Pentagon Announces a New Counternarcotics Task Force in the Caribbean

Critical Questions by Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Henry Ziemer, Rubi Bledsoe, and Isabel Teran

Published October 23, 2025

As part of the growing force posture in the Caribbean, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced the Department of Defense's formation of a Counternarcotics Task Force, to be led by the U.S. Marine Corps Second Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) based out of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Trump administration has focused intensely on countering criminal groups in Latin America and the Caribbean, many of which have recently been designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).

Q1: Why is the Department of Defense standing up a new joint task force?

A1: In recent months, the United States has significantly expanded its military presence in the Caribbean, launching one of the largest regional maritime deployments in decades. Under the Trump administration's direction, the new joint task force (JTF) will be placed under the command of the II MEF, seeking to strengthen and coordinate U.S. military efforts to counter drug trafficking networks, disrupt cartel activity, and protect the United States from persistent security threats.

The JTF is likely to encompass the integration of maritime and intelligence assets and capabilities to effectively combat narcotics trafficking in pursuit of four key objectives. The efforts will be focused on identifying drug trafficking organizations' modus operandi and patterns of behavior to be able to intercept drug shipments before they reach the United States. These operations will be supported by enhanced, real-time data and intelligence sharing among U.S. military forces, federal law enforcement agencies, and international partners. To test the JTF's efficiency and feasibility, the force will conduct joint training exercises to foster interoperability across U.S. military services and improve rapid and efficient response capabilities. Finally, partner nations' counternarcotics efforts will be collectively reinforced through collaborative operations aimed at deepening their capacities to combat and dismantle these organizations on their own.

The initiative reflects a broader strategic shift within U.S. defense policy, treating drug trafficking organizations, many now designated as FTOs, as imminent security threats that require precise and decisive neutralization by lethal force. The JTF's close collaboration with allies most likely indicates the desire to pursue greater operational depth and coordinated counternarcotics approaches across Latin America and the Caribbean.

Q2: How will the new JTF relate to Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S)? Is there potential for friction?

A2: While the new JTF will fulfill a role similar to that of JIATF-S, the new JTF will also have different authorities and responsibilities. In terms of structure, both task forces are under the command of SOUTHCOM, but the newly formed JTF is nested under the U.S. Marine Corps' Second Expeditionary Force, while JIATF-S is led by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). In terms of mission, JIATF-S establishes the goal of leveraging "all-domain capabilities to target, detect and monitor illicit drug trafficking in the air and maritime domains." With a longer history of working in the hemisphere, dating back to its creation in October 1989, JIATF-S has a robust structure through which it engages numerous partner nations in the Caribbean and beyond. In 2025, JIATF-S hosted liaison officers from 20 countries, including key players in the counternarcotics effort, such as Colombia and Mexico.

However, JIATF-S also has important limitations. From its inception, JIATF-S has been driven by the mission of conducting detection and monitoring operations "to support law enforcement disruptions of cocaine and marijuana trafficking in the Caribbean, thereby preventing these drugs from reaching the United States." JIATF-S has operated within a law enforcement paradigm since its inception, with the United States in an intelligence gathering role, in many cases passing intelligence to partner nations for interdiction. Because criminal groups earn profit from more than just drug trafficking, JIATF-S's lack of a commodity-agnostic approach to countering criminal organizations is a clear disadvantage-one that Congress has not addressed with new authorities.

By contrast, the new JTF will operate within a military paradigm and have access to more powerful capabilities, such as the ability to conduct rapid overseas operations as part of a crisis response or project a "credible deterrent force." The new JTF seeks to improve interoperability among service branches, laying the groundwork for more complex operations involving the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force. Given the overlap in mission sets and areas of responsibility, it is possible that the task forces could duplicate efforts while conducting intelligence gathering operations and communicating with partner countries. The Trump administration may consider pushing for expanded authorities for JIATF-S, an organization deemed to be the "gold standard" for interagency operations, in the future.

Q3: The U.S. Coast Guard normally plays a leading role in counternarcotics. What is the USCG's evolving role following the current U.S. Navy deployment and the creation of the counternarcotics task force?

A3: The USCG remains the lead U.S. law enforcement arm at sea. By statute, the USCG is the only U.S. armed service with peacetime authority to inspect, search, seize, and arrest vessels and suspects on the high seas and waters under U.S. jurisdiction, in order to enforce the laws of the United States. The USCG-led JIATF-S, based in Key West, Florida, and also under U.S. Southern Command, leads the detection and monitoring of illicit trafficking across the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. It fuses intelligence from U.S. military, law enforcement, and partner nations to identify and track drug smuggling vessels and aircraft. While JIATF-S lacks arrest authority, it coordinates with the USCG and foreign forces to execute interdictions. The surge of U.S. assets to the Caribbean will likely result in more Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments serving on U.S. Navy ships (and even allied ships) in the Caribbean. This arrangement allows boardings and seizures to be conducted under USCG authority, while the Navy provides ships, sensors, helicopters, and sea control.

However, a key term for the evolving USCG role is "peacetime." In a notification sent to Congress on October 2, the Trump administration announced the legal position that the United States is engaged in a "noninternational armed conflict" with drug cartels that it has designated as foreign terrorist organizations, even though the power to declare war rests with Congress. Under international law, during an armed conflict, a state is permitted to target and kill enemy combatants even if they do not present an immediate threat. The new joint task force under II MEF may have been created for situations where the Trump administration prefers elimination over interdiction, with the USCG expected to lead in (the more limited) situations where the administration prefers a law enforcement approach.

Which approach is selected, and hence the involvement or not of the USCG, may also vary according to geography and which FTO the administration is pursuing. To date, lethal strikes on suspected drug boats have mainly occurred in waters close to Venezuela, targeting drug boats seemingly connected to Venezuelan FTOs Tren de Aragua and possibly the Cartel de los Soles. However, one strike took place close to the Dominican Republic, with authorities of that country cooperating with U.S. officials in the action, and another, on October 19, destroyed a drug boat allegedly connected to Colombia's Ejército de Liberación Nacional rebel group, designated by the United States as an FTO. It is not clear where the last strike occurred.

Two of the latest strikes have occurred in the Pacific Ocean, opening a new theater for the lethal strikes where approximately 74 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States passes. The USCG announced on October 14 that it has seized more than 100,000 pounds (50 tons) of cocaine in the eastern Pacific Ocean since launching Operation Pacific Viper in early August 2025. These seizures were the result of 34 interdictions, which led to the apprehension of 86 individuals suspected of narco-trafficking under the USCG operation. The latest strikes in the Pacific, however, indicate that the USCG's lead on counternarcotics in that theater may be coming to an end as the new paradigm enters that theater as well.

Q4: What does tactical and strategic success look like for a counternarcotics task force in the Caribbean?

A4: The key metric and stated intent of the new task force is simple: reduce the flow of drugs through the Caribbean to the United States. However, effective implementation poses challenges. For one, drug traffickers are highly adaptive, provided their financial networks and production infrastructure remain intact. This may pose a challenge given that the current task force will focus primarily on maritime interdiction, and there are already signs that traffickers have pivoted to aerial smuggling in response to U.S. strikes on drug boats. Cartels may also increase the adoption and use of unmanned vessels, such as the remotely piloted "narco-sub" captured off the coast of Colombia in July 2025, to minimize reliance on human crews. Finally, traffickers will likely continue to adulterate commercial shipments with drug payloads, a challenge requiring more fine-tuned intelligence collection and the bolstering of port and customs security, which could be especially challenging in the case of foreign ownership of ports. The new task force will accordingly need to be highly adaptable if it is to advance on the cartels it seeks to dismantle.

Another metric of success will be how successfully the task force truly embodies the concept of "jointness." While the Trump administration has sought to elevate the role of the military in counter-FTO operations, there are a host of other U.S. agencies with deep expertise in combating organized crime whose insights and unique expertise will be vital to mission success. The USCG, Drug Enforcement Agency, FBI, and Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control, among others, all have a role to play. There is also a question of international cooperation. The drug cargoes that transit through the Caribbean are driven by cocaine headed to European markets. If the new task force can effectively integrate with European counterparts, this may serve as a force multiplier and mechanism for greater burden sharing. Other counternarcotics task forces like JIATF-S have had success partnering with both trans-Atlantic allies like the European Union's Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre and regional partners like CARICOM's Implementing Agency for Crime and Security.

Fortunately, the new task force will have a long history of U.S. counternarcotics knowledge to draw upon, and should be able to integrate into the existing networks described above to complement their efforts. The new task force can offer more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to historically under-resourced Caribbean partners. However, attention must be paid to ensuring unity of purpose and clear chains of command, as such a force could also hinder cooperation by confusing lines of communication and exacerbating redundancy issues.

Q5: What does the establishment of this task force tell us about the Trump administration's national security priorities?

A5: Alongside deterring illegal immigration, counternarcotics is the top priority of the Trump administration in Latin America and the Caribbean. The administration endeavors to sustain a long-term campaign against criminal groups now classified as FTOs, and the establishment of a task force assists in maintaining that long-term focus. Further, the administration intends to expand the new counternarcotics paradigm to other parts of the Southcom area of responsibility, as seen in recent strikes on vessels in the Pacific Ocean. The objective is to demonstrate resolve, and, with a combination of the paradigm shift and the publication of unclassified strike videos, generate a highly deterrent impact. As with any "war" on drugs, the definition of winning is important. The job of the task force will be to define what it means to manage-and ultimately reduce to as close to zero as possible-the flow of drugs into the United States, as that is always the objective in counternarcotics strategy.

Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Christopher Hernandez-Roy is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Americas Program at CSIS. Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS. Rubi Bledsoe is a research associate with the Americas Program at CSIS. Isabel Teran is a research intern with the Americas Program.

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