The EU-Western Balkans Summit: Enlargement moves forward but political tensions endure

Metadata

Last week, the Western Balkans moved to the centre of the EU's political agenda. European Council President António Costa visited Sarajevo, Tirana, Skopje, Pristina and Belgrade, before attending the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat, Montenegro, on 5 June. Joined by Commission President von der Leyen, Costa arrived with a familiar message: the Western Balkans remain firmly anchored in the European future.

The summit's agenda reflected this ambition, focusing on two closely connected priorities: (gradual) integration and regional security. Another message stood out: at a time of competing crises, the attention devoted to the Western Balkans last week underscored the region's continued strategic relevance. Yet behind the carefully choreographed displays of commitment lies a more complex reality. The run-up to the summit was marked by unresolved disputes, political crises and reform setbacks that continue to test both the region's European aspirations and the EU's credibility in delivering on its enlargement promises. The renewed case for enlargement cannot rest on geopolitics alone. Tackling domestic crises, governance challenges and unresolved regional tensions is not peripheral to enlargement but central to its success.

The political realities behind the summit

Regional leaders arrived in Tivat facing very different challenges. Bosnia and Herzegovina is grappling with uncertainty over international oversight, Albania and Kosovo* with domestic political turmoil, and Serbia with concerns over regional relations and its strategic orientation. For the EU, the summit was an opportunity to demonstrate that enlargement remains credible; for regional leaders, a chance to reaffirm their European trajectory.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, just days before leaders gathered in Tivat, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the main body responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, failed to agree on a successor to High Representative Christian Schmidt, who announced his resignation in April. Two candidates were under consideration: Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi, backed by Italy and the United States, and French diplomat René Troccaz, supported by France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The deadlock exposed divisions among key international stakeholders over the future direction of international oversight in Bosnia and Herzegovina, just months ahead of the general elections scheduled for 4 October.

Albania's leader arrived in Tivat facing mounting domestic pressures. In the days preceding the summit, thousands protested in Tirana against a controversial Jared Kushner-backed tourism project planned on a protected coastal ecosystem. The demonstrations, which at times turned violent, quickly evolved into broader criticism of Prime Minister Edi Rama and his government, with protesters calling for his resignation. The timing was particularly notable as recently Albania met the interim benchmarks for Cluster 1 (Fundamentals), allowing it to enter the next phase of accession negotiations and start closing negotiating chapters.

Political deadlock remained the defining feature further south. Acting Kosovo President Albulena Haxhiu arrived in Tivat just days before voters headed to the polls on 7 June for the third time in 18 months. The snap parliamentary elections confirmed Prime Minister Albin Kurti's Vetevendosje as the largest political force, but without the majority needed to govern alone. The continued inability of political parties to overcome their differences has raised growing doubts about Pristina's capacity to deliver on the European agenda its leaders routinely champion.

Relations between Serbia and Montenegro also cast a shadow over the summit. Montenegrin authorities barred 87 Serbian nationals from entering the country, citing security concerns and alleged threats linked to the event, triggering a diplomatic dispute between the two neighbours. Serbia's Security Information Agency (BIA) subsequently advised President Aleksandar Vučić not to travel to Tivat, warning of a 'high security risk' stemming from the activities of criminal networks in Montenegro.

President Vučić ultimately did attend. His arrival came directly after a visit to China, where Serbia further deepened its relations with Beijing. Recent years have seen Serbia further diversify its strategic partnerships, including through the acquisition of advanced Chinese military systems. The timing once again prompted renewed calls from European leaders for Serbia to clarify its strategic orientation and commitment to its European trajectory. Yet despite repeated appeals from Brussels and key Member States, Belgrade has shown little inclination to abandon its hedging strategy.

In addition, Costa used his regional tour to reiterate EU expectations of Serbia in three longstanding areas of concern: implementing Venice Commission recommendations on the judiciary, establishing a new Council of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) through a transparent process and aligning electoral legislation with OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) standards. Meanwhile, the European Commission continues to withhold funding from Serbia's €1.5 billion Growth Plan allocation over concerns about democratic backsliding and the rule of law.

What should we take away from Tivat?

Three broader conclusions emerge from the Tivat summit. First, gradual integration is the EU's preferred enlargement tool. A Franco-German non-paper published ahead of the summit echoed this approach, calling for a more efficient enlargement process focused on delivering reforms and tangible progress rather than allowing procedural obstacles to slow accession. Initiatives such as the Growth Plan and the forthcoming inclusion of the Western Balkans in the 'Roam Like at Home' area demonstrate that meaningful benefits can be delivered before accession itself.

Second, Montenegro's progress matters beyond Montenegro. As the region's frontrunner, it offers the strongest proof that EU accession remains achievable and could provide a powerful incentive for other enlargement partners to sustain reform efforts. Podgorica used the Tivat Summit to reinforce this message, not least through President Macron's bilateral visit, which signalled growing support from key Member States at a moment when the EU has already begun drafting Montenegro's Accession Treaty. At the same time, Brussels should remain cautious about attaching specific accession dates to the process. Maintaining credibility will depend less on politically attractive timelines and more on demonstrating concrete progress and visible improvements on the ground.

Third, the incident between Serbia and Montenegro demonstrated that unresolved regional tensions and competing narratives remain salient features of the Western Balkans political landscape. As frontrunners move closer to membership, the EU should devote greater attention to strengthening regional resilience, supporting constructive neighbourly relations and countering anti-EU narratives that may emerge both within enlargement partners and from other actors seeking to undermine the EU. Negotiating accession chapters and meeting reform benchmarks is just as important as addressing the political challenges that are likely to become more visible and potentially more dangerous as accession approaches.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Metadata Bottom

• Western Balkans
• EU enlargement
• EU Foreign Policy