Kazakhstan’s Emerging Civilian Nuclear Energy Industry: Implications for U.S. Strategic Interests

Commentary by Tina Dolbaia and Amanda Southfield

Published September 4, 2025

Situated in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is home to abundant uranium and a developing civilian nuclear energy sector, currently dominated by Astana's neighbors, Moscow and Beijing. With the global uranium market showing signs of growth, the United States' engagement with uranium-rich Kazakhstan is important to deter deeper Russian and Chinese entrenchment in this sector.

Kazakhstan holds the world's second-largest uranium reserves at 14 percent, preceded by Australia and followed by Canada and Russia. It is also the leading producer of unenriched uranium, currently making up over 40 percent of the world's supply. Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan's national atomic company, controls all uranium mining and exploration, as well as all other nuclear-related activities in the country. Currently, Kazakhstan has 13 uranium mining projects, three of which are wholly owned by Kazatomprom, while the remaining 10 are joint ventures between Kazatomprom and foreign equity holders such as Russia's Rosatom, France's Orano, Canada's Cameco, and the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). In 2012, Kazatomprom increased its shares in national mining activity from 46 percent to 51 percent, thereby making it the majority stakeholder in national uranium mining endeavors.

Yet, despite having generous uranium levels and a tightly controlled nuclear energy sector, Astana is limited by its inability to domestically enrich uranium, forcing it to export its unenriched uranium abroad for enrichment. As of 2024, Kazakhstan's largest exports of unenriched uranium went to China, France, Russia, and Canada. In terms of imports of enriched uranium, as of 2023, the vast majority came from Russia, followed by China. Kazatomprom's 10 percent stake in the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk, Russia, also explains Russia's significant role in Kazakhstan's imports of enriched uranium.

However, in the aftermath of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan has made subtle steps toward gradually lessening Moscow's entrenched position within the country's economy. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has expressed pride in the country's role as a "middle power" and stressed that Astana's goal is to "build new, resilient bridges between conflicting geopolitical poles." In this context, the development of a strong civilian nuclear energy sector is likely important for the Tokayev administration not only to meet the country's rising energy needs but also to decrease its energy dependence on Russia. Currently, Kazakhstan relies on Russia in the hydrocarbon industry, including crucially for physical oil exports-dependencies that have historically granted the Kremlin political and economic leverage vis-à-vis Astana.

Despite seeking to build strong connections across "conflicting geopolitical poles," Kazakhstan has not yet meaningfully deepened its relations with the United States. Rather, China has emerged as the largest single-country economic player, including in the strategically important civilian nuclear energy sector. In a statement last September, Kazatomprom said that sanctions against Russia have made it difficult to sell uranium to Western buyers. In presumed coordination with Rosatom-associated sanctions risks, Kazatomprom announced in December 2024 that Rosatom's Uranium One Group had sold its almost 50 percent stake in Kazakhstan's Zarechnoye mine and gave up its 30 percent stake in the Khorasan-U joint venture. Though these are not the largest mining operations in Kazakhstan, the sale of Uranium One stakes is significant as it reduces Russian ownership in Kazatomprom's mining operations. The ultimate beneficiary in both sales is China's General Nuclear Power Corporation, shifting significant control over Kazakhstan's civilian nuclear energy sector away from Russia to China.

One Step Toward Russia, Two Steps Toward China: Kazakhstan's Nuclear Power Plant Deals

The recently agreed nuclear power plant (NPP) deals are the epitome of China's growing presence in Kazakhstan's civilian nuclear industry, likely serving as a counterbalance to Russia.

This summer, Kazatomprom announced three NPP deals, one with Moscow and two with Beijing. This follows a national referendum on the development of peaceful nuclear programs in October 2024, where 71 percent of the population voted in favor of the initiative, and a subsequent search for global providers occurred. The shortlisted companies for the project came from four countries, including Russia and China, as well as two U.S. allies-France and South Korea. This June, Kazatomprom announced that the first two NPPs will be international consortia led by Russia's Rosatom and China's CNNC, respectively. The third NPP project, announced a month later, will also be led by CNNC.

The proposals were reviewed according to factors such as reactor type, financing, and proposed timelines. Officials from Kazakhstan's Ministry of National Economy made it clear initially that the NPPs had to be financed externally-a strong point for Rosatom, which has historically lent out between $10 and 25 billion at a 3-4 percent interest rate for similar projects. The French and South Korean financing options were less favorable, with the French model being almost twice as expensive to construct. Furthermore, a 1973 agreement between South Korea and the United States means that Seoul lacks domestic uranium enrichment and conversion abilities, thus constraining its ability to support the project as effectively as its competitors. By contrast, Kazakhstan's stake in Russia's International Uranium Enrichment Center was a likely benefit for the Rosatom proposal, as Kazakhstan has access to enrichment within the Russian facility-an effective solution to its lack of domestic capabilities. Ultimately, Kazakhstan determined that the Rosatom offer-projected to be at least $14 billion, though the final price is contingent on upcoming feasibility studies-was the best deal. The CNNC was deemed second best, with the French and South Korean firms tied for third and not receiving NPP deals. Given the advantages of the Rosatom proposal, the selection of CNNC to lead the next two NPP consortia likely indicates an attempt at diversification within the energy sector and a desire not to rely too heavily on Russia as a single supplier.

Though intended to be an international consortium, the selection of Russian and Chinese state-owned companies for the first three NPPs presents difficulties for Western involvement and highlights Kazakhstan's current, and likely future, dependence on its powerful neighbors in its growing civilian nuclear energy sector. Kazakh officials have emphasized a desire for cooperation with other countries to ensure the projects are executed effectively. Yet it seems unlikely, given current geopolitical tensions, that Western companies will play any serious role in these efforts.

Potential Space for U.S. Involvement

The post-2022 period highlights an opportunity for Washington to take advantage of Astana's stated goal to become a "middle power" and strengthen bilateral ties with the resource-rich Central Asian state. As Russia's influence over Kazakhstan's oil and gas exports continues, the civilian nuclear energy sector is an increasingly viable option for Western markets to capitalize on. Currently, one of Kazakhstan's largest uranium mining operations, the Inkai mine, is a joint venture with Canada's Cameco that was initially launched in 1996 and restructured in 2018 to reach Cameco's current 40 percent stake. This example-viewed in tandem with Astana's willingness to diversify its economic ties and Rosatom's sale of stakes in joint ventures with Kazatomprom at least partially tied to Western sanctions concerns-indicates an opportunity for increased Western and U.S. presence as Kazakhstan expands its civilian nuclear energy goals. A potential Western engagement in the country's civilian nuclear energy industry could also reduce Astana's dependence on Beijing, which increasingly appears to be taking a leading role in this space.

Currently, a piece of legislation, the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, described as an "absurd relic of the past" in January 2025 by current U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, stands as a major hindrance to strengthening U.S.-Kazakh economic relations. The amendment restricted countries with non-market economies that do not meet freedom-of-emigration requirements from having normal trade relations (NTR) with the United States. Gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in December 1991, Kazakhstan met the required standards and was granted temporary NTR status since 1992, with the amendment being subject to an annual moratorium since 1989. The formal repeal of this legislation for Kazakhstan would be a direct sign of the importance the United States places on the potential partnership and a beneficial step toward a more active involvement of U.S. firms in developing Kazakhstan's natural resources and civilian nuclear energy sector. While there is bipartisan support for repealing Jackson-Vanik in the House of Representatives and similar legislation from 2023 in the Senate, the failed efforts to repeal this amendment indicate a more recurrent political gesture that continues to strain Washington's relations with Astana. President Trump's nominee for ambassador to Kazakhstan, Julie Stufft, has reinforced the desire for strengthening ties, stating that the United States is "on the threshold of a new era of commercial and energy cooperation with Kazakhstan" at her hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The International Energy Agency reports that on top of the existing 420 nuclear reactors globally, 63 additional reactors are under construction, and beyond that, 60 reactors are extending their operational lifespan. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the global uranium market will continue to grow, though this hinges on continued access to reliable supplies from politically stable and friendly nations. In the post-2022 period, Western access to critical sources of unenriched and enriched uranium has been at least partially obstructed. Sanctions against Russia have naturally limited access to Russian supplies, especially following the passage of the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act in 2024. Additionally, anti-Western sentiments in Africa have complicated Western access to major African producers. Following the 2023 coup in Niger, a mine formerly owned by France's Orano has been nationalized, and ties with Russia have strengthened through a recent nuclear energy agreement with Rosatom. Namibia and Tanzania are similarly leaning toward cooperation with Russia and China over uranium, with Tanzania recently launching its pilot uranium processing plant commissioned by Rosatom.

For the United States, achieving President Trump's nuclear energy initiatives will require reliable access to uranium. As such, Kazakhstan's relative geopolitical stability, its willingness to strengthen cooperation with Western nations, and its possession of one of the world's largest supplies of unenriched uranium make it a crucial source of supply in the post-Ukraine war period. Currently, Kazakhstan remains dependent on its neighbors, Russia and China, and the recent NPP deals indicate they will likely carry significant influence over Kazakhstan's uranium production and the civilian nuclear energy sector more broadly in the coming years. However, while the current focus is on the large-scale NPPs, small modular reactors serve as an additional avenue for nuclear energy that the United States can have an impact on. Negotiations with U.S. companies NuScale and GE-Hitachi have been underway for several years and indicate the strong potential for U.S. involvement in the sector going forward. As such, it is in the U.S. national security interest to support Kazakh attempts to diversify its energy sector dependencies and grow the role of U.S. investment in the region. Doing so would deter China and Russia from dominating bilateral nuclear cooperation with uranium-rich developing nations. Through the encouragement of investments in Kazakhstan rooted in shared economic interests, the United States can boost its standing in the strategically lucrative and resource-rich region of Central Asia.

Tina Dolbaia is an associate fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Amanda Southfield was an intern with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.

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