Experts React: U.S.-China Relations Heading into a Likely Summit

Commentary by Thomas J. Christensen, Jeannette Chu, Brian Hart, Scott Kennedy, Henrietta Levin, and Ilaria Mazzocco

Published October 6, 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump has announced he will meet with Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the forthcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders meeting, which will be held October 31-November 1, 2025, in Gyeongju, South Korea. During the first few months of 2025, the bilateral relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States was quite tense in the wake of the Trump administration's imposition of high tariffs and its effort to restructure the international trading system more generally. A series of meetings between officials in Geneva, London, and Stockholm seemed to have ushered in a fragile calm. The White House has also announced that President Trump has accepted an invitation to visit Beijing in early 2026, and that Xi Jinping has accepted an invitation to visit Washington in the second half of the year.

Below, several CSIS experts offer their brief assessments on the state of the overall relationship and the prospects for the forthcoming meeting.

Table of Contents

A Careful Two-Step: Complex Preparatory Meetings and the Risks of a Grand Bargain

Thomas J. Christensen, Pritzker Chair, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department

The two sides will likely hold working-level meetings to prepare the groundwork for what would constitute a successful meeting from the perspective of each nation's leader. Each side is expected to raise the following issues in these preparatory meetings.

U.S. officials will presumably emphasize the need for more progress from Beijing in restricting Chinese exports of fentanyl precursors used by international drug cartels that export the deadly final products to the United States. U.S. officials will also place on the agenda the lifting of Chinese restrictions on the export of rare earths and rare earth magnets to the United States, as well as China's purchase of more U.S. products, such as soybeans.

Consular issues are generally raised by U.S. officials in APEC meetings, including canceled exit visas and detentions of U.S. citizens in China, as well as China's ongoing reluctance to accept the return of Chinese citizens living unlawfully in the United States. Although U.S. officials might not be the first to raise these issues in the conversations, one can expect them to criticize the PRC for its persistent coercion campaigns at sea and in the air against Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan.

Chinese officials will likely ask for a reduction in U.S. tariffs on China, some of which are tied to China's export of fentanyl precursors. In addition, China may also seek further relaxation of U.S. technology restrictions regarding high-end semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment and is expected to complain about the Department of Commerce's growing "entities list" that prohibits U.S. firms and institutions from doing business with Chinese companies and institutions on the list without prior U.S. government approval.

Chinese officials may also press the Trump administration to make new commitments, such as opposing (rather than merely "not supporting") Taiwan independence or even supporting eventual peaceful unification of Taiwan and mainland China. The perennial PRC complaint that U.S. arms sales to and security cooperation with Taiwan are inconsistent with the United States' "one China" commitments will almost certainly be raised. Chinese officials will likely raise consular issues of their own, including U.S. visa rejections for Chinese citizens (for example, for some students and scholars), entry bans on Chinese officials accused by the U.S. government of participating in human rights abuses, and the refusal of the United States to extradite certain Chinese citizens whom Beijing labels criminals.

As for the goal of the meeting itself, a grand bargain would not be in the United States' interest because Beijing would likely seek commitments from the United States on issues that should never be up for negotiation. The U.S. technology export restrictions on semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment are not bargaining tools but national security measures designed to slow the military modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). As such, they should stay in place regardless of the details of Beijing's behavior on other issues or any change in the overall tone of U.S.-PRC relations following the APEC summit. On Taiwan policy, while it is always prudent for U.S. officials to listen to Beijing's concerns about U.S. policy and about Taiwan politics, the United States should not negotiate with Beijing over U.S. arms sales or security cooperation with Taiwan and certainly should not discuss the nature of Taiwan's future relationship with the PRC with PRC officials.

U.S.-China Counterpunches Not Productive Heading into a Likely Summit

Jeannette Chu, Non-Resident Senior Associate, Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics

It is difficult to describe the U.S.-China relationship as a trajectory with defined stages and a clear endpoint. Rather, the last nine months have been more of a series of lateral counterpunches. But has this been a metaphorical "proxy war," and if so, for what? Damage control for domestic audiences on both sides? Where do we go from here, and what are the limits of a Trump-Xi summit? Spoiler alert: It would be far better if both sides set limitations and realistic expectations in advance rather than be overtaken by events or other influences.

Since the aughts, China has sought to consistently project power geoeconomically and diplomatically. The United States, meanwhile, continues to manage multiple and complex relationships, each with its own set of moving pieces, all against an oftentimes conflicting and increasingly strident domestic policy agenda. It is unclear, however, whether China can scale its use of export controls, including restrictions on critical minerals and rare earth elements, as well as sanctions against foreign entities for sustained effectiveness. China may also lack sufficient leverage with its trading partners to effectively block or censure the United States, while the United States has been busy baking its export controls and sanctions policies into trade negotiations. Both governments have been increasingly opaque with respect to licensing processes and timelines. These factors have created an environment where counterpunches become the language of choice. There is a decreasing interest in advancing a common agenda.

Setting aside the recent spate of misunderstandings that have marked the U.S.-China relationship would seem to be a modest and achievable goal for a Trump-Xi summit. However, recent counterpunches, including the Chinese Ministry of Commerce's designation of U.S. companies on its unreliable entities list and export control list, as well as the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security's "Affiliates Rule," may make this harder than meets the eye. There is little incentive for either party to set a more positive trajectory. Perhaps then the goal of a Trump-Xi summit could be simply to find a sustainable basis for more constructive interactions in the future.

Making Concessions on Taiwan in Pursuit of a Deal Would Be Dangerous

Brian Hart, Deputy Director and Fellow, China Power Project

If a U.S.-China deal does materialize, what is excluded from the terms of the agreement may be just as important as what is included. The allure of a major trade deal may tempt President Trump and his negotiators to reach deep to secure a substantial win on trade. However, the administration should draw clear red lines on critical national security interests, especially Taiwan, and avoid even the impression that they are negotiating on those issues.

During the Biden administration, Chinese leader Xi Jinping pushed, to no avail, for President Biden to change U.S. policy from "not supporting Taiwan independence" to "opposing Taiwan independence." Recent media reports suggest that Beijing is once again angling for this wording change. China would also certainly relish other concessions, such as an agreement by Washington to limit or cease arms sales to Taiwan.

Negotiating on these fronts could seem justified to the administration if it leads to a win on top priorities like trade. But making concessions on Taiwan would be a mistake for several reasons. First, it would signal to China that it can leverage its economic power and market access to extract future unilateral gains from Taiwan. Second, it would directly link economic and security issues in ways that increase the likelihood that future trade tensions could dangerously spill over into crisis or instability in the Taiwan Strait. Third, it would create distance between Washington and Taipei, increasing Taiwan's international isolation. This would, in turn, make it harder for U.S. allies, such as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, to push back against Chinese aggression and show support for Taipei. These cascading effects would make it easier for China to pressure Taiwan and shift the status quo further in its favor. Such risks are not worth a trade deal.

The administration should go one step further by avoiding giving the impression that Washington would contemplate a deal that sacrifices Taiwan's security. Of course, general U.S.-China dialogue on Taiwan should continue to avoid miscommunication and miscalculation. But the administration should go out of its way to wall off those conversations from negotiations on trade and other issues. Failing to do so risks sending the wrong message to China and to U.S. allies and partners.

The United States Needs a Coherent China Policy

Scott Kennedy, Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics

Stability, predictability, and cooperation-advocates of a strategy of engagement in policy circles, the business community, and academia have long set these as important goals of the United States' China strategy. They are important-and in short supply-but should not be seen as sacrosanct.

U.S. issues with China can be divided into three baskets:

1. Economic disagreements about fairness and which side should adjust to accommodate the other's capabilities and preferences: The United States and others believe China's state-directed economic governance model has created major bilateral and global imbalances that can only be fixed by China adjusting its approach. China, instead, believes its model "works," and the rest of the world should be grateful for its ability to provide high-tech goods at low prices.
2. Differences over the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific: Washington believes its military presence and alliances keep the peace and undergird economic prosperity. Beijing, by contrast, believes the U.S. military should reduce its presence-or withdraw-from Asia and that its alliance system is standing in the way of resolving outstanding sovereignty claims concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea.
3. Economic security issues arising from economic interdependence between countries with deep national security differences: Both have moved to "de-risk" by denying technology to the other, attempting to reduce supply-chain dependence, constraining investment, and better protecting their data security.

The Trump administration's efforts to date to address these three challenges have been ineffective, and in some cases, have made the problems worse. Sky-high tariffs on China have lowered the bilateral trade deficit, but only because both imports and exports have precipitously declined. China has not constrained its industrial policy machine, and the United States has not increased its domestic manufacturing or overall competitiveness. Instead, the U.S. economy appears to be sliding toward stagflation, and there is growing talk among foreign governments and international businesses of "de-risking" from the United States. In the meantime, Beijing has used the leverage of denying rare earth exports to get the Trump administration to lower tariffs and limit its actions on export controls.

Trade and political tensions between the United States and its allies have also reduced fears in Beijing of being economically cornered or isolated. U.S. actions related to Taiwan so far have leaned heavily in the direction of reassuring Beijing, raising potential doubts about the credibility of the United States' commitments to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. On economic security, the administration seems to bounce back and forth between expanding restrictions as part of a technology-denial strategy and promoting tech exports as part of a strategy to keep Chinese industry embedded in U.S.-led technology ecosystems. The ambivalence produces the worst of all worlds: U.S. tech exports are down, while China is developing alternative domestic supplies while expanding its trade and investment ties with others.

Before President Trump gets on Air Force One to fly to Asia, his administration would be wise to first develop and articulate an overall China strategy. What are the administration's top economic and security goals, and how does the relationship with China fit into those aims? What kind of relationships with traditional allies in Asia and Europe, and with countries in the global South, would best facilitate pursuing a China policy that advances those broader goals?

If these questions are not even asked, let alone answered, then the meeting in South Korea and subsequent engagements elsewhere will have little value in truly tackling the economic and security issues facing the two countries. The best that could be hoped for is the thinnest veneer of stability and the avoidance of an outright disaster. Given how much is at stake for the United States, China, and the rest of the world, one would hope-but not bet on-the administration's aiming higher.

A Big Deal Can Only Favor China

Henrietta Levin, Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies

President Xi Jinping will likely walk into his meeting with President Trump with an exceptional amount of confidence. Beijing had assumed it would have the upper hand in President Trump's trade war, predicting that China's economic and political system could better withstand the pain of significant trade disruptions than its U.S. counterparts. After Chinese restrictions on the export of rare earths forced the United States to seek a rapid rapprochement in April, Chinese officials felt they had been proven right. Beijing's success in inflicting targeted economic pain on constituencies important to Trump, including soybean farmers, has reinforced this confidence. Chinese officials believe they have successfully leveraged Trump's interest in meeting Xi to achieve further concessions, including a downgrading of Washington's engagement with Taipei and the withdrawal of certain protections for high-end U.S. technology. Beijing also believes it has achieved a strong position in its own region, recently hosting the largest-ever Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin, achieving rapprochement with India, or at least the appearance of it, and advancing increasingly expansive claims in the South China Sea with little pushback.

All that to say, this is not a moment in which the United States will be able to cut a good deal with China. Xi will not offer meaningful concessions without getting far more in return, and Washington should be wary of Beijing's efforts to link limited economic gestures that would merely restore the status quo ante, such as unenforceable promises to resume purchases of U.S. soybean exports, to more significant concessions from the United States. While continued mutual de-escalation may be achievable-perhaps the "pause" on the 145 percent and 125 percent tariff rates the United States and China have imposed on each other could be made permanent-any such arrangement should stand independently. The alternative, in which de-escalation provides the foundation for a broader deal, would surely favor Beijing.

U.S. diplomacy with China is a difficult art, in part because it also affects the strength and credibility of U.S. alliances and partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. If allies see that Washington is willing to compromise on its own national interest to achieve a détente with Beijing, they can hardly expect the United States to push back on Chinese aggression to defend the national interests of allies. In response, some allies would feel they have no choice but to bandwagon with China. One bad deal would open the door to countless others. President Trump's planned travel to Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo, before attending APEC in Gyeongju, will provide an excellent opportunity to reassure allies that U.S. national security will remain nonnegotiable in his upcoming talks with Xi.

The Challenges of Purgatory

Ilaria Mazzocco, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics

As of early October 2025, the U.S.-China relationship appears relatively stable. However, a better representation might be that the relationship is in a state of purgatory, as negotiators prepare for a potential meeting between the two countries' presidents in South Korea in the coming weeks and perhaps even some kind of deal. This current phase started in June 2025 after the meeting held in London between a Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier He Lifeng and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. The London meeting helped cement a temporary economic ceasefire between the two countries that began to be negotiated the previous month in Geneva.

This respite has been welcomed by many in both countries and around the world, as the level of tension that had built up as the two governments engaged in an open trade war over the winter and spring of 2025 appeared unsustainable. Record-high tariffs and punitive export controls had disruptive effects on value chains, markets, and people-to-people ties. However, although the pain was felt by both economies, China, for its part, likely feels it has an edge over the United States. Indeed, when looking at other countries, particularly U.S. allies and partners, that have been maneuvered into accepting unfavorable terms, China stands out for its decision to fight back and its impressive demonstration of power by export controls on rare earths. The United States, for its own part, appears to have mixed and poorly defined objectives when it comes to China. Among other things, there is still some confusion as to whether trade and economic security policy towards China is distinct from the administration's broader goal of rewriting global trade rules. Similarly, the administration's prioritization of national security and economic goals appear to still be very much in flux.

Yet, purgatory, by definition, does not last forever. Rather than rise to a better state, the two countries may well find themselves in a far more difficult and unpleasant position if negotiations do not progress as hoped. Indeed, there are still many structural challenges that have not been resolved so far and appear unlikely to be settled in the short term. These include strategic issues like Taiwan, economic security concerns such as export controls on both sides and technological competition, and broader economic issues such as Chinese industrial policy and U.S. high tariffs on Chinese goods, and a general increased suspicion between the two countries that is expanding beyond political elites, among other things. These issues remain powerful irritants in the relationship and could very rapidly derail the current fragile balance.

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