Europe must really confront China now: delay is no longer an option.

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For Europe, China is always important, but never urgent. Last week's EU summit demonstrated this once again. First, there was endless discussion about Russia: who should speak to Putin on Europe's behalf, would that serve any purpose, when should such a conversation take place, and what message should it convey? This was followed by a familiar budget battle. The frugal camp, including the Netherlands, insisted that the European budget must above all remain small. Southern and Eastern Europe want to preserve spending on agriculture and cohesion. Predictably, leaders reverted to entrenched positions, with little insight into how Europe intends to finance its new priorities. It was primarily a procedural debate that exposed divisions, precisely at a time when Europe needs to project strength and unity.

It was not until late in the evening - it was already past 11 p.m. - that the leaders got to what should have been the summit's main focus: China. On the agenda, it was listed under the heading 'competitiveness and economy', because Europe still struggles to say out loud what the debate is really about. But naturally, it was about China. Everyone was tired, the debate had already been postponed twice, and once again little came of it. That is a missed opportunity.

Europe urgently needs a serious debate on China. Not a technical discussion about tariffs, subsidies, or market access, but a strategic one. After all, China affects everything at once: industrial policy, defence, technology, critical raw materials, and trade. This is geopolitics, and therefore a top priority.

The challenge is becoming more urgent. Pressure is growing in sector after sector. Electric cars, batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, pharmaceuticals, chemicals - European companies are feeling the rise of Chinese competition everywhere. Behind this lies an economic model in which state aid, cheap financing, export promotion, and strategic market access are closely intertwined. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly difficult for European companies to operate in China itself under fair conditions.

Strategic problem

The consequences are visible. The European trade deficit with China is approaching one billion euros per day . In Germany, long the symbol of European industrial strength, thousands of manufacturing jobs are disappearing every month . And the national planning agency in France says that, over the long term, 55% of the EU's industrial base is at risk. This is a huge, structural threat to the European revenue model and, by extension, to our welfare states.

Moreover, it has long ceased to be just an economic problem and has become a strategic one. China is reducing its own dependencies, while increasingly using European dependencies as a tool of power. Critical raw materials, chips, magnets: time and again, it becomes clear how vulnerable Europe is when Beijing decides to slow down exports, restrict permits, or politicise access.

That now affects our security as well. In recent years, we in Europe have rightly stated that we need to scale up the defence industry. However, tanks, drones, missiles and communication systems require critical materials, magnets, chips, and industrial capacity. The discussion on European defence often revolves around dependence on American weapons. That is important. But the dependence on Chinese raw materials and components is at least as relevant.

That is why it is strange that the China debate is constantly being postponed, watered down, or hidden behind technocratic language. As if the words are more dangerous than reality. Of course, this is difficult, especially now that Europe is also dealing with Putin's aggression and Trump's whims. And, naturally, Europe has an interest in maintaining trade with China, cooperating on climate, and engaging on numerous other issues. But that should not be an excuse to avoid the core question: how does Europe defend its strategic interests against a power that increasingly uses trade, technology, and interdependence for political purposes?

Second pitfall

A second pitfall also looms here. Europe must not simply follow Washington - and certainly not Trump. US China policy is tougher, more erratic, and often primarily aimed at maintaining American pre-eminence. Europe has other, distinct interests. We do not want a world divided into blocs, where every choice is turned into a test of loyalty. And we must be wary of a potential US-Chinese 'deal' that comes at the expense of our interests.

Charting its own course does not mean that Europe must be soft. On the contrary. Europe must be less naive about market access, take stricter action against Chinese state subsidies, and work faster on reducing dependencies on critical raw materials and technology. Europe must also be more honest about the costs involved. That is where the problem lies. You hear everywhere that Europe must act geopolitically. But as soon as that geopolitics costs money and touches upon national preferences, the conversation falls back into familiar patterns, including in the Netherlands. Then we want strategic autonomy, but no joint financing. Less dependence on China, yes, but without industrial policy or trade tensions.

That is not how it works. Those who want to be less vulnerable must invest. Those who want to act strategically must set priorities and accept risks. And those who take China seriously must hold the conversation where it belongs: with the leaders themselves.

Europe is not powerless. It has a vast market, strong companies, and technological expertise. The EU has a wide range of instruments to tackle Chinese malpractice. But those assets are under pressure and only count if they are played strategically. And that is precisely what Europe is failing to do.

All of this calls for political choices and clarity. It also requires concrete action: - trade tariffs in vulnerable sectors, European preference in public procurement, and greater protection of strategic sectors and companies. Only then will Europe make it clear that it is prepared to play hardball. Just as China does.

Some argue, especially in Southern Europe or among the climate camp, that we need China. Many are afraid of Chinese 'escalation'. That is understandable, but ultimately wrong. To confront China, the choice is simple: either Europe takes the pain now, or it will pay a much higher price later on.

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• Asia
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• Economic security
• EU Foreign Policy