Escalating Japan-China Tensions: Insights from the Past and Prospects for the Future

Commentary by Bonny Lin and Kristi Govella

Published December 5, 2025

On November 7, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi responded to questions in the Japanese parliament by saying that "warships with the use of military force" against Taiwan could lead to a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan. Beijing viewed her comments as highly provocative because they could be interpreted as suggesting that the Japan Self-Defense Forces would be legally allowed to engage in collective self-defense activities in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Over the past month, Beijing has escalated through dramatic signaling of government opposition to Japan and a global diplomatic campaign. Thus far, its economic and military responses have been relatively limited compared to the past, but there is ample room for further escalation.

Analysis of similar periods of Japan-China tensions in 2010 and 2012 suggests that the current episode could lead to permanent changes in Japan-China relations, how each views the other, and the overall trajectory of their respective foreign policies. In particular, changing domestic political conditions will make it more difficult than before for both sides to deescalate and push Japan to redouble efforts to reduce its dependence on China. Moreover, even as relations between the two countries stabilized after similar crises in the past, they never fully returned to previous levels, suggesting that the current episode may result in a lower baseline for the relationship. However, it remains to be seen how matters will unfold in the coming weeks and months and what role U.S. policy may play in ameliorating or exacerbating tensions.

Why China Is Escalating

In many ways, Takaichi's remarks in the Diet reflected security concerns that have been increasingly discussed by Japanese politicians in recent years. For example, after leaving office, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that "A Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency, and therefore a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance." In 2021, then-Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi claimed, "The peace and stability of Taiwan are directly connected to Japan." The same year, then-Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso said, "If a major problem took place in Taiwan, it would not be too much to say that it could relate to a survival-threatening situation" for Japan. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's repeated assertion that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow" was also widely interpreted as alluding to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan

In Takaichi's response to a question from the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan's Katsuya Okada on November 7, she did not say that Japan would use military force to defend Taiwan, nor did she commit Tokyo to taking any specific action to aid Taipei in the event of a contingency. After mentioning the possibility of a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan in the case of a Taiwan contingency, she said that the Japanese government would make its judgment by synthesizing all information based on the specific circumstances of the actual situation-language that reflects Tokyo's consistent position on the issue. However, Takaichi's statement was perceived by Beijing as highly provocative in that it came from a sitting prime minister in a public, official setting and in reference to a specific scenario.

After November 7, Beijing pushed back immediately, demanding that Takaichi retract her remarks. Since then, Chinese Politburo member and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has labeled Takaichi's statement as "shocking" and claimed that Japan "has crossed a red line." Chinese officials have accused Takaichi of being:

. . . the first Japanese leader since Japan's defeat in 1945 to openly promote in an official setting the notion that "a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency," to explicitly link it to the exercise of collective self-defense, to express ambitions of a potential armed intervention in the Taiwan question, and to issue a military threat against China.

Chinese officials and experts are concerned that Takaichi will loosen the restrictions on Japan's military use of force and its defense policy.

China's actions also fit within a broader anti-Japanese narrative pushed by Beijing. This September, Beijing commemorated its China-centric version of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II: its victory in the "Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War." This involved not only showcasing China's growing power but also releasing films such as Dead to Rights that document the atrocities that Japan committed in Nanjing in 1937. As part of this campaign, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that "Japan once again faces questions about its past and present" and that Japan must "face history squarely, reflect deeply upon its crimes of aggression, make a clean break with militarism and pursue the right path of peaceful development, good neighborliness and friendship." Some Chinese commentators are counting down the days until December 26, when many suspect Takaichi will visit the Yasukuni Shrine, an action which China has long condemned. Takaichi regularly visited the shrine in the past, including during her time as economic security minister, but she has so far refrained from doing so as prime minister.

How China Has Escalated

In the past month since Takaichi's statement in front of the Japanese parliament, China has escalated using a variety of diplomatic, economic, military, and informational means (see Table 1), and this represents only the tip of the iceberg in terms of what it could do in the future. Thus far, the most notable aspects of Chinese measures against Japan include the following:

• Signaling of Opposition to Japan from Across the Chinese Government: Over half a dozen Chinese government ministries and actors-including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of State Security-have issued public statements or taken public positions against Japan. Wang Yi's warning that Japan has crossed a red line is also unprecedented. Within the People's Liberation Army, military units from all five theater commands have broadcasted their views. These activities showcase the intensity of Chinese opposition and criticism of Japan and Takaichi. It also suggests that Beijing is willing to escalate significantly beyond what it is already doing.
• Global PRC Diplomatic Campaign Against Japan and Takaichi: To date, China has most strongly emphasized diplomatic and political pushback against Japan and Takaichi. This involves not only painting Japan as the aggressor but also characterizing Takaichi as unqualified to lead Japan, in hopes of weakening her ability to govern and rule the country. China sent two letters to the United Nations criticizing Japan, and it has leaned on Russia and North Korea to publicly denounce Japan. Xi subtly encouraged the United States to rein in Japan during his November phone call with President Donald Trump by emphasizing the recent positive trajectory of U.S.-China relations. China also appears to be supporting South Korea's claim to the Takeshima/Dokdo islets, which is disputed by Japan.
• Economic Punishment of Japan: In contrast, Beijing has not yet embraced more extreme economic options against Japan, though China's Ministry of Commerce warned on December 4 that if Takaichi does not retract her comments immediately, "Japan must bear sole responsibility for all consequences." On the economic side, China has called on its citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan and to reconsider studying abroad there. It has reinstated a de facto import ban on Japanese seafood products that was lifted in June, and there have been postponements of Japanese film releases and cancellations of Japanese performances. However, Beijing has neither restricted the exports of rare earths nor slowed the flow of goods to and from Japan, measures China embraced in prior crises. Beijing has not called for boycotts of Japanese products, and there have been reports of some officials trying to assuage the concerns of Japanese companies in China.
• Limited Military Action Against Japan: Although the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and China Coast Guard (CCG) have engaged in a variety of activities against Japan, they have been relatively small in scale, involving only a couple of assets at a time. China's publicly broadcasted military exercises have also been far from Japan in the Yellow Sea and Bohai Gulf, instead of in the East China Sea. China has, however, sent the CCG to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to enforce its claims and confront Japanese vessels. This has led to the beginning of a standoff between the two countries.
• Rhetoric related to the Use of Military Force: In contrast to its limited military actions, China has ramped up its rhetoric. Chinese censors, for example, have allowed the publication of an article that recommends using 72 nuclear weapons to destroy Japan's military and defense industry. Diplomatically, China appears to be setting the stage to justify potential use of military force against Japan. Beijing is falsely claiming that the UN Charter's "enemy state clauses"-UN Charter Articles 53, 77, and 107-allow founding UN members such as China to "take direct military action if any of the former enemy states of the World War II, including Japan, attempts to carry out a policy of aggression." Japan has pushed back against Chinese claims, noting that China supported a 1995 UN General Assembly resolution demanding removal of the clauses and that the clauses do not state countries can use military force, but that regional organizations can take "enforcement measures."

Overall, this means that China has left ample room for escalation. Chinese media and past Chinese actions also suggest several areas where Beijing could press next, including

• cutting off exports to or sanctioning Japanese defense industry companies as supporters of Japanese "militarism";
• further disrupting Japan-China trade and economic cooperation, including restricting rare earths and disrupting highly specialized industrial supply chains;
• detaining Japanese citizens;
• engaging in military activities against Yonaguni Island, Japan's territory closest to Taiwan;
• significantly ramping up Chinese military or paramilitary activities around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and establishing new, routine Chinese operating behaviors around or above the disputed features; and
• engaging in larger-scale Chinese military exercises in the East China Sea, Sea of Japan, or Pacific Ocean closer to Japan.
  

Deescalation Difficulties and New "Normals"

Regardless of what China decides to do next, it is unlikely that tensions between Japan and China will dissipate soon. And even if relations are mended, there is a good chance that Beijing will use this crisis as an opportunity to press its interests vis-à-vis Japan. On the Japanese side, Tokyo has learned from past episodes of tension with Beijing and taken many steps to try to bolster its resilience against Chinese coercion-a trend that is now likely to further accelerate.

Historically, it has taken months, if not years, for relations between the two countries to stabilize after a crisis; however, after each episode, Japan-China relations never fully returned to where they were before. In 2010, after a Chinese fishing boat rammed into two Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in early September, China escalated and sought to punish Japan through a rare-earths export ban and other measures. It was not until the end of November 2010 that diplomatic ties between the two countries were restored, and China resumed rare-earth shipments. Tensions were even more difficult to calm after September 2012, when China escalated after the Japanese government purchased the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It took over two years for the two sides to agree to gradually resume diplomatic and security dialogues.

In each instance, China further "normalized" its operations in the East China Sea (see Table 1). In 2010, China's maritime law enforcement established a regular presence around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This was a major change-China had not sent any government ships to the islands since the 1970s, with the exception of one incident in 2008.

This was also the case after the Japanese government's purchase of the islands in 2012. Beijing increased law enforcement maritime operations within the 12 nautical-mile territorial waters around the islands. China began deploying assets inside the territorial waters on a regular basis to challenge Japan's administrative control. PLA warships also passed through Japan's contiguous zone south-southeast of Yonaguni Island for the first time. By December 2012, China violated Japan's territorial airspace over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands for the first time with a PRC Y-12 patrol aircraft. In January 2013, a Chinese navy frigate locked its fire-control radar on a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter and destroyer in the East China Sea. Six months later, China sent four vessels from its newly created coast guard bureau to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to pressure Japan, and a Chinese Y-8 aircraft flew for the first time through international airspace between Okinawa and Miyako. In November 2013, China announced the establishment of an East China Sea air defense identification zone. Since 2012, the number of CCG and other vessels that have entered Japan's contiguous zone or the territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has remained continuously elevated, never returning to pre-2012 levels.

Comparing these past episodes to the present, it seems likely that this latest escalation has the potential to again ratchet up the overall level of tensions in Japan-China relations, leading to a new, lower baseline for relations. First, both sides are less likely to deescalate than before. On the Chinese side, Beijing is much stronger diplomatically, economically, and militarily now than a decade ago, and it views Takaichi's governing coalition as weak. Whereas the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have always been important to China, Taiwan is the core of Chinese core interests, which means that Beijing is more likely to take a hardline position than in past episodes. Beijing is also deeply suspicious of Takaichi and likely to view her attempts to deescalate without explicitly retracting her comments as hypocritical or, even worse, strategically deceptive.

On the Japanese side, although Takaichi has not retracted her remarks, she has said that they were "hypothetical" and that she would avoid making similar comments in the Diet again. She has also emphasized that there has been no change in the Japanese government's relatively ambiguous position that "regarding a situation threatening Japan's existence, the government will make a comprehensive judgment based on all available information, taking into account the specific circumstances of each actual situation as it arises." However, widespread concern among Japanese elites and citizens about China's assertiveness and a potential Taiwan contingency suggest that a complete capitulation by Tokyo is unlikely. Strikingly, despite the row with China, Takaichi's approval ratings have remained extremely high, at around 75 percent. A November poll by Nikkei and TV Tokyo showed that 55 percent of respondents felt that Takaichi's statement was appropriate, versus 30 percent who did not. A recent Kyodo News survey showed that 48.8 percent of respondents supported the exercise of collective self-defense in a Taiwan contingency. These are all signs of how the discourse around security policy has changed in Japan since the early 2010s.

Second, the fact that similar episodes have happened in the past means that this will only increase the motivation of the Japanese government to diversify economic ties away from China and to continue strengthening relationships with the United States and other U.S. allies and partners. This latest bout of tensions with China underscores the risks associated with interdependence, pushing Japan further down a trajectory of building up its own defense capabilities and economic resilience. For example, for over a decade, Japan has been pursuing diversification initiatives in areas such as rare earths, where its dependence on China has dropped from about 90 percent in 2010 to about 60 percent in 2023. This latest bout of tensions will push Tokyo to redouble these efforts, driving Japan and China further apart in the long term.

Conclusion

Japan-China tensions are at their lowest point in over a decade. Past episodes offer some insights into how the coming weeks and months may unfold, but the context in both countries has shifted significantly since the 2010 and 2012 incidents over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Changing domestic political conditions-and the importance of the Taiwan issue to China-suggest that deescalation will be more difficult, and that even when it happens, Japan-China relations are likely to stabilize at a new, worse normal. This latest episode is likely to push Japan to redouble its efforts to reduce its economic dependence on China and bolster ties with the United States and other U.S. allies and partners.

A wildcard in the current situation is uncertainty about U.S. policy. In some ways, worsening U.S.-China relations over the past decade have been seen as a boon for Japan-China relations, with the theory being that Beijing has been more reluctant to antagonize Tokyo when at odds with Washington. Similarly, uncertainty about U.S. policy under the second Trump administration could potentially give Beijing pause when considering its escalation options now. However, compared to the 2010 and 2012 incidents, the U.S. response to this situation has been muted so far, which may embolden China to escalate further. As this situation continues to unfold, uncertainty about U.S. policy will add another layer of complexity to the strategic calculations of Japan and China as both attempt to navigate murky waters.

Bonny Lin is director of the China Power Project and a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Kristi Govella is Japan Chair and a senior adviser at CSIS.

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