Ahead of APEC, Trump Signs Flurry of Bilateral Minerals Agreements on Asia Tour

Ahead of APEC, Trump Signs Flurry of Bilateral Minerals Agreements on Asia Tour

Photo: Kiyoshi Ota/Bloomberg/Getty Images

For too long, the United States has sat on the sidelines while China forged ahead with mining investments throughout the Asia Pacific. The new agreements indicate a strategic shift: Washington now intends to build its own minerals investment presence in the region and actively counterbalance Beijing's dominance.

Q2: How do the bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) signed with Thailand and Malaysia compare with the frameworks signed with Japan and Australia?

A2: While the MOUs signed with Thailand and Malaysia seek to deepen cooperative ties between the two nations and the United States, the critical minerals frameworks signed with Australia and Japan go beyond calls for cooperation to prioritize the deployment of capital to strategic projects.

Under the bilateral agreement with Australia signed on October 20, both governments have pledged to deploy $1 billion each within six months to jointly advance projects deemed strategically significant. Although the framework with Japan does not specify a monetary commitment, it also establishes a six-month timeline to provide financial backing for selected projects. In both cases, the agreements stipulate that the resulting offtake will be directed to buyers in the United States and the partner nation-and, where applicable, to allied countries.

The agreements with Japan and Australia include provisions to collaborate on a range of supply-side interventions, including price support, streamlined permitting, geological mapping, recycling initiatives, and complementary strategic stockpiling. Both agreements also establish mechanisms to curb Chinese acquisition of new mining assets through tools like domestic investment screening, while coordinating diplomatic efforts to constrain China's expansion into third-country resource markets.

The frameworks signed with Australia and Japan are notably more advanced and immediately actionable, drawing on sophisticated policy instruments and substantial financial commitments to tackle critical mineral supply chain vulnerabilities. They underscore both the depth of the United States' long-standing alliances with these partners and the high degree of industrial capability each brings to the partnership. By combining Australia's world-class mining expertise with Japan's mature manufacturing and processing capabilities, all three countries are well positioned to turn minerals cooperation frameworks into tangible outcomes.

By contrast, the bilateral MOUs with Thailand and Malaysia serve primarily as entry points for dialogue and alignment on shared objectives. These agreements focus on foundational areas of cooperation: exchanging knowledge and technical expertise on global best practices to enhance the competitiveness of Malaysia's and Thailand's minerals sectors; organizing joint workshops, seminars, and meetings between government officials; and ensuring fair treatment for investors. The language is broad and no funding obligation is included. These preliminary MOUs reflect the nascency of the minerals industry within these countries. Building mining and processing capacity in Thailand especially will require significant investment to address infrastructure, regulatory, and energy bottlenecks for a critical minerals industry to emerge at scale.

Although the MOUs with Thailand and Malaysia are not as immediately actionable as the more advanced frameworks signed with Australia and Japan, they still represent meaningful diplomatic progress that can expand U.S. access to critical minerals as these countries further develop their mining sectors. At a time when nations like Malaysia are simultaneously exploring rare earth refining projects with both Western partners and China, sustained U.S. engagement is essential to maintain influence and offer viable alternatives to reliance on Chinese technology and industrial expertise.

Q3: How do the recently signed agreements facilitate vertical integration from mine to manufacturing?

A3: Several projects are positioned to benefit from the recently signed agreements, with significant potential to improve vertical integration within the region. Lynas Rare Earths has developed its rare earth capabilities over the past decade. In 2011, Japan invested $250 million into the Australian company after experiencing firsthand how overreliance on Chinese rare earths can quickly become weaponized against Japanese industries. Lynas has expanded its footprint over the past decade to develop mining capabilities in Australia and processing capacity in Australia, Malaysia, and the United States. By combining Australia's heavy rare earth endowments with Malaysia's refining capacity and Japan's financing mechanisms and offtake for advanced technology manufacturing, Lynas built the first dysprosium supply chain independent of China. Since the signed U.S.-Australia bilateral agreement, Lynas has announced it will expand its processing capacity in Malaysia with a new separation facility, increasing capacity from 1,500 metric tons of heavy rare earth feedstock to 5,000 metric tons per year.

The advancement of Lynas's heavy rare earth supply chain complements MP Materials' major strides to produce neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) feedstock for high-performance permanent magnet manufacturing in the United States. MP Materials is on track to build manufacturing capacity for 10,000 metric tons of permanent magnets by 2028 with U.S. government equity and price support. Recently signed bilateral agreements will help to ensure the United States has access to both the light and heavy rare earth feedstocks needed for robust domestic magnet manufacturing.

Q4: Can bilateral agreements foster multilateral cooperation?

A4: The Trump administration has prioritized bilateral cooperation over multilateral coordination, favoring bilateral financing commitments over multilateral forums like the Minerals Security Partnership. However, a template is emerging for multilateral coordination between Asia-Pacific allies and private industry. Australia and Japan have highly integrated critical mineral supply chains as joint ventures between Australian mining and Japanese processing or manufacturing firms are common: The Kalgoorlie Nickel Project is a joint effort between Ardea, Sumitomo Metal Mining Co, and Mitsubishi Corporation; Alcoa of Australia, Sojitz Corporation, and JOGMEC are jointly developing gallium recovery capabilities at an Australian alumina refinery; and Australia's Liontown Resources is working with Sumitomo to develop lithium hydroxide production in Japan with lithium concentrate from Australia. These projects have been announced in the years since Australia and Japan signed a partnership on critical minerals in 2022. While the frameworks signed by the United States are bilateral, the integrated nature of the minerals ecosystem means trilateral and even multilateral cooperation will be required and should be encouraged.

Already, the Trump administration is shifting from bilateral to multilateral partnerships when strategic to U.S. interests. Following the signing of the U.S.-Australia Framework, the U.S. Department of Defense (recently renamed the Department of War), announced its support for the development of Alcoa's gallium refinery, turning the bilateral joint venture between Australia and Japan into a trilateral effort. The project is expected to produce 100 tons of gallium per year.

Q5: With what other countries should the United States bolster bilateral cooperation through critical mineral frameworks or memoranda of understanding?

A5: While the president's Asia Pacific tour may be coming to an end, bilateral negotiations and cooperation with Asian partners to secure critical minerals should not. South Korea, in particular, represents a key ally with significant industrial capacity and technological sophistication. In August 2025, Korea Zinc signed an MOU with Lockheed Martin to supply refined germanium for the U.S. defense contractor's advanced semiconductor production. As the operator of the world's largest zinc smelter, Korea Zinc plans to leverage its existing infrastructure to extract germanium and invest more than $100 million in a new recovery facility in Ulsan, South Korea. Under the agreement, Lockheed Martin will secure germanium through an offtake arrangement-an example of how industrial partnerships can directly bolster allied supply chains for defense and advanced technologies.

Two additional private sector partnerships in the minerals sector were announced this week, but details have yet to emerge: POSCO International will partner with U.S. ReElement Technologies to build a production complex for rare earth elements and permanent magnets in the United States, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) will partner with Centrus Energy Corp to expand uranium enrichment capacity in Ohio. These are early stage, but potentially impactful, partnerships addressing key gaps in the U.S. industrial base.

Private sector partnerships are essential, but government-to-government agreements provide positive market signals and leverage policy support that catalyzes additional private sector investment and ensures projects make it all the way from announcement to production. South Korea's technologically sophisticated and globally competitive private sector is well positioned to partner with U.S. industry, and establishing a formal bilateral minerals framework would help ensure that these joint ventures receive the financial backing and political support needed to reach completion.

Q6: Did the United States and China hold negotiations over China's newly announced restrictions on rare earth exports?

A6: Yes. The agreement reached between President Trump and President Xi Jinping during their meeting in South Korea this week paused the rare earth and permanent magnet export controls for a one-year period. China also committed to resuming purchases of U.S. soybeans and tightening enforcement against the export of precursor chemicals used to manufacture fentanyl.

In return, the United States will lower tariffs on fentanyl-related goods from 20 percent to 10 percent and extend the suspension of its 24 percent reciprocal tariffs on Chinese imports for another year. The most significant U.S. concession, however, was a one-year freeze on a recently introduced rule that expanded the list of Chinese companies restricted from accessing advanced U.S. technologies. Announced only a month earlier, this rule had widened the scope of Washington's "entity list," which targets firms considered national security risks.

Q7: Do this week's U.S.-China negotiations in South Korea signal an end to the rare earths crisis?

A7: Far from it. If 2025 has made anything clear, it's that China's weaponization of rare earths is not a temporary tactic; it's a recurrent feature of its modern economic statecraft. Since April, Beijing has tightened, eased, and reimposed export controls at will, using rare earths as a lever of pressure in its trade confrontation with the United States.

The latest negotiations have done little more than provide a pause on the October restrictions, while the broader export control framework established after April 4 remains firmly intact. Foreign buyers must still secure a license from Beijing to access these critical materials. In short, China's grip on the rare earth supply chain remains a strategic constant in an increasingly volatile trade landscape. Whether the reprieve lasts a full year is yet to be determined.

The series of minerals cooperation agreements signed across Asia this week aim to forge new, resilient supply chains and dilute China's dominant grip on the region's mining sector. Collectively, they represent an effort to reshape the balance of power in one of the world's most vital arenas for rare earths and other critical minerals.

Gracelin Baskaran is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Meredith Schwartz is a research associate for the Critical Minerals Security Program at CSIS.

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