How U.S. Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Cuts Could Undermine Global Development Gains

Commentary by Andrew Friedman and Anne Frederick

Published November 3, 2025

This analysis is a component of part two of a three-part series, A New Landscape for Development, that examines the context, current state, and early impacts of the dramatic changes to U.S. foreign assistance in 2025.

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Human development does not happen in a vacuum. A growing economy, an improved educational system, and better health outcomes cannot be removed from broader questions of governance, political stability, and conflict. Human development efforts, seen as independent of wider political questions, can lead to inefficiencies at best, with conflict, war, or civil strife at worst. This includes the development of effective institutions. A robust examination of development data by the Atlantic Council concluded that "the rule of law consistently emerges as the most influential factor . . . in driving prosperity." Another analysis has focused on the importance of other democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) indicators such as "voice and accountability," "political stability," "government effectiveness," and the "control of corruption," but has all reached the same conclusion, that "good governance is essential for development."

Traditionally, foreign assistance has played a significant role in the financing of development globally. Over the last several months, that historic role has been thrown into doubt. While the future of foreign assistance is unclear, it is important to examine how the system is interconnected, including how the prioritization or de-prioritization of certain sectors as others lie dormant could lead to unexpected or even problematic results.

Funding Landscape

On the very first day of the second Trump administration, U.S. President Donald Trump initiated a series of executive orders intended to overhaul U.S. foreign assistance and refashion U.S. foreign policy and global engagement, beginning with a 90-day review of foreign assistance to ensure alignment with U.S. interests and "American values." In the first 100 days of the new administration, the U.S. Department of State reported that over $80 billion worth of foreign assistance-funded grants and contracts across the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State were found to be inconsistent with the administration's priorities and were terminated. These cuts accounted for over 85 percent of USAID programming and over half of the Department of State's assistance programming, agencies that house the majority of U.S. support for democracy, human rights, and governance globally. Further, after the initial review, the White House outlined additional withholding of foreign assistance through President Trump's historic pocket rescission package to eliminate $5 billion in foreign aid and international organization spending deemed by the administration to be "woke, weaponized, and wasteful."

Although the United States has consistently spent only 1 percent of its federal budget on foreign aid (totaling only a quarter of one percent of the United States' GDP), the United States has historically been the biggest contributor to global development, funding between 25-30 percent of global Official Development Assistance (ODA) since 2003. The gap these cuts create is compounded by funding reductions by other large donor countries such as Germany (the largest foreign aid contributor in Europe), France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. By 2026, global ODA is projected to decline by $62 billion, of which 84 percent of the projected decrease is accounted for by just three nations: the United States ($36 billion), Germany ($10 billion), and the United Kingdom ($7 billion).

Impact on DRG Funding

While the Trump administration dismantled much of the wider foreign assistance ecosystem, democracy, human rights, and governance programming and approaches were targeted with particular precision. The sector, which has encompassed a broad range of efforts at democracy-building, the promotion of good governance, the protection of human rights, and support for civil society, saw a nearly 75 percent cut in budgetary obligations between FY 2024 and FY 2025.

The Human Rights Funders Network projects human rights-focused ODA will decrease between $1.4 billion (22 percent) and $1.9 billion (31 percent) by 2026. In the recission package, the administration called into question the objectives of democracy-promotion work, positing that these activities "undermine American values" and "interfere with the sovereignty of other countries," and members of the Trump administration have described DRG programming as "regime change," a categorization that has already been cited in investigations of USAID partners. These designations and the stated antipathy to DRG approaches make it difficult to envision that, as the administration considers the future of foreign assistance, there will be any meaningful return to DRG work.

What Does This Mean for Other Development Programming?

In addition to both the strategic value of human rights and democracy programming, improving stability, fostering alliances with broad swathes of populations, gaining new information and perspectives from those immersed in communities beyond elite and government circles, and the normative good of a world that is more democratic and rights-respecting, advocates of this type of work have long pointed out its connection to the sustainability of other development efforts. This connection, along with a broad turn against it, throws into question the long-term sustainability of other efforts that continue or are brought back in the development ecosystem, including health, food and water security, education, and others.

How human rights and good governance programming improve development sustainability are myriad, but three areas are particularly prominent. First, the corrosive impact that corruption has on development outcomes and development efforts. Second, the conflict's destructive force. Finally, the impact of withdrawing support for civil society on finding partners capable of working to improve development or provide humanitarian assistance.

Corruption

While countering corruption has always been an element of democracy, human rights, and governance work in the U.S. international development approach, it has been a specific focus area since at least 2004. The 2004 anticorruption strategy recognized the pervasiveness and damage done by grand corruption, tearing at the fabric of development while also damaging social cohesion and leading to tensions and conflict. The strategy was updated in 2022 to include a focus on cross-border and transnational corruption, recognizing that not only does corruption impede development, it also empowers malign actors, including U.S. competitors.

This focus stems from an understanding that corruption can undo much of the good done through development efforts. Take, for example, Chad, a country where oil and gas constitute the largest source of revenue. Despite being a fossil fuel exporter, only 11.9 percent of the country has electricity, and only 2 percent in rural areas. According to the investigative journalism project Kleptolands, "[the Chadian national electrical company] provides unreliable service, resulting in significant disruptions for businesses and households. Corruption and mismanagement have plagued the company, diverting funds from necessary improvements, perpetuating a cycle of blackouts." A similar story can be told regarding the health care system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite estimates that the country holds $24 trillion in untapped mineral wealth and is the largest recipient of exploration investment on the African continent.

This is true not just of broader development efforts, but also of U.S. foreign assistance. While most foreign assistance is well-stewarded and extremely well-tracked, and "aid diversion isn't significant enough to be stopping aid impact," there are high-profile cases of corruption in the aid space. In one such incident, the United States halted all food aid to Ethiopia for several months after a large-scale corruption scheme to steal food aid by local officials was uncovered.

These types of schemes not only reverse development gains and exacerbate human suffering, but they also breed a loss of confidence in development efforts, including foreign assistance.

Conflict

The impact of conflict on development is both significant and intuitive. Active conflict destroys infrastructure and human capital, both of which are imperative in development efforts. A country cannot deliver adequate healthcare if hospitals are being destroyed due to active conflict. Schools under bomb threats are not viable places for children to learn. Water systems that are damaged in kinetic warfare fail to deliver clean drinking water to communities. Damaged electrical grids and power plants cannot supply electricity, making steady and reliable economic efforts a fantasy.

This is not only true of infrastructure, but also of the human innovation and entrepreneurship that is required for development efforts. Individuals and groups who must focus on the most immediate needs, such as food, water, and personal security, seldom have the bandwidth to focus on what is required for long-term economic growth and development. They may also be induced to leave, creating a brain drain with long-term negative impacts.

Lesser understood, however, is the impact that even the mere potential for conflict has on development. According to a macro-level review of literature on the connection between conflict and development, the mere expectation of violence is enough to create significant negative development impacts. The expectation of violence has a negative impact on education, a key long-term development factor that has impacts on economic growth, peace, and stability, by lowering the perceived value of schooling in favor of more pressing concerns. It also causes havoc on prices and valuations of assets, throwing markets and economic growth efforts into disarray. Finally, long-term development of political institutions is inhibited by the expectation of violence due to an uncertain future power structure.

Social cohesion efforts aimed at limiting potential for future conflict were a key element of democracy, rights, and governance work in the foreign assistance sphere. Such work is not only aimed at preventing conflict, but at building confidence that no such violent outbreaks will occur, both of which are necessary for the success and sustainability of other development efforts.

Who Does the Work?

In addition to directly contributing to the sustainability and efficiency of other development efforts by rooting out corruption and preventing conflict, civil society strengthening work, which played a leading role in the human rights and democracy approach to development, engenders key partners in civil society the tools to implement programming across sectors, from health, to food and water security, to the provision of humanitarian aid. At the heart of work strengthening civil society is technical assistance and the provision of resources for small civil society organizations (CSOs) to improve their ability to deliver for local populations. This includes support for advocacy, a key role of CSOs, who are enmeshed in local communities and have a unique understanding of their needs and wants.

In one representative USAID activity in Chad, technical assistance was provided to local CSOs to improve their ability to function, as well as the way in which they advocate for community demands at the local level. This technical assistance was provided to a wide array of civil society organizations doing many different types of work, including the delivery of impactful health interventions. Changing circumstances can also be rapidly considered, with greater support provided at the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic for CSOs providing support and educating the public on the virus, or to those doing peacebuilding and education work in line with a national dialogue.

Most of the U.S. development and humanitarian assistance is provided through civil society organizations. Even international NGOs with a presence across the globe often partner with local organizations that have a greater understanding of local needs and political economy and are more able to operate in difficult or dangerous spaces. A step back from human rights and democracy work is a step back from supporting the continued existence and improvement of these organizations. This pairs with a funding situation in which more than half of development organizations report having six months or less of funding remaining. These factors combined will make it ever more difficult to find groups willing and able to do the hard work of delivering U.S. foreign assistance in whatever scaled-back form it takes next.

Andrew Friedman is a senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Anne Frederick is a program manager for the Human Rights Initiative at CSIS.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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