and security of the Port of Charleston."
On June 5, 2024, the MSC Michigan VII departed from Charleston. The vessel intended to travel up the Cooper River to a turning basin. Once it turned around, it was to proceed down along the Cooper River, beneath the Arthur Ravenel Jr. Bridge, and through Charleston Harbor and out to sea. The Arthur Ravenel Jr. Bridge is an eight-lane, major thoroughfare that spans two-and-a-half miles and connects Charleston with Mount Pleasant, South Carolina.
During this outbound transit, the linkage rod disconnected from the vessel's governor after the MSC Michigan VII's crew made a manual adjustment to it. The governor regulates engine speed. Because it was not connected to its governor, the MSC Michigan VII's main engine could not be slowed and the vessel sped along at approximately 16-17 knots. The Arthur Ravenel Jr. Bridge was evacuated over concern the vessel could strike the bridge, though it was successfully navigated under the bridge and out to sea. Local beaches were also cleared because of concern that the wake of the MSC Michigan VII could cause injuries to people on the beach, and it did injure two people. The vessel's wake also damaged ships and piers.
In pleading guilty, MSC and San Diego San Juan admitted that, on occasion, the exact revolutions per minute (rpms) ordered by the MSC Michigan VII's bridge telegraph could only be achieved if the length of the linkage rod between the governor and fuel rack was manually adjusted. Only trained technicians should manually adjust a vessel's governor and linkage rod, and none of the engineering crew onboard the MSC Michigan VII were qualified to make the adjustments. Despite this, when the vessel was maneuvering (entering or departing a port) the engineering crew had to pay attention to the bridge telegraph order that could be seen in the engine control room. As needed, they would go to the governor and manually adjust the length of the linkage rod until the desired rpm was reached.
Additionally, bridge crewmembers would occasionally call the engine control room and request the rpms be raised or lowered to match the telegraph order. San Diego San Juan admitted that he knew that this practice was hazardous because manually adjusting the length of the linkage rod could cause it to fail. Nevertheless, he allowed the practice to continue. The nuts on both ends of the linkage rod were loosened by the MSC Michigan VII's engine department crew so that the rod could be more easily turned to adjust its length and, therefore, the main engine rpms. The system was designed so that on each end of the linkage rod was a locking washer that would hold the nuts in place so they could not back out. However, on the M/V MSC Michigan VII, both the upper and lower locking washers were removed and the USCG found one of the locking washers on the deck beneath the governor.
Both the failure of the engine to achieve the rpms dictated by the bridge telegraph and the manual adjustment to the linkage rod during maneuvering constituted hazardous conditions that should have been but were not reported to the USCG.
During their investigation, the USCG and the NTSB interviewed San Diego San Juan and asked him if the linkage rod was ever adjusted. He lied and said that the crew never adjusted the linkage rod and only a qualified technician would adjust the linkage rod. The NTSB and USCG later interviewed San Diego San Juan again and asked him whether there had been a delay between the bridge telegraph and the main engine response in the past. He lied and said there had not been. However, when he made that statement, he knew that the governor linkage rod had at previous times been manually adjusted to match the engine order telegraph input which caused a delay for the main engine to reach the desired rpm. San Diego San Juan was asked again if anyone had ever adjusted the linkage rod and he falsely answered "no." He also stated that the crew should never adjust the linkage rod and that only a technician should adjust the linkage rod. He was asked whether he knew that the crew were making manual adjustments to the linkage rod and he lied and said that he was unaware.
During the USCG inspection of the MSC Michigan VII after the incident, San Diego San Juan told another crew member that he had said to the USCG that he did not see anyone adjust the linkage rod. He told that crew member and two others to say what he had said to the USCG so they would be on "the same page." In doing this, he was attempting to persuade these witnesses not to admit to the USCG that there had been manual adjustments to the linkage rod.
The USCG Sector Charleston, the Coast Guard Investigative Service, and the NTSB investigated the case.
Assistant Section Chief Stephen Da Ponte of ENRD's Environmental Crimes Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Dean H. Secor and W. Cole Shannon for the District of South Carolina prosecuted the case.