A New Era: Space After New START

Commentary by Sean Wilson

Published March 2, 2026

On February 5, New START, which was the last major U.S.-Russia strategic arms control treaty, expired. Under Secretary of State Tom DiNanno referred to this moment as "the end of one era of arms control and hopefully the beginning of a new one."

Indeed, its passing presents an opportunity to move on. The past three administrations have talked about a new treaty, and President Donald Trump appears keen, stating: "Rather than extend 'NEW START' (A badly negotiated deal by the United States that, aside from everything else, is being grossly violated), we should have our Nuclear Experts work on a new, improved, and modernized Treaty that can last long into the future."

The president is correct to note Russia's violations of its obligations under New START. Indeed, Russia has violated nearly every arms control agreement to which it has been a party, making the possibility of Senate ratification of any future bilateral arms control treaty a remote one for the remainder of Putin's time in office.

However, even if we set aside the unlikeliness of future ratification of a bilateral treaty, major substantive obstacles to an agreement remain, such as Russia's development of a range of exotic strategic systems that were not limited under New START, its advantage over the United States in non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), and its repeated demand that the United Kingdom and France be included in a future agreement.

But perhaps the single largest obstacle to the ratification of a future arms control treaty is China. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it recently: "Obviously, the President's been clear in the past that in order to have true arms control in the 21st century, it's impossible to do something that doesn't include China because of their vast and rapidly growing stockpile." Concerning the stockpile, in 2025, the Pentagon reported that "the PLA has continued its massive nuclear expansion. While this report assessed in 2020 that China's nuclear warhead would double from a stockpile of the low 200s over the next decade, the PLA remains on track to have over 1,000 warheads by 2030." China continues to reject any arms limits.

Why should the space community pay attention to any of this? Well, while you may not be interested in arms control, arms control is interested in you.

First, the consistent Russian position has been that future arms control should address all factors affecting strategic stability, including missile defense and space. This has been a non-starter for the United States, and it is perhaps even more so now, given "Golden Dome." Would the current or a future Administration trade some part (or parts) of the Golden Dome architecture for a deal on the strategic nuclear balance?

Second, as getting to a new treaty soon is unlikely, the United States will need to respond to China's nuclear buildup and any post-New START expansion by Russia. The United States may need to allocate a greater percentage of the defense budget to nuclear deterrence at the expense of other missions.

Third, in the absence of a new treaty, the United States may turn once more to other tools in the strategic toolbox to engage in risk reduction with China and Russia, such as bilateral space security exchanges.

Restarting such an exchange with China could be a potential deliverable for President Trump's upcoming visit to Beijing. Despite their rivalry as the two largest investors in space, the United States and China have the most to lose from irresponsible behavior in space. This presents an opportunity for mutual understanding to refrain from certain dangerous and/or destabilizing behaviors, such as with respect to destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing in peacetime, as well as interference with sensitive space assets. Establishing more effective bilateral channels could also help to manage the risk of miscalculation and misperception stemming from space activities and benefit U.S. commercial actors, who are increasingly operating in close proximity with Chinese entities in space.

While discussions with Russia are already ongoing on broader strategic topics, any renewed space security exchange with Russia would likely have a very different tenor from that of China. Unlike the tremendous growth in space capabilities by China, the story of Russia's space industrial base in recent years is one of decline, and the civil space partnership will likely end after the retirement of the International Space Station.

However, decline does not necessarily mean less dangerous. Dwindling overlapping interests in space could further tilt Russia toward destabilizing behavior and acting as a spoiler. As the Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted in a 2025 report, "Russia is developing a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an antisatellite capability." New START's expiration also takes with it the provision "not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party" with respect to verifying compliance with the treaty. Depending on the course Russia pursues in space post-New START, it could compel a U.S. response that could have implications for China as well.

Sean Wilson is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. He is also the founder and CEO of the Mirai Group and the former director of international space policy at the White House.

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