The Board of Peace, Gaza, and the cost of being inside the room

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The signing ceremony in Davos last week for the newly established Board of Peace drew fewer international leaders than President Trump likely anticipated. It was also notably less focused on Gaza than the United Nations Security Council resolution underpinning its mandate would suggest. This disconnect has fuelled a broader concern: that rather than serving as a vehicle for implementing the UN resolution, which endorsed its establishment (and, more broadly, the 20-point Gaza Peace Plan) the Board of Peace may be positioning itself as an alternative to the United Nations itself.

Branded as a more agile instrument for conflict resolution, the Board risks normalising parallel structures that centralise power while weakening multilateral legitimacy. Gaza brings these concerns into sharp focus. It is both the Board's most immediate test case and a prism through which its broader implications for international can be gauged.

A cautious embrace

The guarantors of the Gaza ceasefire - Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye - announced their decision to join the Board in a joint statement with the UAE, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The coordination was striking, but not surprising. For most of these states, remaining outside the Board was never a realistic option. Maintaining good relations with President Trump, combined with direct political, security or domestic stakes in the Palestinian issue, made participation the safer course despite the risks. That caution is rooted in the Board's founding Charter. While presented as a multilateral body, the Charter concentrates extraordinary authority in the hands of the Chair - President Trump. These powers include control over subsidiary bodies, agendas, Board decisions, Executive Board mandates, and succession. The Charter also explicitly prohibits reservations. Participation thus becomes an all-or-nothing proposition, with no scope for opt-outs or dissent.

Gaza as a credibility test

Another point of contention is the Board's mandate. Despite widespread assumptions that the Board of Peace was created to focus on Gaza, the founding Charter does not mention Gaza at all. Instead, the Board's role is mediated through two bodies: the Gaza Executive Board and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). The former comprises eleven members appointed by President Trump, including the High Representative for Gaza, Nikolay Mladenov, but currently includes no Palestinian representatives, who are also absent from the Executive Board more broadly. Israel, by contrast, holds a seat. The NCAG, in turn, is a transitional technocratic body made up of Palestinians selected in coordination with Arab partners and the United States. It is intended to oversee rehabilitation and governance pending the full return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza.

Whether this architecture delivers results will depend on implementation. In Davos, Ali Shaath, High Representative for the NCAG, reiterated commitments from the Trump peace plan, including the opening of the Rafah crossing in both directions within one week and unhindered entry of humanitarian aid. Similar commitments were made under phase one of the 20-point peace plan but have failed to materialise, largely due to Israeli opposition. With the body of the last hostage now returned - a precondition set by the Israeli authorities for reopening the crossing - the Board faces its first major test: ensuring that the NCAG follows through completely on its inaugural commitment.

The second phase of the Gaza plan raises even more sensitive questions. These include the composition and deployment of the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and the full disarmament of Hamas, which continues to refuse to lay down weapons. Overcoming these constraints will depend not only on authority, but on legitimacy, buy-in, and sustained international support.

The future of Gaza and the wider Palestinian territories also serve as a broader litmus test for the resilience of the UN system and, by extension, the multilateral, rules-based international order. Recent actions against UNRWA, including the demolition of UN facilities in occupied East Jerusalem by Israeli forces, underscore the accelerating erosion of the UN operational space on the ground. When UN agencies can be constrained or dismantled with impunity, the authority of the system they represent is correspondingly diminished.

Beyond Gaza: The precedent problem

The Board's design has implications far beyond Gaza. Decisions over which conflicts warrant intervention, and on what terms, rest largely with the Chair. Following a meeting with Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Davos, President Trump has already indicated interest in addressing the long-running dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Renaissance Dam.

Egypt sits on the Board; Ethiopia, so far, does not. This asymmetry highlights a structural challenge: when membership includes only one party to a dispute, questions of neutrality become unavoidable. Regardless of whether Ethiopia is eventually invited, the optics alone raise questions about the Board's ability to serve as an impartial arbiter should such a dispute be taken up under its remit. Ultimately, this will test whether the Board will uphold or undermine the principle that effective multilateral institutions require balanced participation.

The EU's dilemma

It is in this context that Europe's debate over joining the Board should be understood. More than uncertainty over implementation, it is the concentration of authority in the hands of the Chair of the Board and commitment to the UN as a system for dispute resolution that frames the EU's deliberations over whether to join. Those very concerns, alongside the 'autonomy of the EU legal order', were reportedly highlighted in the legal analysis prepared by the EEAS and shared with the EU Member states ahead of last week's emergency summit. Under the Charter, membership would not guarantee the European Union or its Member States a meaningful role in shaping decisions, nor would it prevent their positions from being overridden by the Chair's extensive prerogatives. Being formally inside the Board while repeatedly sidelined could prove more politically damaging than remaining outside it.

Recent remarks by European Council President António Costa reflect this reasoning. While stressing Europe's readiness to support Gaza's stabilisation and reconstruction, Costa has voiced serious reservations about key elements of the Board's Charter, notably its scope, governance arrangements, and compatibility with the UN Charter.

For the EU the issue is where and how to engage. To play a more active role in the next phase of the Gaza process, the EU does not need Board membership so much as political will. Member States' governments and EU institutions can work within the existing international framework anchored in UN Security Council Resolution 2803. This includes providing tangible support for the Gaza Executive Board, the NCAG, and the International Stabilisation Force.

Several EU Member States have reportedly been invited to join the latter as founding members. EU Member States should coordinate closely on the scope and timeline of their involvement in the ISF, even if not all will be able or willing to contribute. President Trump's recent retreat from threats of military action against Greenland demonstrated that a united European front amplifies influence. A similarly unified EU-wide position could also help persuade the United States to support the reactivation of the EUBAM Rafah civilian mission - an issue on which Israel remains hesitant - thereby facilitating the reopening of the Rafah crossing and reinforcing an internationally backed presence on the ground.

In this context, the presence of a European High Representative for Gaza, Nikolay Mladenov, within the reporting structure should be seen as an advantage. It provides European countries with direct insight into how decisions are implemented and a channel for influence without requiring adherence to the Charter.

The deeper question

President Trump is right to argue that the UN has vast but unfulfilled potential. Repeated calls to reform the Security Council have gone unanswered. Veto power has repeatedly blocked collective action, as starkly demonstrated after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which was widely condemned by the General Assembly but left unaddressed by the Security Council. No member state has ever been expelled for persistently violating the UN Charter. The result has been a hollowing out of enforcement and weakened deterrence.

However, new mechanisms like the Board of Peace risk deepening fragmentation if legitimacy and inclusion are treated as optional. The debate is ultimately about power and accountability. Gaza will be the first test of whether the Board of Peace can deliver results without marginalising established institutions. The clock is ticking: every six months, the Board will be required to report on its progress to the Security Council.

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