Equinor – Hammerfest LNG – investigation of incidents involving chemical exposure

During the period June 2024 to June 2025, a number of incidents occurred at Equinor's Hammerfest LNG processing plant, where personnel reported odours and symptoms that gave rise to suspicions that chemical exposure was occurring.

Some of these incidents were reported to Havtil.

The incidents under investigation occurred in connection with extensive engineering and construction work linked to the Snøhvit Future project (SFP). Equinor is both the operator for HLNG and responsible for the SFP project.

Given the scope, duration and nature of the incidents, Havtil decided on 2 June 2025 to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the circumstances.

The investigation covers numerous individual incidents spanning a period of one year, from June 2024 to June 2025. Several of the incidents occurred within a short period of time. There were also longer periods without any recorded incidents.

The total number of people working in the area during the various incidents is estimated at 300.

Actual and potential consequences

The majority of those working in the area reported no symptoms, while others experienced symptoms of varying nature and severity. For most of the people concerned, the symptoms were mild and temporary, while some took sick leave - including a few over an extended period.

No permanent health effects linked solely to chemical exposure have been identified, and it has not been possible to determine with any certainty what substances or exposure levels the personnel were exposed to.

Based on the results of air quality measurements taken during and after the incidents, it is difficult to explain the outcome of the incidents. Viewed in isolation, the levels of contaminants that have been identified appear to be modest.

Triggering and underlying causes

The outcome of the incidents cannot be explained by a single cause, and the investigation has concluded that the outcome was due to a combination of several factors.

Possible sources of exposure include ventilation from MEG (monoethylene glycol) tanks, but the available measurements and analyses do not provide a clear answer. It is considered likely that a number of different sources may have contributed to the incidents, but that the exposure has generally been limited in scope.

The investigation has revealed weaknesses in Equinor's planning, risk management and monitoring of chemical working environment risks:

• The risk picture linked to high levels of construction activity and simultaneous operations was identified, but was only followed up to a limited extent in the form of specific risk-mitigation measures.
• A lack of insight into potential sources of exposure and insufficient involvement of occupational health experts contributed to a weak basis for decision-making.
• The investigation has also shown that SFP's project organisation, including the on-site organisation at HLNG, did not have sufficient staff to take account of the fact that Equinor had hired a contractor with limited experience of working on petroleum facilities.
• At the same time, the project involved a large number of workers with no experience of working in gas plants that are in operation, which further increased the complexity.
• The follow-up to the incidents was characterised by delayed reporting, inadequate information flow and an insufficiently systematic approach to data acquisition and assessments.
• The measures that were implemented were largely based on operational and human barriers, such as the use of fire, entry and security officers with measuring devices and the manual ventilation of tanks. These measures were limited in their ability to identify and manage exposure risks in a robust manner and increased reliance on adequate coordination and communication between the parties involved.

Furthermore, the investigation highlighted challenges linked to the organisational and psychosocial working environment, including inadequate facilities, a perception of weak leadership, and reduced trust in management among contract personnel. These factors are believed to have influenced how the incidents were perceived and dealt with, and contributed to intensifying the symptoms and uncertainty associated with the exposures.

Overall, the incidents are considered to have resulted in an outcome close to the realistic potential harm.

Inadequate management and oversight led to an increased risk of both damage to health and a loss of trust among staff. The investigation concluded that there is a need for stronger risk management, better access to technical expertise, more robust technical solutions, and improved oversight of suppliers and working conditions.

Non-conformities

The investigation has identified a number of non-conformities at Equinor. These encompass:

• Inadequate planning and compliance with internal requirements and assumptions set out in the PDO/PIO for the Snøhvit Future project
• Inadequate provision for the psychosocial and physical working environment
• Inadequate overview of exposure sources at HLNG
• Inadequate basis for decision-making regarding the implementation of measures

What happens now?

Havtil's investigation has now been concluded. We have asked Equinor to report to us by 29 September 2026 on how the non-conformities will be addressed.