The Costs and Global Trade-Offs of U.S. Military Action Against Venezuela

Because these costs were already in the DOD budget, they are not available for allocation elsewhere. They do not represent losses to education or healthcare, for example.

However, these operations incur costs above what had been anticipated in the FY 2026 budget, which the DOD finalized over a year ago. For example, units sent to the Caribbean will have a higher level of operations than anticipated, and personnel will receive additional benefits, such as family separation allowances. Even units planned for deployment will likely operate at a higher intensity-more steaming days, more flight hours. Based on the senior author's previous experience in the Office of Management and Budget, these additional costs would add about 10 percent to the budgeted cost, or $3 million per day.

There is no contingency fund in the DOD budget for unexpected operations. Conflicts cost extra. The Biden administration, for example, asked Congress to pass a half dozen supplemental appropriations to fund the U.S. response to wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. If there were enough slack in the budget to cover unanticipated operations, budgeteers would have taken it away years ago. To fund these costs internally, the DOD would need to curtail other planned activities.

Alternatively, the money might come from funds provided in the FY 2026 reconciliation bill (the One Big Beautiful Bill Act). In Section 20011, DOD received $1 billion "to support border operations, including deployment of military personnel." Although legislators likely had the Southwest border in mind, the language might be expanded to cover Caribbean counterdrug operations. Finally, if the deployment continues long enough, the White House could request additional funds in a supplemental appropriation or in an FY 2027 reconciliation bill.

The DOD will likely want to be reimbursed for the Caribbean operations without cutting other activities or using money intended for the Southwest border. The Trump White House, like previous administrations, will be reluctant to propose a supplemental budget unless it is unavoidable. Supplementals often become a "free money" scramble, with advocates across government competing to secure funding for their favorite programs that were not included in the regular budget. The senior author's experience is that the breakpoint is about a billion dollars. Below that, the White House is likely to lean on the DOD to find the money internally. Above that, the trade-offs get too difficult.

The Opportunity Costs

Opportunity costs reflect trade-offs in the allocation of military forces, not monetary costs paid by the American taxpayer. Assets sent to the Caribbean could have been sent elsewhere. For example, because the Ford carrier went to the Caribbean, there was no aircraft carrier in Europe, the Mediterranean, or the Middle East. That is a risk the administration has explicitly accepted. The 2025 National Security Strategy directs the "readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere, especially the missions identified in this strategy, and away from theaters whose relative import to American national security has declined in recent decades or years."

Nevertheless, it is worthwhile laying out that opportunity cost because it has strategic effects. The analysis below focuses on Navy ships because the trade-offs there are so clear, and ships are relatively easy to count.

The analysis begins with Table 2, which lists the 15 "battle force ships" in the region.

Battle force ships are defined as (a) "a commissioned United States Ship warship capable of contributing to combat operations" or (b) "a United States Naval Ship that contributes directly to Navy warfighting or support missions." Table 3 reproduces periodic releases from the Department of the Navy to the U.S. Naval Institute that show battle force ship activity.

The total battle force of 293 ships includes commissioned warships (with the "USS" prefix, crewed by Navy sailors) and combat logistics and support ships (with the "USNS" prefix, crewed primarily by civilians). This count excludes the Army logistics ships, Coast Guard cutters, and the SOF mothership (Ocean Trader, a converted commercial ship). Tasking 15 ships, at first glance, would not appear to put a major strain on a fleet that numbers 293 battle force ships.

However, Navy ships are not always deployed. In a given 24-32 month period, a Navy warship generally goes on a single deployment lasting six to seven months, with the remaining time spent in home port for maintenance and training. The number of ships available to conduct extended operations at any given time is thus much smaller than 293.

Ninety-eight ships are "deployed" today. This number includes ships forward stationed in places like Japan and Spain, as well as those on extended deployments from their home ports. Forward stationed ships are considered "deployed" even if they are at the pier.

"Underway" captures ships at sea. The Navy reports that 39 of the 51 ships underway are deployed on extended operations. The rest may not be deployed but are still at sea for local operations to train, test equipment, or certify a ship before deployment.

The "underway and deployed" group is available for extended missions such as counterdrug operations in the Caribbean. In theory, ships in the "local underway" category could be diverted to Caribbean operations, but these ships were not planned for extended deployments. If that happens, the ships will miss scheduled maintenance, thus exacerbating the Navy's severe ship maintenance problems and disrupting families who had planned time at home between regular deployments.

The administration has 38 percent of its underway naval strength (15 of 39 ships) in the Caribbean. This is a substantial change from previous practice but is consistent with the new strategy of focusing on the hemisphere.

It is worth noting that the "underway, deployed" number (39) is low by recent standards. The FY 2026 Navy budget documents showed 54 in that category. At that level, the Caribbean mission requires about 28 percent of the available force. Figure 1, below, summarizes the discussion.