The War with Iran Threatens Syria’s Recovery

Commentary by Will Todman

Published March 12, 2026

Hours after U.S. and Israeli jets began bombing Iran on February 28, 2026, Syrians heard a loud explosion in Damascus. Given the new Syrian government's hostility to Iran, the lingering presence of U.S. forces in Syria, and Iran's attacks on key infrastructure across several Arab states, many feared Syria had become a target. But the explosion heard in Damascus was not the start of a new front. It was the sound of an Iranian missile headed for Israel being intercepted. In fact, the first full week of the war saw the lowest level of violence in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime.

For now, the direct impact of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran on Syria has been limited. The interim government has worked hard to stay out of the conflict, and in the short term, it has largely succeeded. Yet the conflict is quietly testing the foundations of Syria's recovery strategy. If the war drags on, it will create pressures that threaten to derail Syria's fragile recovery.

Sharaa's Recovery Strategy

Since taking power 15 months ago, the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has pursued a three-pronged strategy for Syria's recovery: diplomatic balancing, territorial consolidation, and investment-led economic recovery.

Diplomatically, Sharaa has adopted a policy of nonconfrontation with Syria's neighbors. While Israel has expanded its occupation of southern Syria, killed Syrian troops, and bombed the heart of Damascus, the Syrian government has denied responsibility for the single rocket attack on Israel emanating from Syria. And despite Hezbollah and Iran-backed militias in Iraq supporting the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, Sharaa has largely avoided direct confrontation with them. Negotiations with Lebanon and Iraq have produced some tangible progress. This policy of restraint has prevented Syria from being dragged into a new conflict or becoming an arena of international proxy competition once again.

Domestically, Sharaa has steadily expanded state control. Most significantly, he struck a deal to integrate Kurdish-led forces with the Syrian army in January 2026. He has also formalized Syria's cooperation with the anti-ISIS coalition, forging an effective collaboration. Although Damascus still lacks control over the Sweida governorate in southern Syria, it has built momentum toward reasserting authority across the country.

Economically, the government has focused on attracting private sector investment rather than relying on large-scale international reconstruction aid, which is unlikely to materialize. Sharaa has also worked to integrate Syria into regional markets and has secured large investment deals from Arab Gulf states.

The Challenges of the War with Iran

The war with Iran now threatens each pillar of that strategy. First, it has heightened two security risks along Syria's border. The first is the possibility of confrontation with Hezbollah. Soon after Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel, Sharaa sent Syrian forces to reinforce the Lebanese border. His concern is not only military escalation but also the broader consequences of Israel's campaign in Lebanon: Lebanese refugee flows into Syria, Hezbollah fighters crossing the border to evade Israeli attacks, and economic disruption if the border closes. On March 9, Sharaa made a rare intervention in support of the Lebanese government's efforts to disarm Hezbollah, revealing how seriously he regards the threat it poses, while also signaling once again to Israel that Syria does not represent a threat. The following day, Hezbollah reportedly fired shells at Syrian army positions. Instability along the Lebanon border threatens several of Syria's most important cities, including Damascus, Homs, and Tartus.

The second potential threat lies to Syria's east. Iran-backed militias in Iraq have gradually increased their involvement in the conflict. If fighting spreads in Iraq, it could undermine the fragile ceasefire in northeastern Syria, derail the integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian army, and create new opportunities for an ISIS resurgence.

Even without direct fighting, the war is beginning to strain Syria's fragile economic recovery. Since the initial strikes on February 28, Syria has closed most of its airspace, limiting connections with the region and disrupting commercial travel. Interruptions to natural gas supplies have forced the government to increase electricity rationing. Meanwhile, the conflict in Lebanon prompted the sudden return of more than 78,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon, placing additional pressure on Syria's already inadequate housing supply and strained public services. These shocks are manageable for now, but they highlight how vulnerable Syria's recovery remains to regional instability.

The greatest threat to Syria's recovery may lie in the war's long-term trajectory. The conflict increasingly appears headed toward a stalemate-one more likely to be characterized by recurring rounds of confrontation between Iran and Israel than by the collapse of the Iranian regime. For Sharaa, this would be the worst possible outcome. His recovery strategy depends on a relatively stable region that encourages investment and economic integration.

Sharaa's strategy also assumes that Arab Gulf states will devote political and financial resources to stabilizing the Levant. But if the war leaves Iran weakened yet more radicalized, Gulf governments are likely to prioritize their own defense spending and economic recovery instead. If that happens, Syria could find itself, as before, at the geopolitical heart of the Middle East but on the margins of regional priorities, just as it begins the difficult process of rebuilding.

Will Todman is the chief of staff of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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