Trump May Seize Iran’s Nuclear Stockpile: Why Airstrikes Alone Aren’t Enough

Commentary by Joseph Rodgers

Published March 13, 2026

On February 28, President Donald Trump commenced Operation Epic Fury, a series of large-scale military strikes against several target sets in Iran. Ostensibly, the administration justified the attacks as a response to Iran's nuclear program. The attacks followed several rounds of failed nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran. Although the strikes eliminated Iranian leadership, Iran still maintains a stockpile of 440.9 kg of 60 percent enriched uranium stored in several clandestine facilities. This week, President Trump is reportedly weighing options to secure that stockpile, while the Department of Defense moves assets into the region that could enable such an operation.

Operation Epic Fury occurred eight months after Operation Midnight Hammer. Last year's strikes dealt a significant blow to Iran's nuclear program, leaving few high-value targets for additional U.S. attacks. Midnight Hammer decimated Iran's enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz and destroyed Iran's metallurgy facilities at Isfahan. Iran has not made significant efforts to reconstitute work at these key nuclear sites, which once formed the core of its capacity to build a nuclear weapon. Despite the operational success of Operation Midnight Hammer, the mission did not eliminate the Iranian proliferation threat posed by Iran's nuclear stockpile.

The director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently stated that roughly half of the stockpile is stored in the underground nuclear facility near Isfahan, Iran. According to intelligence reviewed by the New York Times, the uranium was shipped to Isfahan in gas form as uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Satellite imagery confirms that Iran has excavated old tunnel entrances near the Isfahan underground facility since Operation Midnight Hammer last June. The other half of Iran's stockpile could be buried in rubble at Natanz or Fordow, stored in Pickaxe Mountain, or hidden in another clandestine facility.

If Iran's stockpile is not secured, there are three primary risks. Iran could rush to build a rudimentary nuclear weapon using the existing stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium. Alternatively, if the Iranian government retains access to the stockpile after this conflict, it could reconstitute a limited enrichment capacity and enrich this material to 90 percent, enabling Iran to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Further, if the Iranian government collapses, the material could fall into the hands of non-state actors. Then these three risks could increase further if Iran decides to distribute the stockpile at other clandestine facilities across the country.

The Dangerous Nuclear Status Quo

While 90 percent enrichment is the traditional benchmark for "weapons-grade" material, the technical difference between 60 percent and 90 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) is one of efficiency rather than feasibility. It is possible to construct a rudimentary explosive device that creates a nuclear yield using uranium enriched to 60 percent. Although the weapon would produce a relatively small nuclear yield, it could still be several thousand times more powerful than any nonnuclear explosive. The device would be too large to fit on a missile, but it may fit on the back of a truck. In a "dash" scenario, Iran could theoretically fashion 440.9 kg of 60 percent HEU into several crude nuclear devices. This would require knowledge of weaponization and the conversion of the current UF6 from its gaseous form into uranium metal. Conversion takes facilities that Iran does not currently possess.

A second risk is that the Iranian regime could survive and retain access to the nuclear stockpile. In this scenario, the new government in Iran could reconstitute conversion facilities and a clandestine enrichment facility and bridge the narrow technical gap between 60 percent and 90 percent enrichment. If this occurs, 440.9 kg of 60 percent enriched HEU would be enough material for approximately 10 nuclear weapons. With time, Iran could potentially mate a nuclear warhead to a missile and create a small nuclear arsenal.

An equally concerning scenario is the "loose nuke." If the central government in Iran collapses, this material may fall into the hands of non-state actors or rogue military factions in Iran. While this is certainly concerning, it would take considerable technical expertise and scientific equipment for a non-state actor to develop a nuclear weapon. For decades, the international community has maintained a stance that nuclear materials must not fall into the hands of non-state actors. This consensus was codified in UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which obligates all nations to develop comprehensive measures to secure nuclear, chemical, and biological materials. If the extraction of Iran's stockpile is not attempted soon, the regime may distribute the stockpile across clandestine facilities, increasing the likelihood of lost material.

Counter-Proliferation Operations: History Successes, but with Risks

Seizing Iran's nuclear material poses unique and novel challenges for special operations. Despite this, there is a historical precedent for U.S. and international intervention to secure loose nuclear material. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States worked with Russia to secure nuclear material from Kazakhstan in Project Sapphire.

In 1994, the United States launched a covert operation to remove 600 kg of HEU from Ulba, Kazakhstan, to Y-12 at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The operation, called Project Sapphire, took months of planning. From October 8 to November 21, 1994, the United States secured 600 kg of HEU from Ulba, Kazakhstan. Project Sapphire required 3 C-5 cargo transports, 448 "6M" shipping containers, and 56 cargo restraint transporters. Kazakhstan's material was stored in various forms, including uranium metal chunks, uranium oxide pellets, fuel alloy rods, uranium-contaminated graphite blocks, and other products from uranium production processes.

Unlike Kazakhstan, Iran is currently a war zone. An operation in Isfahan would take place in a contested environment. Project Sapphire was carried out with the support of the host country, Kazakhstan, and with Russia's authorization to remove Russian materials. In Iran, an operation to forcibly seize their stockpile would be quite different. It would take time to breach Iran's underground facilities, and doing so would require establishing security perimeters at each facility.

However, there are unique elements of this operation that may make it more likely to succeed. The New York Timesreported that all 440.9 kg of HEU were stored in gaseous form during transport to Isfahan. In contrast, Project Sapphire dealt with a wide variety of uranium chemical compositions. UF6 is transported in accordance with International Organization for Standardization 7195:2020. If the reporting is correct, Iran's nuclear material is likely stored in cylinders that are approximately the size of a propane tank. This may make acquiring the uranium easier, since it was previously packaged for transport and is in only one chemical form.

Criteria for Successful Extraction

In order to succeed, any operation to recover Iran's nuclear material will need to establish at least three core requirements.

1. Verified Material Location: Precise, actionable intelligence about the location of the UF6 is vital. Half of the nuclear material is being stored at Isfahan. Israeli intelligence likely has a good understanding of the internal structure of the Isfahan underground complex, and this will likely have to be a joint U.S.-Israeli operation. The location of the rest of the material is unknown in open sources, but intelligence may provide a clearer picture.
2. Total Air Superiority: Neutralizing all regional air defenses is a requirement to allow the slow-moving cargo aircraft to extract nuclear material from Isfahan and any other sites. The United States recent deployment of 6 MC-130J cargo aircraft out of the United Kingdom and into the Middle East, possibly preparing for this operation.
3. Pre-Agreement on Material Custody: Before deploying assets for this operation, the United States should work with the IAEA to establish basic procedures for handling the 60 percent enriched HEU. The material could be down-blended and mixed with lower enriched uranium after international inspection.

Any operation to recover Iranian nuclear material comes with enormous risks. The operation may fail due to intelligence gaps. Materials may be buried too deeply in the facility, complicating the operation and making seizure of the material a time-consuming process. Additionally, UF6 is a volatile material and poses chemical risks if the tanks are opened and UF6 is exposed to oxygen in the air.

Perhaps the greatest risk to operational success is the time this extraction would take. This operation could require hundreds or even over a thousand people, depending on how deep the material is buried and how many separate facilities it is in. Personnel breaching tunnels may require specialized equipment, such as a self-contained breathing apparatus and chemical protective suits. The logistics for infiltration and exfiltration would be sophisticated and challenging in a contested environment.

Despite these risks, an operation to secure Iran's nuclear stockpile merits serious consideration if it can be successfully accomplished. Several weapons' worth of highly enriched uranium cannot be left unattended in Iran. The risk of government collapse, leaving weapons worth of highly enriched uranium unguarded, or of a future Iranian regime proliferating, is too high in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury.

Joseph Rodgers is deputy director and fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

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