Hard Lines, Limited Gains: Europe’s Return Policy in Flux

• Commentary Europe and Global Governance · Migrations and Demography
  by Gaia Mastrosanti
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The European Parliament has taken a decisive step toward toughening the EU's return policy. On 10 March, nearly a year after the reform was first proposed by the European Commission, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) gave its backing to a highly contested overhaul of the EU's return rules that had been approved by member states in December. The vote paves the way for a plenary decision that could soon open negotiations with member states in the Council of the European Union.

This proposal seeks to increase returns of irregular migrants by expanding detention powers, facilitating returns to third countries, and allowing the creation of return hubs outside the EU. Beyond the substance of the reform, however, the committee vote also revealed a deeper political shift: the European People's Party sided with conservative and far-right groups to support stricter provisions on detention, deportation procedures, and the externalisation of return operations, reinforcing the uneasy feeling among centrist political forces that the EPP has abandoned them in favour of the far right.

Towards more effective returns?

The reform's central goal remains the same as when it was presented a year ago: increasing returns, a task that has gained urgency as return rates in the bloc remain stubbornly low, particularly to African countries. To address this, the Commission proposed a new regulation to replace the existing directive and to strengthen enforcement of return decisions, building on the EU's already extensively externalised approach to migration management.

One of the most visible elements of the proposal was the possibility of creating facilities outside the EU for people awaiting deportation, the now widely known return hubs. However, while this element quickly drew political attention, with a group of member states now exploring these facilities, the reform goes well beyond such arrangements.

When first presented by the Commission a year ago, two elements appeared particularly central: the possibility of establishing return hubs and the creation of a unified system of returns. The latter would have meant moving toward a more integrated framework in which return decisions issued by one member state would be recognised and enforced by others, with the broader aim of streamlining procedures and harmonising practices across the Union. In practice, however, this dimension of the reform was largely overshadowed by the political attention generated by the debate surrounding hubs.

The parliament's compromise

In the compromise approved by the Parliament, the idea of a fully common system has been significantly watered down. The mandatory recognition of return decisions issued by other member states was abandoned. Instead, the proposal introduces a mechanism to facilitate mutual recognition through a common "European Return Order", supporting enforcement when a third-country national moves between member states. The system will be reviewed and, following this assessment, the Commission may make the recognition of return decisions mandatory across the Union.

As for the other elements, the reform extends the maximum duration of detention to up to 24 months, with specific exceptions for minors, while allowing longer detention periods for individuals considered to pose security risks. The definition of those considered to represent such risks is broadened, and the possibility of detaining them for longer periods, as well as imposing potentially indefinite entry bans, is introduced. Individuals who have been convicted of serious crimes, who are suspected of involvement in organised criminal activity or terrorism, or who are otherwise deemed a threat to national security may therefore be subject to stricter return measures. In such cases, member states may accelerate return procedures, apply stronger monitoring measures, and rely more readily on detention in order to prevent absconding or protect public safety.

The regulation also enhances authorities'' powers to locate individuals evading enforcement, allowing entry and search of private premises under national procedural rules, usually with judicial authorization, a provision that critics say could enable enforcement practices reminiscent of those associated with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the United States. Authorities may temporarily secure personal belongings, documents, or assets relevant for return procedures, including identity and travel documents.

Procedural safeguards remain: third-country nationals retain the right to appeal return decisions before a judicial authority. However, appeals do not always have suspensive effect, particularly for individuals considered a threat to public security or in cases judged manifestly unfounded.

Migration policy moves to the right

The return regulation reflects both a push by member states toward more restrictive migration measures and a rightward shift in the European Parliament, where the 2024 elections produced, for the first time, an absolute majority held by centre-right and right-wing parties.

Talks of "innovative solutions," a phrase first used by Ursula von der Leyen to signal her efforts to address migration, have since become a buzzword in European politics, largely coming to signify return hubs and externalised efforts. As this discourse gained ground, so too did other initiatives within the EU policy environment. For example, the now-traditional informal migration breakfasts held ahead of EU summits, launched in June 2024 by Italy's Giorgia Meloni, Denmark's Mette Frederiksen, and the Netherlands' Dick Schoof, have become influential in shaping the narrative on migration in Brussels.

This political steering has been matched by a regulation focused on what matters most to certain member states: reducing arrivals and increasing returns. Deterrence has clearly become the central pillar of EU migration policy.

Hubs have gained traction, but core challenges remain

As noted above, hubs are the element of the return regulation that has attracted the most attention, with Germany, Greece, Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark all taking steps to make them a reality, demonstrating growing momentum. These states are part of a joint push building on the regulation, while Italy has recently passed a bill aiming to relaunch its Albania model under the new framework.

Despite this attention, the focus on hubs highlights a tension within the proposal: while they are presented as part of a common EU approach, they remain facilities established and managed by individual states. Far from creating a harmonised return policy, this risks increasing fragmentation and raises numerous legal and operational challenges. Hubs may ultimately become a very costly initiative with limited impact on actual returns, once again crowding the migration debate with political signalling rather than striving to establish a coherent common framework. While they may signal a stronger deterrent effect, their limited capacity and the unchanged level of cooperation with transit and origin countries suggest that the structural problems of EU return policy will persist, all while raising concerns over fundamental rights and potentially lengthening detention periods.

Past attempts at outsourcing migration control offer a cautionary lesson. Schemes such as the UK's Rwanda plan or Italy's agreement with Albania have repeatedly run into legal obstacles, raising doubts about the operational viability of externalised arrangements. The EU's renewed focus on looking outward risks overlooking the core constraint of return policy: returns ultimately depend on the willingness of countries of origin to readmit their nationals. Without stronger cooperation on that front, hubs and other offshore solutions may do little to raise return rates. They may, however, expand detention practices and intensify legal disputes over fundamental rights. Europe may thus succeed in projecting a tougher stance on migration, while remaining no closer to solving the structural limits of its return system.

The views expressed by the authors solely represent their own opinions and do not reflect those of ISPI.