ICYMI: Fischer Prescribes U.S. Strategic Deterrence Strategy for Indo-Pacific

WASHINGTON - U.S. Senator Deb Fischer (R-NE) delivered the keynote address at the Washington Times' Threat Status 2026 INDOPAC event. In her speech, she outlined her policy agenda on how to deter China by investing in our nuclear triad, revitalizing the U.S. defense industrial base, and supporting Golden Dome for America.

Watch Fischer's speech here or by clicking the image above.

Fischer's remarks as prepared for delivery:

Good morning. It's a pleasure to be here with all of you.

I want to spend my time today discussing the strategic environment America faces in the Indo-Pacific, the steps Congress is taking today to modernize our forces to meet tomorrow's threats, and the work that lies ahead to ensure the United States deters the Chinese Communist Party.

Informed discussions about U.S. investment priorities - whether nuclear modernization, shipbuilding, or autonomy - require a clear understanding of how fundamentally the geopolitical environment has shifted.

For the first time in history, the United States faces two peer nuclear adversaries at once. In addition to Russia, China is expanding its nuclear arsenal at a breathtaking pace - consistently exceeding U.S. estimates.

China is building new missile silos, increasing its warhead stockpile, and rapidly developing the full range of nuclear delivery systems.

This is not the strategic environment we planned for. The structure of our nuclear forces today was determined during a very different geopolitical moment.

The prevailing consensus was that China would remain a more limited strategic competitor. Those assumptions have been proven wrong.

China is now an increasingly capable strategic rival. President Xi is working with our persistent adversaries - Iran, Russia, and North Korea. They are sharing weapons, technology, resources, and strategic objectives.

Together, these countries are working to challenge American power, undermine stability, and threaten international security.

That reality should inject urgency into everything we do - from force modernization to industrial capacity to alliance coordination to modernizing the bedrock of our national security: our nuclear triad.

Our nuclear arsenal remains the foundation of American security, which means that maintaining the credibility of our deterrent must be a national priority.

This means getting Sentinel back on track.

The missile and warhead components are progressing, while much of the challenge lies in the infrastructure - the launch facilities and command centers that support the system.

We now have a Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager overseeing the ICBM enterprise, with centralized authorities and direct reporting lines to the Pentagon's senior leadership.
Major design and contract decisions are expected soon, which will provide greater clarity on the program's cost and schedule.

Getting Sentinel right is critical to maintaining credible deterrence.

Beyond the ICBM force, we must also ensure the rest of the nuclear triad remains strong.

The current force structure - which again was set forth in a very different geopolitical environment - is not sufficient. We must size our forces to meet tomorrow's threats - not yesterday's assumptions.

We must expand our bomber force beyond just the program of record. Considering STRATCOM's and PACOM's requirements, 100 bombers won't be enough. We need at least 200 to meet current demands.

Additionally, given the threat posed by China, the president should have a full array of options to respond to limited nuclear strikes and deter our adversaries from employing an escalate-to-deescalate strategy.

That's why I fought to authorize over $250 million for the nuclear-powered sea-launched cruise missile in the Senate version of this year's NDAA.

It's also why I included a provision to authorize the development of two additional theater-range nuclear capabilities.

Without these theater-range capabilities, the United States risks ceding strategic advantages to China in the Pacific that could undermine U.S. maritime power in the region.

Of course, having a modern, credible nuclear deterrent with the right mix of capabilities is of little use without the assured ability of the president to command, control, and communicate with those forces.

That's why a major focus of mine is not just modernizing our nuclear deterrent but also our NC3 systems.

In the Senate FY27 NDAA, I included a provision limiting funds for the Secretary of the Air Force until the acquisition strategy for the Airborne Command Post capability has been delivered.

This capability is important to ensuring command and control of nuclear forces in a crisis.

There is another hard truth we must reckon with. The demand for ships and submarines is outpacing our building capacity.

Meanwhile, China's shipbuilding capacity, in tonnage, is roughly 230 times greater than ours.

The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission said it clearly back in 2023.

We need more nuclear-capable shipyard capacity. We need higher submarine production rates. And we need more missile capacity across our existing fleet.

I believe the Navy should build additional shipyards that can maintain nuclear-powered ships and submarines.

This will be expensive. It will take time. But we simply cannot meet future demand without more nuclear shipyards.

During the Cold War, we had twice as many public shipyards as we do today.

Right now, we're not even on track to meet our basic goal of producing two Virginia-class submarines and one Columbia-class submarine every year.

And we're certainly not ready to take on any additional nuclear shipbuilding.

We will need more Virginia-class submarines for the AUKUS security pact we agreed to with Australia and the United Kingdom.

We will likely need more SSN(X) and Columbia-class submarines in the 2030s and 2040s.

I also continue to prioritize strengthening our nuclear industrial base. After the Cold War, we essentially abandoned our nuclear enterprise. We let facilities age and capabilities atrophy.

Now, we must modernize our entire nuclear enterprise - much of which contains one-of-a-kind facilities or date back to the Manhattan project era - without disrupting weapons production.

The Strategic Posture Commission was clear that the nuclear industrial base is a national security vulnerability. The U.S. is not producing enough scientists, engineers, or skilled technicians.

Part of remedying this means providing NNSA and the National Labs with the flexibility to recruit and retain talent competitively.

But the private sector must play a larger role in developing the workforce needed to sustain this industrial base.

These investments must not just focus on capital assets but must also include workforce development.

We should be building stronger vocational pipelines, apprenticeship programs, and partnerships with technical colleges across the country.

We need more welders, machinists, pipefitters, engineers, and technicians - and we need to treat workforce development with the same strategic urgency as weapons design.

At the end of the day, our ability to modernize U.S. shipbuilding and scale the industrial base hinges on a workforce aligned with the magnitude of the task.

Although it may not seem like it, another key influencer of U.S. maritime power in the Indo-Pacific region is homeland defense.

That's because China has systems capable of holding U.S.-based assets at risk.

The greater our vulnerability to homeland attacks, the more challenging it will be to project and employ power in the region during a conflict with China.

This brings us to Golden Dome. The United States needs a stronger missile defense system.

That's why, in 2024, I introduced legislation requiring the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a comprehensive integrated air and missile defense architecture for the United States, which was ultimately included in the FY2025 NDAA.

When President Trump began his second term, he supercharged these efforts. He brought the attention, the energy, and the resources needed. He did this by establishing Golden Dome for America. His focus here is welcome because the threat is real, and it's growing.

China has built the world's most advanced hypersonic arsenal. And China has historically run up to twenty times more test flights than we have.

It should alarm every American that our adversaries are racing ahead with these weapons.

While the United States is protected against a limited ICBM attack from a rogue nation by ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California, these systems were never built to stop

advanced cruise and hypersonic missiles.

This is precisely why Golden Dome is essential. As Chair of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I'm working closely with General Guetlein and Department leadership as they finalize the design, the schedule, and the long-term funding needs.

We provided initial funding last year. And I used this year's NDAA to update the annual reporting requirement for Golden Dome to help keep it on track.

But this is going to require sustained investment over many years.

Last August, I traveled to the Indo-Pacific. I visited Taiwan, Palau, Guam, and the Philippines. And earlier this year, I visited China.

These trips made one thing clear. It is critical that we support our allies and partners in the region.

We also need to ensure our U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific is well defended, including over 170,000 U.S. citizens on Guam. I also secured a requirement for full, 360-degree radar coverage around Guam in this year's NDAA. And I authorized the funding to make that happen.

Taken together, these provisions send a clear message that America's capabilities remain strong and credible to project power and deter Chinese aggression.

Let me close with this. We face serious challenges as we navigate China's growing military buildup in the region. But with strong leadership and sustained investment, we can maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Thank you.

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