WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Today, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security Chairman Carlos Giménez (R-FL) and Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Chairman August Pfluger (R-TX) delivered the following opening statements in a hearing to examine the changing Arctic security environment, particularly the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) domain awareness and counterintelligence capacity in this strategic region. As new Arctic maritime routes open, new opportunities for commercial, tourism, and scientific exploration have emerged. At the same time, the region's abundant natural resources have intensified global competition for access and dominance of the Arctic frontier.

Watch Subcommittee Chairman Giménez's opening statement here.

As prepared for delivery:

Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you to our witnesses for joining us today.

Today's hearing will focus on the importance of Arctic Security and the urgent need for the United States to strengthen its presence, coordination, and defense capabilities in this challenging yet vital region.

The Arctic, long considered a strategic frontier for the U.S., has become a competitive tundra, with melting ice opening new shipping routes and expansive new access to critical minerals.

Given these developments, Russia has stepped up its Arctic posture. Despite its ongoing war with Ukraine, Russia has quietly expanded its military footprint in the High North and reactivated its Cold War-era bases to deploy more advanced air and missile defense systems and increase complex naval operations across the region.

Over the years, Moscow has built up the world's largest fleet of heavy icebreakers and increased investment in Northern ports, airfields, nuclear-powered vessels, and critical energy infrastructure. This allows Russia to strengthen its projection of maritime power and close in on critical maritime corridors along the Northern Sea Route.

At the same time, China is positioning itself as a, quote, "near-Arctic state" and steadily expanding its presence along the region. Beijing has invested in Arctic infrastructure and pursued what it claims to be "scientific research" activities to gain greater access to critical minerals and natural resources.

China is actively integrating the Arctic into its broader global strategy, leveraging investments in dual-use capabilities that could support future military and intelligence-gathering activities.

These aggressive tactics by Russia and China demonstrate a clear intent by two of our greatest adversaries to expand their Arctic domain and put pressure on the United States.

Meanwhile, as our adversaries plot in the Arctic, the United States has limited operations in the region. To support our national security priorities, we must reengage as an Arctic nation and harness the power of the High North.

Last year, Congressional Republicans bestowed the Coast Guard with unprecedented resources through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed into law by President Trump. This $25 billion investment, including tens of billions directed toward the procurement of new Icebreaking, Polar Security, National security, and Arctic Security cutters, gives the U.S. an unprecedented opportunity to deploy the Coast Guard's Arctic assets and exert greater dominance.

As such, the Coast Guard has commissioned the building of a new medium polar icebreaker, called Storis, in addition to its one medium icebreaker, the HEALY. The Coast Guard's only operational heavy icebreaker, the POLAR STAR, just completed its 29^th Antarctic tour despite being long past its intended service life. This widening gap in U.S. Arctic capability is unacceptable, and the U.S. cannot afford to fall behind Russia and China. We must implement this historic investment expeditiously to expand U.S. presence, capability, and commitment to Arctic security.

For years, the Coast Guard has been plagued by delays, cost overruns, and contract mismanagement, and this Subcommittee has sounded the alarm. These are not just acquisition challenges; they are growing national security vulnerabilities. While these investments act as a down payment on Coast Guard readiness, Congress must also consider future opportunities and challenges on the frozen frontier, including through improving international partnerships and hardening our intelligence-gathering methods, to improve our Arctic strategy on all fronts.

We must recognize that the Arctic is a challenging but promising frontier, and the competition to dominate it is increasing by the day. The Trump administration is appropriately considering how to leverage strategic vantage points, such as Greenland, to improve U.S. military readiness in the Arctic. Today, we should explore those opportunities and examine why the Arctic matters, where the U.S. stands with our Arctic allies, and what must be done to prepare and protect our interests.

Thank you again to our witnesses for appearing at today's hearing, and I look forward to your testimony.

Watch Subcommittee Chairman Pfluger's opening statement here.

As prepared for delivery:

Thank you all for being here today as we consider the security of our Arctic homeland - the newest frontier for great power competition.

The witnesses we have with us this afternoon each bring with them deep knowledge of the Arctic operating environment and our readiness to confront emerging threats there. I'm grateful to them, and to Chairman Gimenez, for holding this hearing, and I'm hopeful that we all leave this conversation with a clearer understanding of the path forward in this strategically vital region.

Until recently, the Arctic was only a peripheral place in our strategic guidance - and understandably so. Limited navigability constrained our access to its sea lanes, and with NORAD established at the height of the Cold War, North American airspace remained well protected. Arctic security, at the time, was largely unquestioned.

Today, however, the strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. New sea lanes and rapid advances in military capabilities have expanded the region's operational significance, while our capacity to detect, monitor, and mitigate threats has largely stayed the same. This widening gap demands a renewed and more deliberate approach to Arctic security.

The Arctic can no longer be viewed as a safe haven or a peripheral theater. Complacency in our posture risks diminishing our comparative advantage.

ODNI's Annual Threat Assessment, released just last week, underscores the ambitions of our adversaries. ODNI assesses that Russia seeks to leverage its Arctic presence as a pillar of its broader efforts to reshape the global balance of power - relying on persistent military activity and assured access to the region's natural resources. China, for its part, continues to pursue dual-use scientific and commercial investments that could advance its strategic aims.

The challenge for the U.S. now is to ensure that we can detect and defeat threats to the homeland in a way that keeps pace with the environment and the new tools at our adversaries' disposal.

As it relates to the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Coast Guard will continue to be an essential piece of our collective efforts in the Arctic. Last summer, Republicans provided the Coast Guard with billions of dollars through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act to improve the force's capabilities, including funding for Polar Security Cutters and Arctic Security Cutters capable of operating in this dynamic region.

Aside from sustained investments in polar-capable ships and aircraft, vulnerabilities below the Arctic surface - especially surrounding subsea cable infrastructure - should also inform our posture, preparing us to prevent any actor from being able to exploit or disrupt everyday services used by Americans.

Like the Arctic itself, the space domain presents new challenges and opportunities. As ground-based assets start to age and provide a soft target for our adversaries, space-based assets can help to complete our operational picture and enhance our defense posture.

But beyond physical assets, we must also ensure that U.S. security interests in the Arctic are not a casualty of interagency siloes. The intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of War, and many of our NATO allies are all Arctic stakeholders. A spirit of partnership and cohesive information sharing should characterize Arctic security. Relationships should serve as force multipliers. And if that's not the case now, then it is our job as policy makers to engage the experts, evaluate the problems, and create the needed efficiencies.

As this committee knows well, threats to our interests and our homeland are pervasive. It is through the dedication of our servicemembers, the skill of our intelligence analysts, and professionalism of our homeland security workforce that we can consistently remain proactive and agile in confronting those threats.

Today's Arctic may remain an arena for great power competition for the foreseeable future - but we have a window of opportunity to prevent it from being exploited and weaponized by bad actors.

Thank you again to our witnesses for being here, and I look forward to the conversation that we're about to have.

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