Kim Jong-un’s Flurry of Diplomacy

This first appeared as a CSIS Korea Chair Platform here.

In early September, Kim Jong-un took the rare but not entirely surprising step of traveling to Beijing to participate in the September celebration of the "80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War," as China calls it. Kim departed Pyongyang two days earlier, after making a brief publicized visit to a factory involved in solid-fueled ICBM production, a likely signal that while embracing two of his socialist comrades, Kim had not forgotten Donald Trump nor slowed his efforts to strengthen his nuclear arsenal targeting the United States. Kim's confidence in showing up for this international event was likely bolstered by China's promises he would have a front and center position in both entering and watching the event together with President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin. The symbolism was likely the main deliverable: there was no read-out of any summitry, substantive discussions, or agreements. A follow-on visit by North Korean foreign minister Choe Son-hui in late September yielded no further insight into the current diplomatic agenda between Beijing and Pyongyang.

For Kim, why now?
Kim's decision to attend this event is consistent with North Korea's diplomatic strategy of locking in acceptance of North Korea's nuclear power status one country at a time, although he had generally avoided multinational gatherings where he would have less likelihood of being the center of attention. The visit also enables Kim to appear to be open to further thawing of the North Korea-China relationship under the right conditions. Kim is likely not to be receptive to any suggestions from China to back off his cooperation with Russia, slow the growth of the North Korean nuclear and missile program, or return to denuclearization dialogue. For his part, Xi Jinping is unlikely to have pressured Kim to make any such commitments, and the images of Xi, Putin, and Kim entering the parade venue together signals Beijing is comfortable for the most part with Russia-North Korea cooperation to date. Overall, the visit advanced North Korea's overarching diplomatic goal of gradually normalizing his interaction with the outside without engaging in denuclearization dialogue.

Is Beijing now acknowledging North Korea's nuclear power status?
It's complicated. Beijing's invitation to Kim and the seat of prominence it gave him at the parade makes clear it sees a possibility for improving North Korea-China relations even sans forward progress on denuclearization. For the past several years, Beijing's call for Washington and other parties to understand and address Pyongyang's "legitimate security concerns" has sought to put the ball in the U.S. court for resuscitating denuclearization dialogue while evidencing a de facto tolerance of a non-denuclearizing North Korea. The shared commitment to countering hegemonism announced in the September 28 read-out of Foreign Minister Choe's meetings with Wang Yi demonstrates China-North Korea strategic alignment against the United States while dodging the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. This leaves Beijing's messaging a step behind Moscow's "respect" and "understanding" for North Korea's nuclear program, as articulated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in July. Yet to be seen is whether Kim is disappointed he did not receive a clearer endorsement of his nuclear weapons status either during the September 4 Kim-Xi meeting or Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi's September 28 meeting with Choe Son-hui.

Does this represent a failure of recent U.S.-South Korea summitry seeking to lead North Korea back to the negotiating table?
No. Kim's pivot away from diplomacy with Washington and Seoul to concentrate on "axis of upheaval" friends such as Moscow and Beijing has its roots in a diplomatic shift following Kim's failure to gain U.S. and South Korean acceptance for his nuclear power status in 2018 and 2019 summitry with Presidents Trump and Moon Jae-in. It does, however, pour cold water on expectations that the recent Trump-Lee Jae Myung summit could be a springboard to restarting meaningful denuclearization dialogue with Pyongyang. The CRINK (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) community allows Kim to maintain a long-standing strategic prioritization of nuclear weapons over reform, opening, and integration into the international order. Kim likely hopes his diplomacy with Moscow and Beijing might serve as a model for possible talks with President Trump in which the nuclear issue may be glossed over.

How should Seoul and Washington respond?
Distancing and dismissing, in the near term, and unwavering calls for denuclearization diplomacy over time may be the best way for South Korea and the U.S. to minimize any nuclear legitimacy or negotiating leverage Kim Jong-un hoped to generate through his attendance at Beijing's celebration. Though criticized by conservatives, President Lee's dispatch of the National Assembly speaker to the event was a pragmatic move consistent with Seoul's desire for improved relations with Beijing without conferring leader-level legitimacy to the event. If Beijing mimics Moscow in its "respect" and "understanding" of the North's nuclear development language, such comments should be dismissed with an emphasis on all countries need to abide by and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions proscribing the North's nuclear and missile activities. Even if President Trump succeeds in enticing Kim Jong-un to talks by initially downplaying denuclearization as an immediate near-term objective, sustained messaging on denuclearization will be helpful in reminding Kim of the limits of progress in relations with Washington sans meaningful denuclearization steps.

What about Kim's daughter?
North Korean media coverage of Kim Ju Ae has, from the very beginning, suggested she is likely Kim Jong-un's chosen successor. Her participation in various domestic and now diplomatic events with her father demonstrates a long-term, well-rounded preparation Kim Jong-un may feel he was denied by his father, Kim Jong-il. This does not suggest a sense of urgency or an imminent leadership vacuum, but may point to a desire to ensure a firm foundation is laid for what would be North Korea's first succession to a female leader.

Why the visit to the ICBM-related facility ?
Kim may have had multiple audiences for choosing to visit the factory involved in composite carbon fiber material production for, according to KCNA coverage, a "new-type solid-fuel engine" to be used in Hwasong-19 and Hwasong-20 production. The visit, coming a week after the U.S.-South Korea summit on August 25, could be a reminder to both Washington and Seoul that Pyongyang is interested in missile and nuclear development, not dialogue. It also could signal Beijing not to expect Pyongyang to refrain from actions such as ICBM launches in hopes of scoring diplomatic point with China. To the domestic and broader international audience, images of Kim leading the growth of the nuclear and missile program complement the impressions from Beijing of Kim's nuclear leader status. In any of these cases, the visit could presage upcoming rocket engine testing or even an ICBM launch.

Will this significantly strengthen Beijing's influence with Pyongyang?
Not likely. Like his grandfather Kim Il-sung, who learned to navigate the complicated relationship between China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Kim Jong-un may see limited opportunity to nudge Beijing toward giving the same attention and acknowledgment of North Korea's "heightened strategic status" as Moscow has. Kim is likely seeking to achieve what he failed to in 2018-2019 diplomacy: moving Beijing into a more open posture of deemphasizing denuclearization, lowering pressure including sanctions enforcement targeting North Korea, and accepting North Korea's nuclear power status. Beyond that, however, Beijing and Moscow are unlikely to allow Pyongyang to exploit any real or perceived split between Beijing and Moscow in their respective dealings with North Korea.

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