Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind the Developing Conflict

Reports indicate that the strikes in the Caribbean have occurred near the Venezuelan coast. Earlier CSIS analysis described a possible U.S. surveillance screen off the coast that the United States has established to identify and target possible drug runners before they could merge with the heavy traffic of the Caribbean.

The Guns of August: Military Forces Are Rapidly Built Up

Until late summer, the U.S. Navy deployed ships to the Caribbean at the relatively low level of the last several years. As Figure 2 shows, that changed in August when the administration ordered a surge of forces to counter drug smuggling. The level will increase again when the Gerald R.Ford CSG arrives.

Recent deployments have also included larger ships, bringing with them immense firepower and other combat capabilities. A crude way to quantify a capability increase is to look at the displacement of ships deployed. Figure 3 depicts the large increase in the displacement of deployed ships since the beginning of the second Trump administration. The first major increase came with the deployment of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group; the arrival of the Ford CSG will nearly double the number.

Figure 4 shows that the number of military personnel has increased as well. The base level consists of military personnel permanently stationed in the Caribbean region, mostly on Puerto Rico and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The surged forces have eclipsed those figures since August, with several developments driving the major increases.

• Marines: Approximately 2,200 Marines of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed to the Caribbean in August aboard the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group.
• F-35s: Ten F-35s deployed to Puerto Rico in September, consisting not only of pilots but also of hundreds of ground support personnel.
• Special Operations Forces: An estimated 150 special operations troops are conducting missions from MV Ocean Trader, the afloat staging base serving as the "mothership."
• Ford CSG: About 4,500 Navy sailors are deployed on the USS Gerald R. Ford; each of the three destroyers escorting the Ford has 320 sailors.

As a previous CSIS analysis argued, the forces currently committed are insufficient for an amphibious landing or ground invasion. That would require at least 50,000 troops, and war planners would likely want much higher numbers-perhaps 150,000-to achieve the overwhelming force they prefer. However, the air and naval assets built up over the past three months have delivered sufficient firepower to the Caribbean to conduct air and missile strikes against Venezuela.

Table 1 shows the array of ground attack munitions that U.S. forces can employ. Tomahawks, fired from ships and submarines, and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs), launched from aircraft, can strike targets from a sanctuary far away from Venezuela. Other munitions-like the GBU-53 or bombs fitted with the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) precision-guidance kits-are short-range and require penetrating Venezuelan airspace. They would likely be delivered by stealth aircraft (B-2s or F-22s), though neither of these has yet been reported in the region. Navy destroyers positioned close to the Venezuelan coast could also provide naval gunfire support, as they did against ISIS targets during the Libyan Civil War.

Figure 5 compares the number of Tomahawks available in the Caribbean to those used in previous campaigns. An estimated 170 Tomahawk missiles will be in the region when the Ford CSG arrives. The number is comparable to past campaigns of limited scope and duration, such as the 2011 intervention in Libya.

The Balance of Forces Drives Operational Possibilities

A comparison of U.S. and Venezuelan forces shows respective strengths and weaknesses and illuminates what operations the United States can carry out with currently available forces. The tables below show the balance of forces in key areas.

Venezuela has a small air force with serviceable numbers far below the cited numbers. One source shows only 30 of the 49 aircraft being operational. Few F-16s can still fly because of the lack of spare parts resulting from a U.S. embargo. Two Venezuelan F-16s did fly near a U.S. destroyer as a show of force on September 4, but this is unlikely to be repeated because the Trump administration moved F-35s into the region to counter such maneuvers. Venezuelan air assets and facilities-such as runways-will likely be among the first targets struck in a U.S. missile attack, making them inoperable.

Infrastructure improvements being made to U.S. air bases in Puerto Rico-such as repaired runways and expanded taxiways-will allow the administration to bring additional aircraft to the region. Even so, Venezuela is at the limit of the combat range for the F-35s based in Puerto Rico, so they would need aerial refueling. Fighter jets operating from air bases in southern Florida could also reach Venezuela with aerial refueling. Aerial tankers have, in fact, been spotted in Puerto Rico. For the carrier air wing, range is not a problem, as the carrier can reposition closer to designated targets.

Bombers have sufficient range to reach their targets from their bases in the continental United States. Only 15 are stealthy B-2 bombers, which are less vulnerable to air defense systems. Its replacement, the B-21, is not yet operational. The B-52s and B-1s would launch long-range missiles from outside Venezuelan air defenses. Nevertheless, bombers could launch massive amounts of munitions against Venezuela. For example, a flight of five B-52s could launch 100 JASSM long-range missiles. As a comparison, seven B-2 bombers flew against Iranian nuclear facilities during Operation Midnight Hammer and dropped 14 bombs.

Venezuelan air defenses are a mix of old and new systems that cover long, medium, and short range. All are mobile, which helps survivability if they move out of garrisons before hostilities begin. The S-300 and Buk are relatively modern and are used in Ukraine. The S-125 is obsolescent but still widely used worldwide. Point air defenses are short-range, like the U.S. Stinger, but can make U.S. low-level operations hazardous, particularly for helicopters.

In theory, Russia could send weapons, munitions, and technical support, as it has in the past. Maduro has reportedly reached out to Russia, requesting surface-to-air missile systems and parts to repair existing equipment. A Russian cargo aircraft did arrive in Venezuela recently, presumably with military supplies. However, Russia is tied down militarily and politically in Ukraine. Venezuela is far away, Russia has little to give, and it cannot afford to antagonize the United States too much. The Russia connection will yield Venezuela little.

The U.S. military has extensive experience operating in contested airspace, and its aircraft could penetrate Venezuelan territory. However, the United States is extremely casualty averse, and enemy air defense systems were persistent challenges in past campaigns, particularly when mobile. In the Kosovo war of 1998, for example, Serbian short-range air defenses kept NATO aircraft above 10,000 feet to avoid any risk of interception. Venezuelan capabilities pose enough risk that the United States will probably rely on long-range strike and not overfly Venezuelan territory.

Venezuela's only submarine is reported to be inoperable, as are several of its warships. At best, Venezuelan forces might snipe at U.S. military assets. The United States, with its overwhelming maritime force, has unrestricted use of the sea.

Venezuela has a large advantage in numbers and ground firepower if its troops fight, though it suffers several limitations. The army's warfighting training is likely weak because it has focused on internal stability for many years. The militias are unlikely to provide useful combat capability, except possibly in the cities. The United States has the advantage of choosing where to attack, while Venezuelan forces must defend the entire country.

Since August, the 2,200 U.S. Marines deployed to the Caribbean have been carrying out exercises in Puerto Rico. The Trump administration could deploy airborne units of the 82nd Airborne Division and additional amphibious forces from Norfolk and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. In 2022, for example, 4,700 soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Infantry Brigade Combat Team deployed to Poland from Fort Bragg in about two weeks after Biden's order. Evidence of such deployments would be seen quickly, and so far, no such evidence has been reported.

Even with brigade-sized airborne and amphibious reinforcements, the Venezuelan advantage in size and ground firepower is so great that, unless the Maduro regime disintegrates, invasion is impossible without much larger ground forces.

Targets Will Reflect the Administration's Theory of Victory

If the United States launches air and missile attacks on Venezuela, the targets will reflect deliberate choices to achieve a desired end state. Table 6 illustrates the two major target sets: the cartels and the Maduro regime.

Attacks on the cartels would show a continuing focus on counterdrug operations to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. They would also send a signal to the Maduro regime that the United States could do this to them.

Attacks on the Maduro regime would reflect a goal of regime change and, perhaps, a broader agenda of intimidating other governments that the administration regards as insufficiently aggressive in their domestic counterdrug efforts or otherwise unresponsive to the administration's policies. Spreading democracy and enforcing human rights are unlikely to be part of the rationale, as somemembers of the Trump administration have expressed disdain for spreading democracy through military operations. Yet, the democratically elected Venezuelan opposition will be critical in forming a post-Maduro government.

Attacks on joint use facilities (cartel and regime) could threaten the Maduro regime while keeping the focus on counter-drug operations. Targets would be sites that facilitate Venezuela's state-criminal activities, such as military airfields that the government permits the cartels to use for drug smuggling operations.

The Trump administration likely will argue that there is no distinction between the two target sets because the Maduro regime and cartels are so intertwined. However, the distinction is important militarily because the regular military forces the Maduro regime can bring to bear must be eliminated before a new government can be installed. Neither is true of the cartels.

Economic or infrastructure targets, such as oil refineries, would not be targeted because the administration will be planning for a short war. In a short war, Venezuelan economic activity will not have enough time to affect the fighting. A U.S. Navy blockade can stop any oil exports, and the United States has tools to divert their proceeds to the opposition (and legitimate) government. Making the population feel pain-for example, by shutting down the electrical system-would punish people who have already suffered terribly and mostly oppose Maduro. Further, any such attacks would be counterproductive to the post-Maduro government's efforts to rebuild the country, whose GDP has contracted by more than 80 percent between 2013 and 2020.

Venezuela's Population Distribution Shows Opportunities and Challenges

As Figure 6 shows, most of Venezuela's population resides along the northern coast and immediately inland. That makes the country's power centers vulnerable to U.S. maritime and ground power.