EU Statement at the IAEA Board of Governors on the Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231[...]

EU Statement at the IAEA Board of Governors on the Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), 10 September 2025

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, and Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report and DDG Aparo for the technical briefing. We commend the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, independent and impartial work.

We take note of the announcement that an agreement has been reached in Cairo between Iran and the IAEA on the technical measures to resume inspections of the Iranian nuclear sites. We take positive note of the DG's statement that this is a step in the right direction. We look forward to further details and to the immediate implementation of the agreement.

We have always been clear that Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon and that it must comply with its legally binding nuclear safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The IAEA's verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear programme and its regular reporting to the Board and, as appropriate in parallel to the UN Security Council are mandated by the respective resolutions. We call on Iran to immediately enable the full resumption of the Agency's in-field verification activities, the conduct of which must be in line with the standard safeguards practice and is therefore non-negotiable.

The proliferation risk remains profound and urgent. As of 13 June 2025, Iran's overall enriched uranium stockpile was 48 times the JCPoA limit, and Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% had further increased to more than 440 kg, that is more than 10 significant quantities. This has no credible civilian justification. We are seriously concerned that the inventory of highly enriched uranium in Iran, the only non-nuclear weapon State to have produced such material, cannot be currently quantified nor its whereabouts determined by the Agency. Iran has not provided the requested reports to the IAEA and accounting and verification of stockpiles of enriched uranium are now overdue. The resumption of inspections of this stockpile is therefore urgently needed.

Chair,

The EU has been engaged over many years in a diplomatic effort to find a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, including as coordinator of the negotiations that led to the agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in 2015. We will continue to do our part in all diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions and to bring about a lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, which can only be achieved through negotiations.

Despite all diplomatic efforts up to 2022 to fully restore the JCPOA, Iran has significantly departed from its commitments, producing nuclear material in quantities and enrichment levels far exceeding the limits agreed under the JCPOA, and has gained irreversible knowledge. Iran's continuously escalating nuclear trajectory over the last five years has increased the risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region.

As a result of Iran stepping back from its commitments, the Agency has been unable to carry out several key JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities for more than five years. Iran's decision to suspend cooperation with the Agency is deeply regrettable. The Agency has now lost continuity of knowledge on critical components of Iran's nuclear programme, including the current inventories of highly enriched material in Iran. This situation has detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to draw conclusions about Iran's nuclear programme, and urgently needs to be addressed. We reiterate our grave concerns in this regard.

We call upon Iran to fully implement the legally binding CSA and modified Code 3.1 and to return to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and to ratify it, in order to address in a credible manner our serious doubts about the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

We are at a critical juncture. It has been almost two weeks since the notification to the Security Council triggering snapback, which initiated a 30-day window before the reimposition of previously suspended resolutions. The EU has been clear to Iran and the international community that we remain committed to diplomacy. Iran should take concrete steps to demonstrate it is serious about finding a diplomatic solution and to engage meaningfully with the E3's resolution 2231 extension offer.

We express our full support to the IAEA and DG Grossi in their essential task of monitoring Iran's nuclear programme and we support their continued efforts to enable the full return to monitoring and verification activities. To this end, we call on Iran to resume cooperation with the Agency and to urgently provide the accountancy reports and updated information requested by the Agency.

With this, we take note of the Director General's report, we look forward to further regular reporting on this item, and request that this report be made public.

Thank you, Chair.