Statement of Ms. Carmen Malone, Assistant Inspector General for Audit for the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Delivering on Government Efficiency[...]

Statement of Ms. Carmen Malone, Assistant Inspector General for Audit for the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Delivering on Government Efficiency Subcommittee Roundtable Hearing "Getting Taxpayers a Better Bang for their Buck from Military Contracts."

Chairman Burchett, Ranking Member Stansbury, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Carmen Malone, and I am the Assistant Inspector General for Audit for Acquisition, Contracting, and Sustainment. It is an honor to represent the Department of War Office of Inspector General and to discuss the persistent challenges affecting cost, schedule, and performance across the Department's most critical programs.

Our body of oversight work, including audits, evaluations, and investigations, makes one message unmistakably clear: effective monitoring of acquisition programs by the Department is not optional-it is essential to fielding capable, affordable systems for the warfighter. When monitoring is neglected, fails, or is inconsistently applied, the result is predictable: cost growth, schedule delays, performance shortfalls, and avoidable strain on the Department of War and Defense Industrial Base.

Across our reviews, we consistently find that program requirements are not always well defined, traceable, or kept current with validated capability needs. The Army's rapidly evolving requirements, in the Integrated Visual Augmentation System, drove the program toward immature technologies, resulting in redesigns, delays, and higher costs. When requirements are unstable or overly ambitious, programs pursue systems they are not ready to build.

We also see that programs often prioritize schedule over cost or performance, proceeding into production with known deficiencies. In the MQ-4C Triton program, the Navy moved to initial operational capability despite unresolved developmental and operational test issues, leading to costly retrofits and a potential intelligence collection gap. The Navy spent $83.1 million to retrofit two MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft to the latest version and will need to spend additional money to further retrofit the MQ-4C Triton to correct the open deficiencies. When production begins before problems are understood and mitigated, the result is predictable: redesigns, delays, and inefficiencies.

Fragile supply chains remain one of the most significant drivers of cost increases and schedule overruns. In the B-52 program, diminishing manufacturing sources and spare parts shortages reduced aircraft availability and forced cannibalization. When suppliers disappear or materials become unavailable, programs must redesign components and requalify vendors, delaying testing, fielding, and sustainment.

It's important to note that Department officials are responsible for holding contractors accountable. In the F-35 air vehicle sustainment contract, the Department paid the contractor $1.7 billion for sustainment efforts that did not meet the Military Service aircraft readiness requirements. For example, the average air vehicle availability for all Military Service F-35 aircraft was 50 percent in FY 2024, which is 17 percent lower than the average minimum requirements. Clear requirements, documented surveillance, and consistent enforcement are essential to holding contractors responsible for performance.

Finally, unstable or unpredictable funding continues to harm acquisition programs and the Defense Industrial Base. A recent Office of Inspector General audit showed that funding uncertainty delayed efforts to expand production capacity and most heavily affected small businesses-the Department's next generation of suppliers. In the Space Force's GPS IIIF program, the continuing resolution limited procurement to one satellite instead of two, increasing unit cost by $10.4 million and disrupting production planning.

Across these areas, the Office of Inspector General provides actionable recommendations that if implemented strengthen acquisition governance and improve accountability. The Department's current acquisition transformation efforts-reinforcing requirements, embedding clearer metrics, improving oversight tools, and building supply chain resilience-address many of the same root causes. These reforms aim to reduce redesigns, improve contractor performance, and deliver capability to the warfighter more efficiently.

As the Department moves forward, we remain committed to providing independent oversight that supports effective, affordable, and timely capabilities for the men and women who defend our nation.

I look forward to your questions.