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02/20/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 02/20/2026 17:53
U.S. Military in the Middle East: Numbers Behind Trump’s Threats Against Iran
U.S. Military in the Middle East: Numbers Behind Trump's Threats Against Iran
Photo: Seaman Daniel Kimmelman/DVIDS
Commentary by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park
Published February 20, 2026
Once again, just eight months after Operation Midnight Hammer, the United States is poised to attack Iran. The naval "armada" in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean-with two carriers and 14 surface warships-is the largest in the region since five carrier battle groups assembled at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The force is capable of punitive strikes on Iran and protection of U.S. allies and partners in the region. However, it lacks Marines, special operations forces (SOF) for raids or ground operations, and the logistics for an extended air campaign. It is also far smaller than what the United States used in 1991 and 2003 against Iraq for major combat operations and regime change.
The U.S. Threat
Initially, U.S. threats focused on protecting Iranian demonstrators. On January 2, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that "if Iran [shoots] and violently kills peaceful protesters," the United States will "come to their rescue." He followed up with tariff threats on Iran's trade partners. At that time, the United States could launch a punitive strike but lacked the capability to fully protect its allies and partners in the region, who feared Iranian retaliation. There was no aircraft carrier present because the USS Gerald R. Ford and its escorts had been sent to the Caribbean. To fill the gap, the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group was ordered to the Middle East on about January 15 but took more than a week to arrive. The Iranian government had time to crush the demonstrations.
President Trump then demanded that Iran give up its nuclear ambitions-a long-standing U.S. policy goal. On January 28, Trump wrote that "a massive Armada is heading to Iran." He threatened another attack like Operation Midnight Hammer unless Iran "quickly 'Come to the Table' and negotiate a fair and equitable deal-NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS." The Ford was sent from the Caribbean back to the Mediterranean on February 12. Air forces followed.
The Forces Historically
The Middle East has long seen a U.S. naval presence, albeit at a low level in recent years. The force level jumped following Hamas's October 7 attacks on Israel. Figure 1 shows the level of U.S. naval forces in the region since the summer of 2023.
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Remote Visualization
The United States maintained at least one carrier in the Europe-Middle East region after October 2023. At the beginning of the second Trump administration, two aircraft carriers were in the Middle East as the United States launched air and naval strikes against the Houthis in Operation Rough Rider. Israel-Iran tensions also intensified as missile exchanges in April 2024 ultimately led to the Twelve-Day War in June 2025. In October 2025, the Ford carrier was sent to the Caribbean, and there was no carrier coverage in Europe or the Middle East. This was consistent with the Trump administration's National Security Strategy, published in December 2025, which saw an opportunity to pull forces from the region because Iran and its proxies had been beaten down.
The "Armada"
The current naval deployment marks a new apex of ships in and around the Middle East since the beginning of the regional war in 2023. Figure 2 compares the "Middle East armada" to past naval campaigns. The ships here are a different mix than those deployed for Operation Absolute Resolve that captured Nicolás Maduro and his wife on January 3, 2026. In the Caribbean, an afloat staging base served as a mothership for SOF. There was also an amphibious ready group operating with 2,200 Marines. Neither capability has been deployed to the Middle East so far. Once the Ford arrives, the United States will have 2 carriers, 11 cruisers and destroyers, and 3 small combatants in the Middle East.
Remote Visualization
The level is comparable to Operation Desert Fox, a four-day bombing campaign against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1998. Then, President Bill Clinton ordered strikes against Iraq as Saddam refused to cooperate with UN nuclear inspectors. The bombing stopped after 70 hours, and Clinton stated that the objective to "degrade Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program and related delivery systems" had been met. However, the level of naval forces today is far below the level used in 1990 to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait and in 2003 to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime.
Demand on Naval Forces
Today, 292 battle force ships make up the U.S. Navy-223 of which are commissioned warships (USS) and 59 are support ships (USNS). Most are in port or in maintenance and training, with less than a fifth of the force at sea for operations. A total of 51 Navy ships are at sea conducting operations, 18 of which are in the Middle East (16 USS and 2 USNS). The bottom line is that 35 percent of Navy ships that are ready for military operations are in the Middle East. Figure 3 breaks down the Navy battle force.
Remote Visualization
Total U.S. Force in Region
Alongside naval assets, the Trump administration assembled a large number of air assets in the Middle East. Forward-deployed aircraft in Europe can also be brought to the Middle East. Flow of additional aircraft to Europe and the Middle East continues-several F-22s arrived at Royal Air Force Lakenheath in the United Kingdom earlier this week. Table 1 lays out the naval, air, and ground forces currently in the Middle East and compares them to four benchmarks.
Remote Visualization
The table reinforces several key points:
- The current force level is comparable to that used in Operation Desert Fox, which entailed four days of long-range punitive strikes. With today's force, the United States could launch 50-100 Tomahawk and other long-range missiles against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and other security forces or facilities supporting Iran's nuclear program. Such an operation would align with the president's stated rationales for using military force: supporting demonstrators and preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons.
- The large number of cargo aircraft (C-17s and C-5Ms) and tankers (KC-135s and KC-46As) moving to the Middle East does not indicate any deployment of ground forces. Rather, these aircraft are bringing vehicles, support equipment, and munitions for the aircraft squadrons being deployed into the theater.
- U.S. forces lack special operations and ground units needed to conduct raids or operations ashore. Snatching the Iranian leadership, therefore, is not a realistic option, particularly given the distance of likely launch points to Tehran.
- The available forces are also insufficient for regime change beyond limited targeted strikes. It is unlikely that the United States will attack Iranian leaders, given concerns about retaliation and legitimacy. Moreover, the regime's resilience even after taking significant losses from Israeli operations suggests that decapitation will not destabilize the regime.
- Finally, there are not enough forces for an extended, multi-week air campaign. That would require a substantial logistical buildup, which is possible but would take additional time.
If you are interested in learning more about this topic, explore CSIS's Executive Education courses Meeting China's Military Challenge and Inside DOD's FY 2027 Budget.
Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Chris H. Park is a research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2026 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
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CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies Inc. published this content on February 20, 2026, and is solely responsible for the information contained herein. Distributed via Public Technologies (PUBT), unedited and unaltered, on February 20, 2026 at 23:53 UTC. If you believe the information included in the content is inaccurate or outdated and requires editing or removal, please contact us at [email protected]