Houthi-Islamic Resistance in Iraq: A Partnership with Constraints. Until Now

• Commentary Migrations and Demography
  by Eleonora Ardemagni
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After October 7^th, the partnership between Yemen's Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) has grown, driven by ideological, military and financial interests. However, despite the announcement of joint military coordination against Israel, the Houthi-IRI cooperation appears to be constrained by the powerful role played by the Iraqi pro-Iran Shia groups, directly and indirectly, in national institutions: this increases the political cost of joint offensive operations at home and abroad. Therefore, the hybrid role that some IRI groups - first of all Kataib Hezbollah - have in the Iraqi state seems to be the main disincentive to the partnership's offensive actions. But the current US-Israel war on Iran may push the IRI to reconsider previous positions: IRI has already claimed attacks especially against US targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. Given the new Gulf war, the Houthi-IRI potential threat to Mediterranean security can't be underestimated.

From Cooperation to Coordination: Gaza is the Watershed

The Houthis have established a presence in Iraq since 2011, but the Gaza war has represented a turning-point in the Houthi-IRI partnership. In 2024, the Houthis opened an office in Baghdad's Al-Jadriya district, and can rely on another office in Najaf. The office in Baghdad is headed by Ahmed al-Sharafi (aka Abu Idris), the founder of the first Houthi military factory in Saada. In 2024, Al-Sharafi visited headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Baghdad and in Southern provinces, when he also met with Iraqi tribal chiefs.

As the Houthis had already reached regional visibility targeting Red Sea shipping, in May 2024 the leader Abdel Malek Al-Houthi announced coordinated military operations with IRI, through the establishment of a joint operation committee. The coordination aimed at targeting vessels travelling to and from Israeli ports through the Mediterranean Sea.

In June 2024, the Houthi-IRI partnership claimed six joint operations against Haifa, Ashdod (both in Israel's north), Eilat (in the south), and allegedly Israeli-linked vessels. No one confirmed the attacks claimed; however, following a jointly claimed attack against Israel on 19 December, Tel Aviv retaliated by striking port and energy infrastructure in Yemen.

Who is IRI? The Houthi-Kataib Hezbollah Partnership

IRI is an evolving "constellation of actors" operating like an "online brand" that has claimed attacks after October 7th against US forces in Iraq and Syria, as well as against Israel. According to UN experts, IRI comprises Kataib Hezbollah (founded by the late Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis), Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (a splinter of the former), Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya and Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba. Some of IRI's members are formally part of the PMF, as for Kataib Hezbollah.

Evidence indicates Kataib Hezbollah is the pivot of IRI's cooperation and, more recently, coordination with the Houthis. In July 2024, a Houthi missile force commander was killed by a US airstrike at Jurf al-Sakhar in Iraq, a Kataib Hezbollah's fiefdom (Babil province) and site for drone training and storage. In Jurf al-Sakhar, where the US conducted an airstrike during the first day of the 2026 war on Iran, the PMF provided training in 2024 to about eighty Houthi combatants at the Bahbahan training centre. In January 2023, Kataib Hezbollah collected funds to support the acquisition of drones by the Houthis to attack the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose backed forces were repelling Houthis' territorial penetration in the Yemeni region of Shabwa. In 2024, the Houthi "ambassador" to Iraq joined a Kataib Hezbollah's demonstration in Baghdad against the US.

The Houthis and Kataib Hezbollah display common features. Both are directly tied to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) while acting like the less-restrained, unpredictable, maverick actors in the "axis of resistance". Both are US-designated terrorist organizations. They are ideological and adaptable actors at the same time: both negotiated, indirectly, a pause in attacks on the US which, for the Houthis, is still lasting, while Kataib Hezbollah has restarted the targeting of US forces since the 2026 Gulf war.

Against this backdrop, differences are significant. The history of the Houthi movement predates Iran's support and provisions, as its ties with Iraq: since the 1980s, leaders forged relations with religious seminars in Najaf. Furthermore, the Houthis run a de facto state where coercive, political and economic power lie only in their hands. Conversely, Kataib Hezbollah -and the IRI constellation more broadly - exercises looser territorial control than the Houthis and must navigate a range of constraints and interests stemming from its hybrid status within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), including its roles in the armed forces, state institutions (e.g., the Harakat Hoquq parliamentary bloc), and government-linked economic networks (e.g. the Muhandis General Company for constructions and agriculture, controlled by KH).

For these reasons, the Houthis and Kataib Hezbollah's different role in national state institutions tend to generate nuanced strategic interests and, therefore, wide-ranging behaviours in everyday politics, even when ideological interests tend to overlap. At least for now.

Drivers of Houthi-IRI Cooperation: Drones and Geography

The Houthi-IRI relationship is horizontal, with actors cooperating as equal partners. Both players are strategically important each other. After October 7^th, Israel's campaigns greatly hit Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis' main ally, trainer and mentor in the region; and the Assad regime in Syria, whose bordering presence provided support and strategic depth to Iraqi pro-Iran Shia militias, fell. Therefore, the Houthi-IRI cooperation looks, at the same time, a partnership of shared interest and of necessity, in the framework of a reconfigured "axis of resistance". More specifically, the cooperation provides to the Houthis material provisions, political-military relations and presence close to the Mediterranean Sea, and to the Saudi northern border. According to the UN, the Houthis receive financial support from Iraq's groups through oil shipments.

In the Houthi strategy, the partnership with IRI brings a geographical added value. From Iraq, the Houthis can gain strategic depth towards the north of Israel and the Mediterranean. Since mid-2024, the Houthis are reported to be present in the Muthanna province, at the Saudi border, an area controlled by Kataib Hezbollah; and also in IRI members-held territories in Western Anbar, close to Trebil, at the frontier with Jordan.

For the Houthis, forging partnerships and physical presence at the Saudi northern border is first a psychological tool vis-à-vis Riyadh. The Iranian-backed group can exploit Saudi encirclement fears to put political and propaganda pressure on Riyadh when the Houthis find it convenient. At a strategic level, attacking from the Iraqi territory would mean for the Houthis the possibility to target Israel, and potentially the Mediterranean, without entering the Saudi and the Egyptian airspaces or, even, to hit the Gulf monarchies conserving a degree of plausible deniability.

In February 2022, an Iraqi group called Awliyat al-Waad al-Haq (True Promise Brigades), claimed the launch of four drones against infrastructures in Abu Dhabi all successfully intercepted by the UAE. In 2021, the same group claimed a drone attack that targeted the Saudi royal palace, likely launched from Iraq.

For Kataib Hezbollah and IRI, strengthened cooperation with the Houthis may support drone and missile capabilities, especially local production and longer-range precision attacks. In Iraq, Iranian-backed groups may be able to assemble drone parts delivered by and through Tehran while the Houthis, although reliant on Tehran's import, have developed internal assembling and production expertise for drones, and likely for short-range missiles.

Drug production and smuggling are a more recent dimension of potential cooperation. In 2023, Iraq's authorities discovered and closed the first identified drug laboratory in the country, in Muthanna province: networks linked to the PMF are reportedly involved in drug trafficking through Iraq. After Israel disrupted Hezbollah's organisation and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Iran is relocating production and trafficking of Captagon elsewhere, mainly in Yemen, as revealed by confiscations at sea, and drug laboratories then dismantled.

How Political Constraints Limit the Partnership

As the Houthi-IRI partnership strengthens, political constraints on the Iraqi side have limited strategic coordination so far, especially on joint attacks. For the Houthis, diversifying military and financial partners 'beyond Tehran' is key for survival and to strengthen autonomy. From IRI and, specifically, Kataib Hezbollah's side, things are further complicated: the more Iraqi groups entrench with national power structures - comprised institutions - the more the cost related to their 'proxy activity' increase, putting the delicate balance between national interests and transnational ones at risk.

For IRI, political, military and economic constraints are visible. From a political perspective, recent legislative elections in Iraq marked a victory for the Shia and pro-Iran Coordination Framework, which allows IRI to benefit from patronage and from the access to the lucrative economic networks permeating the state. Constraints to the Houthi-IRI partnership also come from the disarmament issue. In 2025, commanders of Kataib Hezbollah and other IRI groups anonymously stated to media they were considering US' request for disarmament and integration in state military apparatuses to avoid Washington's strikes. Kataib Hezbollah then denied these affirmations, suggesting that an internal debate on disarmament is likely ongoing.

On the economic side, existing and looming Gulf monarchies' investments in the Iraqi economy add further limits to the Houthi-IRI partnership. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's economic engagement in Iraq is on the rise, from electricity to the infrastructural project of the Iraq Development Road, and reach also Kurdistan. In this context, the Iraqi government launched in 2025 the building of a major border road connecting Muthanna province with Saudi Arabia to boost religious travels and trade.

Against this backdrop, the offensive potential of the Houthi-IRI partnership has been primarily constrained so far by the Iraqi groups' power in national institutions and economic state circuits, thus appearing more oriented to mutual benefit and deterrence. The hybrid role of IRI forces has mitigated the violent fallouts of the Houthi-IRI cooperation as for now, thus reducing incentives for joint attacks. Nevertheless, the role IRI and PMF-tied groups play in national politics and economy hasn't prevented these forces from developing cooperation and even coordination with the Houthis, in the framework of the Iran-led "axis of resistance". But the US-Israel attack on Iran, and the new Gulf war may reshape priorities, further reducing IRI groups' appetite for restraint. Much will depend on the involvement of Iraq, and of the Kurds, in the conflict theatre. As regional balances greatly shift due to the war, the Houthi-IRI partnership could emerge as more impactful than before.

The views expressed by the authors solely represent their own opinions and do not reflect those of ISPI